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This thesis captures a history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) logistics 
fuel operation in Afghanistan and considers its lessons for the broader logistics 
community. The research focuses on a small group of individuals and how they came to 
supply over three million liters of fuel daily to Afghanistan with very little upfront 
investment from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations. The thesis 
describes how these individuals managed NATO fuel operations outside of traditional 
agencies like the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) and the worldwide U.S. Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy. In addition, this thesis examines NATO’s operation in 
Afghanistan as compared to similar historical examples of large-scale coalition fuel 
efforts over long lines of communication. These historical case studies assist in framing 
the context of NATO logisticians’ accomplishments and the level of risk they accepted in 
supplying fuel to the NATO-led ISAF mission. Finally, the NATO case study provides a 
model for coalition support in a time when nations are unwilling or unable to provide 
logistic support to their forces. 
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A. THE BEGINNING 
On 1 February 2006, personnel from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) published the first of three contract statements of work (SOW) for bids to 
commercial companies to meet the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fuel 
requirements at three key NATO aerial ports of debarkation (APOD): Herat Airfield, 
Kabul Afghanistan International Airport (KAIA), and Kandahar Airfield (KAF). As 
exemplified by the Herat SOW, they were straightforward and elegantly simple: 
The general requirement of this service is to meet the fuel, oil and 
lubricant needs of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces 
located in the Herat Area of Operation (AO), Afghanistan. The Herat AO 
encompasses the provinces of Hirat, Badghis, Ghor and Farah. In addition, 
ISAF requires an alternate supplier and alternate route of transit into the 
country than the current means through Pakistan. This will allow 
operational flexibility in case of supply or transport difficulties between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.1 
Whether by chance or foresight, this simple and elegant requirement initiated a series of 
highly flexible and responsive commercial agreements. Three basic ordering agreements 
(BOA) were written to provide commercial contracted fuel support to the NATO ISAF 
APODs where ISAF nations could not or would not provide fuel support. Together the 
BOAs are commonly known as the NATO fuel BOA or the BOA. 
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to capture the history of the NATO logistics 
operation to supply fuel to ISAF, to tell the story of the NATO fuel BOA, to understand 
the context of the NATO ISAF fuel case study as compared to similar historical examples 
of large-scale multinational fuel efforts, and to provide a model of logistic fuel support 
for future multinational and U.S. operations. Drawing on the history of multinational fuel 
 
1. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Statement of Work (SOW) for the Provision of 
Aviation & Ground Fuels for NATO ISAF Herat, Afghanistan,” February 1, 2006, 1. 
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operations from World War II (WWII) through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
assists in framing the NATO ISAF case study. 
The scope of the research focuses on a small group of individuals and how they 
supplied over three million liters of fuel daily to Afghanistan with very little upfront 
investment from ISAF nations. The thesis will describe what led NATO decision makers 
to implement such an innovative model as the BOA, and how these individuals managed 
NATO fuel operations in a manner different from traditional NATO or U.S. agencies. 
The decisions that were made by the NATO logisticians in supplying fuel to ISAF in a 
risky environment were practical and innovative, yet uncelebrated. Finally, the NATO 
ISAF fuel case study will serve as a model of success in multinational support operations 
that will benefit the entire logistics community, and may provide solutions to improve 
future U.S. fuel operations. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis will use historical analysis of large fuel logistics case studies in 
military operations in order to understand the context and scale of NATO ISAF fuel 
operations. With a solid historical frame, this thesis will compare and analyze defense 
contracting organizations and the various types of contracts that they normally develop in 
order to support military operations. This analysis will provide the background from 
which to identify and better appreciate the unique aspects of the NATO fuel BOA. 
Together, the two approaches will provide a deeper level of understanding of the supply 
chain management of large fuel operations and the risks associated with contracting out 
portions of the fuel supply chain. A history of multinational fuel support operations will 
add perspective to the current situation of NATO fuel operations. The thesis includes the 
following chapters. 
1. Chapter II: The NATO ISAF Fuel Team History 
The first portion of Chapter II describes NATO’s post-Cold War transformation 
that saw reduced NATO force structures and increased obligations to new missions. 
These changes had significant impact on NATO and national logistics communities. 
Chapter II also details NATO’s move to a new expeditionary posture as it took command 
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of ISAF in Afghanistan, and the efforts of senior NATO logisticians to support a new 
expeditionary force and meet Alliance transformation requirements. During this difficult 
period in NATO logistics history, a small team of logisticians implemented a unique 
solution to collective fuel support operations. The last portion of Chapter II describes 
their innovative product, the NATO fuel BOA, and the role of the NATO ISAF fuel team 
at Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC HQ) Brunssum in ISAF and Alliance 
logistics history. 
2. Chapter III: Big Logistics 
In order to frame the accomplishments of the NATO ISAF fuel team, Chapter III 
explains the evolution of multinational fuel support operations in modern history. The 
NATO ISAF fuel case study will be framed in the context of similar large-scale historical 
fuel operations. Three historical cases share much in common with the NATO ISAF fuel 
operation: World War II; U.S. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy worldwide 
operations; and U.S. DLA Energy Afghanistan operations. The operations were similar in 
size and scale, the lines of communication were lengthy and dangerous to navigate, and 
the organizations exercised varying levels of control over the fuel supply chain. 
Comparing these historical case studies and organizations will reveal key aspects for 
future application in operations, such as control of the fuel supply chain and analyzing 
the risk associated with contracting out various portions of that supply chain. The history 
of multinational fuel operations will provide the necessary background one will need to 
understand the environment in which the NATO ISAF fuel team operated, and their 
innovative approach to supporting ISAF operations. 
3. Chapter IV: Contract Fuel 
Because of the increasing reliance on contractors on the battlefield, Chapter IV 
examines the NATO ISAF fuel operation from a contracting perceptive. We compare the 
technical aspects of the NATO fuel BOAs to U.S. contracts. Unique organizational 
entities manage these agreements and contracts, and their customer’s requirements 
determine the nature by which such instruments are developed and executed. This 
comparative method reveals two distinct approaches to contracting fuel operations in 
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ISAF. The NATO fuel BOAs represent a type of single, integrated instrument where all 
costs are inclusive to the agreements, while the U.S. DLA Energy contracts illustrate a 
multilayered system of management and oversight for fuel support operations. Chapter 
IV also compares the NATO fuel BOA and DLA Energy contracts to another significant 
contracting model, the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). 
A better understanding of these agreements/contracts and the different approaches used 
by various ISAF organizations allows for a more thorough analysis of the risks associated 
with supply chain management and contracted logistics. 
4. Chapter V: Risk Analysis 
Chapter V conducts a risk assessment of the various instruments used by the 
organizations that supported multinational fuel operations. With NATO support to ISAF 
as a case study, we discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the NATO fuel BOA against 
other contract types. NATO decision makers weighed the advantages of various 
instruments against resources, constraints, and two specific types of risk, political and 
financial, when determining the optimal solution in providing fuel to ISAF. Chapter V 
highlights the impact of decisions made by top-level decision makers, as well as by the 
JFC HQ Brunssum fuel staff in light of these risks, and provides insight on their decisions 
from personal interviews with NATO ISAF fuel team members and documents related to 
decisions made by national leadership. Chapter V also discusses the factors that 
influenced the U.S. decision to provide unilateral fuel support, and then to later take 
advantage of the NATO fuel BOA. Finally, the chapter closes by identifying the core 
risks and benefits that the NATO fuel BOA and the U.S. DoD fuel operation in ISAF 
have created. 
5. Chapter VI: Conclusion 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the applicability of using the BOA for 
future multinational operations. The NATO ISAF fuel case study represents an example 
of how necessity in an extremely resource-constrained environment promoted innovative 
and effective solutions. As the number of nations that are able to support large-scale 
operations decline, solutions like the NATO fuel BOA represent a model for future 
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military logistic operations. The NATO fuel BOA has proven to be an innovative, 
flexible, and cost effective instrument to provide logistic fuel support during ISAF 
coalition operations, but can it suit the needs of future multinational campaigns? Is the 
BOA flexible enough to be exported to other theaters, or was it successful only within the 
unique operating environment of the Afghanistan? What can the U.S. DoD learn from its 
experience working with NATO and from its role in helping to create the BOA? As the 
U.S. and NATO transition out of Afghanistan in the coming years, it will be important to 
codify the lessons learned from NATO ISAF fuel support in order to keep this option 
available for consideration in future multinational operations. With this overview, this 
thesis begins by telling the background of NATO’s involvement in ISAF and the NATO 
ISAF fuel team history. Chapter II discusses the history of NATO’s logistics 
transformation in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, NATO’s involvement in ISAF, 
and the development of the NATO fuel BOA. 
 6 
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II. THE NATO ISAF FUEL TEAM HISTORY 
The rapidly changing geo-political landscape of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries forced important changes within NATO. From the Cold War through today’s 
involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), NATO leadership strived to 
implement doctrinal changes to improve the Alliance’s collective security posture, albeit 
with mixed results. Resource constraints hampered the ability of member nations to 
implement change or to take the lead in new NATO missions. Transformation appeared 
to exist only on paper. After NATO assumed command of ISAF, necessity forced a small 
logistics team to create the change needed to support member nations and ISAF overall. 
This chapter focuses on the history of NATO’s logistics transformation initiatives in the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries, NATO’s involvement in ISAF, and the development of 
an innovative logistics solution that would allow NATO to fulfill the collective fuel 
requirements of ISAF. 
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF NATO INVOLVEMENT IN ISAF 
At the December 2001 Bonn Conference, international leaders began the process 
of reconstructing Afghanistan. Conference members developed the concept of a United 
Nations (UN) mandated international force to protect the new Afghan government, the 
Afghan Transitional Authority. The Bonn Agreement established a partnership between 
the UN, the Afghan Transitional Authority, and ISAF.2 The agreement charged ISAF 
with providing a secure environment in and around Kabul and supporting Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction efforts. On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF 
operations and became responsible for the provisioning of forces and the command 
headquarters in Afghanistan.3 In October 2003, UN Security Council Resolution 1510 
 
2. International Conference on Afghanistan, Bonn, Germany 2001, “Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” 
December 5, 2001, accessed April 3, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html. 
3. Official ISAF History, accessed April 3, 2012, http://www.isaf.nato.int/ history.html. 
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formally extended ISAF’s initial mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan.4 NATO’s 
assumption of ISAF responsibilities came at a challenging time when the Alliance was 
still trying to overcome the difficult task of transforming its collective security following 
the Cold War. 
With the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) announced the 
end of hostilities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at the London Conference in July 
1990.5 The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a period of contradictions 
within the Alliance. NATO’s governing body, the NAC, began a strategic realignment 
that greatly reduced NATO command and force structures as the tightly managed NATO 
common budgets shrank.6 While making personnel, materiel and fiscal cuts, the NAC 
simultaneously expanded the role of NATO by committing to new regional partnerships 
and increased mission sets. With less command and force structure available, NATO 
became increasingly reliant on national and multinational force solutions that faced 
similar force and budgetary reductions.7 This trend continued and accelerated as NATO’s 
role in ISAF neared. 
NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia were an early example of 
counterproductive trends that plagued NATO’s logistics transformation. In 1995, NATO 
logistics staff had been reduced to the point where they were incapable of planning and 
managing multinational expeditionary logistics in the Balkans. NATO instead turned to 
U.S. logisticians who pulled together an ad hoc staff, later augmented by NATO 
 
4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, “The Situation in Afghanistan,” October 13, 
2003, accessed April 3, 2012, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/ 
N0355555.pdf?OpenElement. 
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance 
Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
July 6, 1990, accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm. 
6. Wing Commander UK Royal Air Force (ret.) David Orr (JFC Brunssum Operations Directorate Fuel 
Operations Officer) interviewed by Michael Evans, April 24, 2012, interview Orr.mp3, Evans Private Oral 
History Collection. 
7. Thomas-Durell Young, ed., Command in NATO After the Cold War: Alliance, National, and 
Multinational Considerations (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 1997): 1–2, 
accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pubs/display.cfm?pubid=148. 
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personnel, and built and executed NATO’s operational logistics plan.8 However, lack of 
support from U.S. and French senior military leadership undermined the U.S.-NATO 
collective logistics planning. As such, U.S. and French logistics remained separate from 
the NATO logistics.9 While NATO nominally commanded Balkan logistics operations, 
nations continued to operate independently, as they had during the Cold War. NATO 
leadership then decided that the shrinking supply of national resources might better serve 
the Alliance if they were pooled for the collective defense. 
Alliance leadership formally recognized that traditional ideas of collective 
defense needed to evolve in order to face the emerging global threats that challenged the 
Euro-Atlantic region. On 24 April 1999, NATO heads of state and government convened 
at the Washington Summit and approved a new strategic concept that addressed the 
global nature of threats facing the Euro-Atlantic region: 
Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, 
would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, 
Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance 
security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, 
including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the 
disruption of the flow of vital resources.10 
The 1999 Washington Summit instigated a discussion of political and military 
realignment within NATO that would culminate at the 2002 Prague Summit. 
The Prague Summit translated NATO’s new global strategic concept into tangible 
action by committing to additional member nations, new military capabilities, and new 
relationships with international partners. The Prague Declaration initiated a major 
transformation in which NATO further altered and reduced its command and force 
 
8. Major General (ret.) U.S. Army William N. Farmen, “Wanted: A NATO Logistics Headquarters,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998): 63–65, accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ 
jfq_pubs/1318.pdf. 
9. Major General (ret.) U.S. Army William N. Farmen, “Wanted: A NATO Logistics Headquarters,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998): 65, accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ 
jfq_pubs/1318.pdf. 
10. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of 
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 
NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999, accessed April 29, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ 
official_texts_27433.htm?mode=pressrelease. 
 10 
structures in order to create a streamlined and efficient deployable command and control 
organization and force structure. To provide a force capable of executing NATO’s new 
strategic concept, the NAC approved creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) with 
expectations that it would reach full operational capability no later than October 2006. 
The NRF would provide NATO with a fielded force that could move rapidly, as needed 
by the NAC, “to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment 
where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve 
their objectives.”11 The transformation to a leaner, expeditionary Alliance had significant 
implications on NATO logistics policy and posture. 
The Alliance’s dramatic transformations placed a heavy burden on NATO’s 
logistics community. Logistics had always been a critical enabler for effective NATO 
operations, but with NATO’s new expeditionary posture it became even more important. 
NATO of the 1990s faced shortages in personnel, materiel and national resources, as well 
as the possibility of expeditionary military operations far removed from the carefully 
planned military-industrial infrastructure built to support and sustain NATO forces within 
the Alliance’s boundaries. By the mid-1990s the Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference 
(SNLC), the senior-most body for NATO logistics, recognized these challenges and 
proffered the concept of cooperation and coordination between nations and NATO during 
planning and execution of logistics operations. The SNLC laid the foundation for a 
doctrine that would have NATO coordinate and prioritize logistics support for deployed 
NATO forces while nations would be responsible for provisioning their forces, either 
individually or collectively.12 
In October 2003, the SNLC’s work was formally accepted by the NATO member 
nations. With the approval of MC 319/2, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, 
NATO logistics doctrine transformed from the Cold War-era doctrine of individual 
 
11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, 
Press Release (2002)127, November 21, 2002, accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/ 
p02-127e.htm. 
12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Logistics Handbook, 2007, accessed May 1, 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/ logist97.htm, 3. 
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responsibility to one where NATO nations and authorities have a collective responsibility 
to support multinational operations. Under MC 319/2, NATO assumed responsibility for 
logistics operational planning and for developing a logistics command structure capable 
of supporting NATO operations.13 Doctrinally, MC 319/2 intended to hold NATO 
nations responsible for sufficiently supporting their forces by using either national or 
cooperative logistics structures. MC 319/2, however, was sound only in principle. In 
reality, the SNLC had created a paper dragon that failed to make tangible improvements 
in multinational logistics. Because MC 319/2 allowed nations to choose to continue using 
their national logistics structure, NATO’s logistics command and control often came into 
direct competition with national command and control systems. Command, even 
coordination, of multinational logistics required a willingness of nations to subordinate 
their forces to NATO. Although the NATO heads of state and government embraced 
collective logistics and supported its enabling role in the new expeditionary posture, 
issues of national sovereignty, policies and programs, competition for national forces, and 
reduced military budgets undermined NATO’s ability to establish a sufficient command 
and control mechanism for logistics. These same logistics challenges hindered the 
development of the NRF.14 
NATO leadership was under pressure to meet their stated goal of a fully mission 
capable NRF by October 2006. After four years of planning, training, and political 
rhetoric, and three years after accepting the ISAF mission, NATO leadership decided the 
NRF was prepared for its first full-scale test and conducted Exercise STEADFAST 
JAGUAR in 2006. At exercise end, NATO declared that the NRF had passed its last test 
and had reached full operational capability. Robert Bell, the former NATO Assistant 
Secretary General for Defence Investment, provided a heavy critique of this assessment 
in his summary of the exercise. Bell explained that NATO nations’ political 
commitments at Prague exceeded national ability to develop their expeditionary logistics 
 
13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, MC 319/2, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, 
October 24, 2003, accessed May 1, 2012, https://natoschool.org/system/files/NATO%20 
Principles%20and%20Policies%20for%20Logistics%20MC%20319-2.pdf, 1-7–1-8. 
14. Robert Bell, “Sisyphus and the NRF,” NATO Review (Autumn 2006), http://www.nato. 
int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/art4.html. 
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capabilities and the NRF was not fully mission capable. European nations had great 
difficulty filling NRF positions as NATO continued to expand its mission sets beyond 
just the NRF. Theater level logistics floundered because nations were either too small to 
field sufficient forces, or they decided to eschew theater-level logistics support in favor of 
using their own national logistics systems. As a result, the HQ Joint Logistics Support 
Group (JLSG) managed only a ghost support group. Bell characterized theater logistics, 
the JLSG, as an ad hoc mix of national logistics units that failed to provide the effective 
or efficient integrated logistics required by the NRF.15 
Transforming to the doctrine of collective responsibility for readiness and 
operations was slow-going and difficult to synergize among NATO leadership and 
member nations. NATO leadership’s wishful thinking was insufficient to bring tangible 
and effective improvement to the NRF or other collective expeditionary operations. As 
late as 2011, five years after the self-proclaimed success of STEADFAST JAGUAR, 
NATO had yet to solve the HQ JLSG and JLSG problems, and member nations had yet 
to embrace a collective NATO theater logistics command. Because of shortages in 
manpower, resources, national commitment, and cooperation the Alliance was finally 
forced to merge its HQ JLSGs units into the J4 elements of its two remaining operational 
headquarters, JFC HQ Brunssum and JFC HQ Naples. Even with this merger, NATO 
failed to address the manpower shortages of the HQ JLSG. The new structure reduced the 
Alliance to two HQ JLSG units and then dual-hatted the logistics positions with the J4 
positions. Personnel executed responsibilities within the JFC HQ J4 while at the same 
time forward deployed in a HQ JLSG. The new structure had not been tested in either 
exercises or real-world operations. The HQ JLSG plan failed to address the lack of 
national contributions to the NRF JSLG that was commanded by the HQ JLSG.16 
In addition, reluctance to communicate and share critical data between nations 
hampered the success of NATO logistics coordination, planning, and execution. 
 
15. Robert Bell, “Sisyphus and the NRF,” NATO Review (Autumn 2006), http://www.nato. 
int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/art4.html. 
16. Major U.S. Air Force Michael Evans, HQ Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) Statement of 
Manpower Requirements and Finalized Job Descriptions for Merged J4 and HQ JLSG Staff (Staff Paper 
Presented to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, April 2011). 
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Although some key Alliance members like the U.S. have legal limitations that restrict 
what data they can provide, other nations simply chose not to share their logistics data.17 
During the 2009 planning process for the NATO plus-up of forces in Afghanistan, 
nations provided limited movement-planning data that was, effectively, post-facto data. 
The command and control of NATO logistics through the Alliance J4 staff structures had 
little ability to impact change on these national plans. NATO logistics again commanded 
a ghost logistics enterprise. 
In the midst of their struggle to transform, the Alliance took command of ISAF in 
2003. NATO’s ISAF commitment was its first large-scale expeditionary operation at a 
time when effective NATO-led multinational logistics command structures and logistics 
units were immature at best. NRF was the jewel in the crown of NATOs new strategic 
vision for an expeditionary Alliance, but the NAC decided not to employ the NRF in 
ISAF. From the outset, NATO failed to implement its collective logistics doctrine in 
ISAF, and member nations resisted implementing the collective option of MC 319/2. 
NATO inherited an operation two years ongoing that consisted of independent regional 
areas managed by ISAF troop contributing nations (TCN) supported through independent 
national logistics operations. This Cold War-era logistics pattern was so well entrenched 
that 2009 end of tour reports bemoaned HQ ISAF CJ4’s non-existent theater support 
units and the lack of ability to command or even coordinate national logistics efforts.18 
The failure of NATO heads of state and government to reach consensus on how to use the 
NRF kept NRF logistics command structures and units from being implemented in 
NATO’s ISAF operations.19 
 
17. Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl, The NATO Response Force: Facilitating Coalition Warfare 
Through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing, (National Defense University Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, September 2005): viii–ix, accessed May 2, 2012, 
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2018%20NATO%20Response%20Force.pdf. 
18. Colonel U.S. Army Shelia J-McClaney, Lieutenant Colonel CAN Army Jenny M. Newton, and 
Major U.S. Army Douglas A. LeVien, “Innovative Insights into ISAF’s Logistical Operations in 
Afghanistan: The August 2008 to February 2009 Rotation,” (End of Tour Report for JFC HQ Brunssum J4 
Chief of ISAF Logistics, January 23, 2009), 2. 
19. Robert Bell, “Sisyphus and the NRF,” NATO Review (Autumn 2006), http://www.nato. 
int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/art4.html.; Colonel U.S. Army Edward M. Daly, “NATO Logistics 
Reform: Central to NATO Response Force (NRF) Success,” (U.S. Army War College Strategy Research 
Project. March 15, 2008): 11, accessed May 8, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? 
AD=ADA480122. 
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Problems with transformation and cooperation continued to plague NATO’s effort 
to establish and enforce collective multinational logistics, while resource and 
environmental constraints further reduced effective logistics support. As NATO assumed 
command of ISAF, major operations in Iraq drew away the political attention, forces, and 
logistics resources from many ISAF TCNs like the U.S. and the UK, and further 
complicated NATO’s ability to establish effective logistics command and control 
operations.20 Because of Afghanistan’s long, difficult lines of communication (LOC) and 
the immensity of ISAF’s area of operations, few nations were able to assume 
responsibility as the ISAF lead logistics nation or act as the role specialist nation for fuel 
support. In addition, NATO’s logistics command structures lacked the maturity needed to 
manage a developing logistics environment that was further complicated by multiple 
sovereign national systems unwilling to subordinate themselves to an Alliance logistics 
command structure. Instead, regional and individual national efforts provided fuel to 
ISAF forces with very little coordinated effort. 
The effort very much resembled NATO’s traditional Cold War-era logistics where 
each nation provided for its own. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), through DLA 
Energy and U.S. Army theater support commands, provided fuel to Regional Command 
(RC) East. Germany provided fuel support to their RC North operations at Mazar-E-
Sharif, and France contracted local fuel support for their operations in RC Capital. Even 
small TCNs, like the Dutch, provided their own fuel support at Tarin Kowt in RC South. 
In the first years of ISAF operations, NATO member nations individually supported three 
key air logistics hubs at Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul. Various political, economic, and 
operational concerns contributed to declining national support of these key logistics hubs. 
 
20. In 2002–2003, I was assigned to the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia Air Mobility Division under 
the Director of Mobility Forces for USCENTCOM and witnessed first had the U.S. shift of emphasis away 
from Afghanistan. Our unit struggled to provide effective logistic support to Afghanistan and the Horn of 
Africa as significant resources went to the staging of personnel and materiel in preparation for Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM, and then additional logistical resources were drawn off for the execution of the 
invasion of Iraq. M.J. Evans. 
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By 2005, NATO member nations withdrew their support and national assets, and left 
NATO to manage operations and assume financial responsibility for these airfields.21 
With approval from the NAC, NATO assumed responsibility for three key ISAF 
air hubs and designated them as NATO APODs under direct command of NATO through 
HQ ISAF and then later HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC). At the APODs, the NATO 
common budgets provided funds for fuel-related engineering and infrastructure projects 
based on the concept of minimum military requirement. NATO planners met the most 
basic infrastructure requirements for storage and distribution of fuel products through 
traditional contracting systems and national-provided materiel.22 At the end of 2005, the 
NATO APODs and the nations’ regional fuel programs represented the early ISAF fuel 
supply system. This early ISAF fuel system generated a stovepiped approach that lacked 
coherent theater-wide logistics command and control and failed to provide complete 
coverage for all ISAF areas of operation. However, this early ISAF fuel system would 
create an opportunity for NATO logisticians to apply the principles of collective logistics 
in a novel way. 
B. NATO ISAF FUEL TEAM–THE BASIC ORDERING AGREEMENTS 
At the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006, a unique type of NATO collective 
logistics emerged to support the NATO APODs and ISAF TCNs who fell outside of the 
national fuel logistics systems. The absence of effective national leadership or national 
logistics support units compelled NATO to assume the responsibility for satisfying fuel 
requirements at the APODs with limited financial support from the NATO common 
budgets. From ISAF’s operational command in Europe, Allied Joint Force Command 
Headquarters (JFC HQ) Brunssum, three basic ordering agreements (BOA) were written 
to provide commercial fuel support to the NATO ISAF APODs. Together, the BOAs are 
commonly known as the NATO fuel BOA or the BOA. 
 
21. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum fourth Fuel Chief executing 
the BOA), interview by Michael Evans, April 15, 2012, interview McMurry.mp3, Evans Private Oral 
History Collection. 
22. Colonel U.S. Air Force Jonathan Webb (JFC HQ Brunssum Engineer for Kabul Afghanistan 
International Airport), interview by Michael Evans May 13, 2012, interview Webb.mp3, Evans Private 
Oral History Collection. 
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The NATO fuel BOA was a unique solution that allowed NATO to provide fuel 
support to ISAF nations, who could not or would not provide fuel support to their own 
forces, without financial backing from the NATO common budgets.23 The BOA was not 
a contract. Instead, it was a series of agreements for commercial fuel support that were 
awarded under NATO acquisition and contracting rules to businesses from NATO 
member nations. The BOA was based solely on sales, and represented an agreement with 
no upfront costs and no requirement for NATO member nations or ISAF partner nations 
to capitalize the agreements or pay a startup fee, or “buy in,” in order to initiate 
commercial fuel support operations. Contractors provided fuel and the required logistics 
infrastructure to participating ISAF nations and NATO command operations through the 
proceeds gained from the sale of fuel. NATO set a price per liter (PPL) with each 
contractor, and then leveled the PPL to provide a single price per fuel commodity type 
across the whole of ISAF operations. The NATO ISAF fuel team periodically adjusted 
the PPL based on international market fluctuations in order to meet changes to the ISAF 
commander’s fuel and service requirements. They adjusted the PPL for set time periods 
according to anticipated recovery costs associated with a contract modification such as 
new facilities, new service requirements, additional commercial strategic reserves, etc. 
Because NATO owned and managed the fuel BOA, they acted as a type of 
middleman between ISAF nations and the BOA contractors. NATO purchasing and 
contracting structured the BOA in this way so ISAF nations would not assume liability in 
the instruments. At any time, a nation could choose whether or not to use the BOA’s fuel 
services. These nations only paid for fuel when contractors rendered services or delivered 
fuel to agreed locations. ISAF nations assumed no unaccounted costs and paid for all 
logistics services through the PPL. Any additional costs to nations were solely at its 
preference. BOA contractors proved willing and capable in numerous cases by providing 
complete logistics service, such as strategic fuel acquisition, management and operations 
of national fuel infrastructure, local fuel storage systems, internal distribution systems, 
and delivery to end user (aircraft, generator, vehicle, forward operating base, etc.). 
 
23. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army (ret.) Brian McMurry (JFC HQ Brunssum second Fuel Chief 
executing the BOA), interview by Michael Evans, April 18, 2012, interview McMurry.mp3, Evans Private 
Oral History Collection. 
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Through the PPL, the BOA supported full spectrum fuel operations and provided 
strategic bulk fuel delivery, strategic bulk theater fuel reserves, and internal theater 
distribution. Full spectrum fuel operations included managing NATO APODs, and 
providing manning and equipment to support fuel receipt, storage, quality control, 
delivery to end user, and accounting. The contractors directly invoiced the customer for 
all fuel sales, with NATO acting as a monitor and as a mediator in cases of dispute. 
The command structure that managed the BOA was simple, and adeptly 
responsive to the ISAF Commander’s and national requirements. Participating ISAF 
nations forecasted fuel and infrastructure requirements through HQ ISAF CJ4, later 
through HQ IJC CJ4 in Kabul, to the JFC HQ Brunssum Logistics Resources Branch 
Fuels Office. The JFC HQ Brunssum Fuel Office, in coordination with their Purchasing 
and Contracting Office, validated and executed the requirements. The NATO ISAF fuel 
team accomplished this at JFC HQ Brunssum with three fuels staff officers, two 
purchasing and contracting officers, a liaison from the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) Energy, and a representative from one of its contractors, the Supreme Group. 
Within Afghanistan, two NATO staff officers and one staff noncommissioned officer 
managed theater operations with assistance from a contract representative and contractor 
liaisons in each regional command. The U.S. provided an additional liaison officer to HQ 
ISAF from DLA Energy’s Joint Petroleum Office in U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM).24 Together the NATO ISAF fuel team effectively incorporated the vast 
majority of the ISAF fuel system into one coordinated body under direct command of the 
dual hatted ISAF/U.S. Forces Afghanistan Commander (COMISAF). By implementing 
liaison positions, COMISAF leveraged his position as Commander of U.S. Forces in 
Afghanistan and effectively instituted the MC 319/2 ideals of collective logistics 
operations. Figure 1 depicts this NATO ISAF fuel command structure. 
 
24. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge (DLA Energy Representative to JFC 
HQ Brunssum), interview by Michael Evans, April 12, 2012, interview Santiago.mp3, Evans Private Oral 
History Collection. NOTE: Mr. Gulledge was interviewed jointly with LTC Santiago. 
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Figure 1.  NATO ISAF Fuel Management Structure as of May 15, 2012.25 
The NATO fuel BOA area of operation includes, but is not limited to: RC West, 
RC South, RC Southwest, RC Capital (excluding Bagram Air Base), and selected 
locations in RC North. With the 2006 U.S. drawdown of forces in RC South, the NATO 
ISAF fuel team expanded the BOA’s scope to replace existing U.S. fuel supply systems 
and infrastructure. When the U.S. returned to RC South in 2009-2010, USCENTCOM 
and DLA Energy chose to use the NATO fuel BOA instead of re-establishing a national 
system.26 By the summer of 2010, the BOA represented half of all fuel support to ISAF, 
providing more than three million liters of fuel daily to TCNs in Afghanistan. For certain 
fuel commodity types, the NATO fuel BOA satisfied the complete requirement. The 
 
25. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
26. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army (ret.) Brian McMurry (JFC HQ Brunssum second Fuel Chief 
executing the BOA), interview by Michael Evans, April 18, 2012, interview McMurry.mp3, Evans Private 
Oral History Collection. 
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BOA allowed NATO to act as a role specialist nation on par with DLA Energy within 
Afghanistan.27 Over time, the NATO ISAF fuel team expanded the BOA to meet 
emerging COMISAF and TCN requirements. For the first time NATO, as its own entity, 
had become a significant and tangible contributor to the NATO collective logistics 
system. Figures 2 through 4 provide an overview of the regional areas of operation of the 
lead fuel suppliers for F-34 (jet fuel) and F-54 (diesel fuel). Figure 2 depicts ISAF areas 
of responsibility and regional command daily fuel requirements. Figure 3 depicts the 
strategic fuel reserve facilities of NATO and national suppliers. Figure 4 depicts the 
tactical delivery responsibilities of NATO and national suppliers. 
 
Figure 2.  ISAF Regional Command Areas of Responsibility and Daily Fuel 
Requirements as of May 15, 2012.28 
 
27. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication 4.9 – Modes of Multinational 
Logistics, November 2005, 3–1. 
28. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 








Figure 3.  ISAF Strategic Fuel Reserve by National Supplier as of May 15, 2012.29 
 
29. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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Figure 4.  ISAF Tactical Delivery Regional Responsibility by National Supplier as of 
May 15, 2012.30 
C. CONCLUSION 
For the NATO logistics community, the post-Cold War era was marked by 
triumphs in forging new doctrine but failures in executing that doctrine in real-world 
operations. In 2005, a unique opportunity arose within ISAF. Because of Afghanistan’s 
difficult LOCs and competing military operations, key nations were incapable or 
unwilling to take the lead for ISAF fuel. These circumstances compelled NATO to 
become a role specialist nation for fuel. Through the BOAs, the NATO ISAF fuel team 
filled a shortfall in national logistics requirements. The pay-as-you-go concept of the 
BOA allowed multiple nations to integrate into NATO ISAF fuel logistics without 
 
30. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
 22 
causing political concern over sovereignty or command and control. Because the BOAs 
did not use the NATO common budgets, it did not raise any national political concerns 
over financing ISAF fuel operations. The BOA, in combination with DLA Energy, 
provided COMISAF with direct command and control over the majority of ISAF fuel 
logistics. Chapter III will describe in greater detail ISAF’s command and control of 
multinational fuel logistics, which has not been seen on such a grand scale since WWII. 
This historical comparison will also explain how consolidating command and control of 
logistics under a supreme commander shaped the political environment and enabled 
effective fuel operations. 
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III. BIG LOGISTICS 
This chapter explains the development of the NATO fuel BOA through a 
historical focus on the evolution of multinational and U.S. fuel support operations. It 
begins with a description of WWII fuel supply operations as a backdrop to today’s war in 
Afghanistan. It continues with a discussion of the varied strategic-level approaches of the 
U.S. and UK toward government control of the supply chain for the national fuel supply, 
and how the two governments worked together to meet the fuel requirements of the 
Allies. With the lessons from WWII in mind, this chapter describes the evolution of U.S. 
strategic fuel support and the creation of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and DLA 
Energy. As the largest Allied nation capable of supporting NATO and its nations with 
fuel logistics, the U.S. has greatly influenced NATO operations, with OEF serving as an 
important contemporary example. The final section of this chapter will describe the 
groundbreaking impact that the NATO fuel BOA had on enabling operations in OEF. As 
compared to historical NATO and U.S. fuel operations, the innovative NATO fuel BOA 
was a significant, and effective, departure from traditional operations. 
A. CONTROL AND ALLOCATION 
In 1944, after the break-out from Normandy, General Patton commanded the U.S. 
Third Army as it neared Metz, France while Field Marshal Montgomery advanced north 
toward the Low Countries with the Twenty First Army Group supported by the U.S. First 
Army. Allied logistics had sufficient quantities of fuel for each thrust, but lacked the 
capability to simultaneously deliver that fuel to both advancing fronts. Patton’s diary 
provides a glimpse into one of the classic examples of decision-making in multinational 
operations. On August 30, 1944, Patton wrote: 
Bradley, Bull (Ike’s G-3) and Leven Allen were all talking when I arrived. 
I asked to present my case for an immediate advance to the east and a 
rupture of the Siegfried Line before it can be manned. Bradley was 
sympathetic but Bull—and I gather the rest of Ike’s staff—do not concur 
and are letting Montgomery overpersuade Ike to go north. It is a terrible 
mistake, and when it comes out in the after years, it will cause much 
argument. 
 24 
The British have put it over again. We got no gas because, to suit Monty, 
the First Army must get most of it…31 
Much like the war in Afghanistan, fuel supply and distribution posed a considerable 
challenge to the Allied commander in WWII. Patton’s account of U.S. General Dwight 
D. “Ike” Eisenhower’s decision highlights one commonality between the two conflicts 
that share so many with regard to multinational logistics and fuel supply operations. In 
order to showcase the innovativeness and flexibility of the NATO fuel BOA, it is useful 
to compare and contrast NATO ISAF fuel support operations against Allied operations 
during WWII. It was the commonalities, as well as differences, between these conflicts 
that enabled the development and success of the NATO fuel BOA. 
The two conflicts are comparable because both were characterized by an 
expeditionary Euro-Atlantic partnership, the Allied commander’s ability to execute 
logistics, and the scale in which daily fuel was required and handled in combat across 
difficult lines of communication (LOC). In fact, NATO’s system of multinational 
logistics actually developed from this WWII setting and is typified by multinational 
commands with fielded sovereign national units that are heavily reliant on petroleum 
products. The development of NATO expeditionary fuel logistics was wholly dependent 
on those sovereign national units. Like the Allied nations of WWII, when given a choice 
whether to exercise sovereign or collective logistics support options, NATO nations have 
historically chosen the former, leaving the Alliance without a lead nation at the helm. 
Consolidating authority under one supreme commander gave the Alliance the leadership 
required to make influential decisions that benefit all member nations. 
General Eisenhower was regarded as having an extraordinary ability to command, 
and was entrusted with the authority to properly allocate logistics resources among the 
Allies. The ISAF Commander, in his role as both the U.S. and NATO commander in 
Afghanistan, most closely parallels this WWII model of multinational command. Because 
of doctrinal supreme authority, the ISAF Commander was able to decide on the best 
course of action for all member nations in multinational operations. With no single role 
 
31. George S. Patton, The Patton Papers: 1940–1945, ed. Martin Blumenson (Bridgewater: Replica 
Books, 1999), 531. 
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specialist nation in charge of NATO ISAF fuel logistics, the ISAF commander was 
empowered with an unprecedented control over multinational fuel logistics. Supported by 
JFC HQ Brunssum and the U.S. fuels community, his staff developed a flexible fuel 
support program that did not bind participating nations into long-term fuel contracts. This 
allowed willing Allied nations who relied heavily on fuel to sustain operations to 
participate in ISAF where they could not have done so independently. It was this degree 
of supreme authority to command and control multinational fuel logistics operations that 
led to and enabled the success of NATO ISAF fuel operations. 
At the height of WWII in the European theater of operations, massive logistics 
bureaucracies supported the Allied western front as its forces crossed the continent into 
Germany. The U.S. logistics system alone supported 72 U.S./French divisions that 
consisted of more than 5.1 million personnel, including prisoners of war and displaced 
peoples. In the final offensive of the European theater, U.S. logisticians provisioned 
60 multinational divisions with 13 million liters of fuel daily.32 Due to the development 
of and dependency on bigger, more lethal technology, even more fuel is required to 
support today’s forces. In contrast to the huge WWII logistics bureaucracies, an 
extremely small staff of ISAF logisticians sustained 130,000 personnel from 50 nations 
with six million liters of fuel daily.33 Although the war machine and the staff available to 
sustain it are smaller, a greater fuel requirement exists today than in WWII. In fact, the 
ISAF war effort required 46 liters of fuel per man per day, as compared with WWII, 
which required 2.5 liters of fuel per man per day. The NATO fuel BOA was the ideal 
vehicle that enabled a smaller staff to provide massive amounts of fuel to multinational 
forces by entrusting a greater degree of control to contractors instead of fielded military 
support forces. 
Although the logistics commands in these conflicts were very similar, the 
structures supporting WWII and ISAF operations were vastly different in the control each 
maintained over the fuel supply chain. The governments that organized, trained and 
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equipped (and fueled) their enormous war machines of WWII also exercised a greater 
degree of control of the fuel supply chain. The U.S. and UK controlled nearly the entire 
fuel supply chain, from the source of the raw product, to refinement, to transportation and 
distribution to tactical Allied forces (“the customer”). In contrast, NATO ISAF fuel 
operations relinquished a greater degree of control to the contractor. These contractors, in 
many cases, owned and delivered fuel from the refinery directly into a nation’s weapon 
system, and even provided its own security to convoys and storage sites. ISAF departed 
from traditional U.S. fuel support operations by empowering their contractors. Yet, even 
U.S. DLA Energy has let contracts to deliver fuel to customers at remote forward 
operating bases (FOBs). By entrusting fuel operations to contractors, the U.S. and ISAF 
reduced military support personnel and fielded more combat forces on the battlefield. 
B. U.S. AND UK FUEL SUPPORT IN WORLD WAR II 
In the late 1930s, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt struggled to rebuild the 
American economy through federal coordination of U.S. industrial production, including 
petroleum. At the same time, Europe and Asia were spiraling into violence in WWII. On 
September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland using Blitzkrieg tactics that allowed them to 
advance more than forty miles a day. The German technological advantage that enabled it 
to conquer Poland also required massive amounts of fuel, and thus firmly established 
petroleum as the key to modern military operations. This forced world leaders to bolster 
national strategies to protect and increase their supplies while reducing their adversaries’ 
access to petroleum supplies. By 1939, these grand strategies restricted the Allied 
petroleum sources to the Middle East and the Americas, and stretched supply LOCs 
across several thousand miles of hostile territory.34 Allied nations eventually overcame 
these difficulties to meet the needs of the European theater of operations, but their 
successes in managing the petroleum supply chain revealed the extreme difficulty that 
multinational military operations faced in coordinating the wartime efforts of sovereign 
nations. 
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1. Fuel Supply Management at the National Level 
The UK developed its WWII wartime petroleum administration and policy with 
an understanding that military operations must be supported by tight control over its 
national economy. Although the UK had access to worldwide stocks of petroleum, it had 
very few naturally occurring petroleum deposits within its national borders. Pre-war 
British oil policy had attempted to isolate their colonial oil fields and gain control over 
foreign oil as a means of security, but by 1939 British-friendly Middle Eastern states 
represented only five percent of the world oil production.35 British foreign policy also 
focused on securing concessions from friendly governments to ensure access to 
petroleum for its armed forces. Both policies created a heavy dependence on international 
companies and foreign oil that were contingent on maintaining friendly relationships with 
international actors.36 But as WWII neared, the British focused on centralized petroleum 
management of government agencies, its civil sector, and British controlled companies. 
In January 1939, the UK established the Petroleum Department as the executive 
agency in charge of supply, rationing, and distribution of all petroleum products. The 
Petroleum Department executed policy and operations through the Oil Board. In addition, 
the Oil Board determined petroleum transportation priorities. The British government’s 
last pre-war administrative development was the Bunker Control Committee, which 
established control over worldwide national reserves, and allowed it to place diplomatic 
pressure on foreign nations by withholding fuel from their ships if they were harmful to 
UK efforts. The committee also helped to control reserve stock usage in order to ensure 
efficient use of the tanker resupply operations.37 
The British government’s centralized petroleum organization was coupled with a 
similar organization from the commercial industry to support wartime operations. Shell, 
Standard Oil, and Anglo-Iranian were integrated companies that managed eighty-five 
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percent of the British petroleum industry, and which effectively controlled the majority of 
the British petroleum sources, refining capability, and transportation systems. After the 
September 1938 Munich Crisis had increased tensions in Europe, these industry leaders 
came together with other petroleum companies to create a combined distributing agency 
called the Petroleum Board. In the event of war, the members agreed to put aside such 
concerns as industry competition and brand names, and focus production on the grades of 
fuel required for the war effort. All member assets, facilities and transport were pooled 
under central management of the board, where each company received an allocation of 
business based on the proportion of the industry they managed in the year prior to the 
outbreak of war. In March 1939, the British government accepted the group’s proposal, 
appointed its representative as chairman, and placed the Petroleum Board 
administratively under the Petroleum Department.38 The Petroleum Board became the 
key executer of policy. Their companies provided the tangible results of refining and 
transporting petroleum products to Great Britain. 
Shortly after Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, Prime Minister 
Chamberlain established the Oil Control Board as a War Cabinet Sub-Committee. The 
board stood at the highest level of petroleum control within the British government, and 
was comprised of representatives from all the departments, military services, and industry 
who had any action with or requirement for petroleum. The Prime Minister charged the 
board with ensuring supply of petroleum to the nation’s forces and civil sectors, and gave 
the board final arbitration authority in competing interests. The board established a 
positive and open relationship among the government departments, commercial industry, 
and the military services that allowed a free flow of information on stock levels, resupply 
requirements, and production projections.39 
Although Britain was heavily dependent on foreign oil, it maintained centralized 
governmental control of its commercial oil companies to ensure consistent, uninterrupted 
supply to its war machine. In contrast, the United States held large oil resources and had a 
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robust, independent American oil industry. As world hostilities grew, President Roosevelt 
declared an unlimited national emergency on May 27, 1941. On May 28 he followed with 
a letter creating the Office of Petroleum Coordinator of National Defense, headed by the 
U.S. Secretary of Interior.40 On December 2, 1942, the president issued Executive Order 
9276, which transformed the Office of Petroleum Coordinator into the Petroleum 
Administration for War (PAW).41 Although it possessed a robust oil industry and large 
natural petroleum deposits, the U.S. established the PAW to coordinate civil and 
government actions in order to provide adequate supplies of petroleum for the U.S. war 
effort. 
The President charged the PAW with developing policy, plans, and programs for 
the effective development and utilization of U.S. petroleum. The PAW also provided the 
key link between the U.S. oil industry and the various agencies of the Federal 
Government. To this end, the PAW established the overall U.S. petroleum requirements 
and the necessary resources the oil industry required to meet U.S. needs. The PAW 
provided its recommendations on allocation of petroleum products and resources to the 
War Production Board for ultimate approval. In addition, the PAW worked closely with 
the War Shipping Administration to transport fuel, and with the Office of Defense 
Transportation to execute pipeline projects.42 Although it had the status of an 
independent agency, the PAW still worked under the authority of the War Production 
Board. The War Production Board was the senior executive body for management of U.S. 
national resources for the war effort. Together, the PAW and War Production Board 
provided executive management, but the PAW mobilized the American oil industry by 
partnering with the industry leaders. 
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Both the British and the U.S. approached WWII fearing that their petroleum 
industries could not meet the needs of national mobilization and so established a system 
of tight governmental controls to manage production and allocation. These government 
controls existed at the senior-most levels, while the petroleum industry continued to be 
manned and operated by civilians. The governments did set oil prices and executed 
civilian rationing programs, but the oil companies still had to produce and deliver a 
finished product for the war effort. The 1946 official history of the U.S. PAW concluded 
that the “most significant and distinguishing aspect of the Government-Industry 
partnership is perhaps the most difficult to define. For it is an expression of spirit.”43 In 
both countries, oil companies met urgent requirements with extensive expansion or 
retooling of their facilities, and they built massive transnational and undersea pipeline 
distribution systems. These companies frequently changed product yields to meet 
government requirements, and suppressed competition to cooperatively overcome 
technology challenges and meet wartime production requirements.44 Most significant, 
ship crews continued sailing their tankers to Europe in the face of dangerous seas and 
heavy losses to German submarine warfare.45 Tables 1 and 2 provide conservative 
estimates of British and U.S. merchant losses during WWII. 
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Table 1.   Comparison of U.S. Merchant Marine Losses to the U.S. Services Losses in 
WWII.46 
 
Table 2.   Casualties Sustained by Personnel of British Merchant Ships 1939–1945.47 
Although the companies time and again proved their “spirit” and were capable 
and willing to meet the challenges of wartime production, they did so because they were 
assured fair financial reimbursement for their product and excess wartime expenses from 
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their customers.48 The shipping companies provided the vital link between the oil 
producers and the Allied customers prosecuting the war. In the United States, President 
Roosevelt went so far as to nationalize the shipping industry using the powers granted 
him through the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. To coordinate this massive transportation 
effort President Roosevelt established the War Shipping Administration in order to 
organize, operate, man, and maintain the civilian portion of the wartime shipping 
operation. While shipping companies turned control over to the United States, the War 
Shipping Administration utilized expertise of these companies whose agents continued to 
oversee daily seagoing and shoreside operations. The U.S. government paid daily, fixed 
rates for the companies to operate their ships in addition to compensation for the use of 
each ship. Most important, the War Shipping Administration made nationalization 
financially feasible by providing the war-risk insurance for each ship, its cargo, and its 
crew. The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy maintained similar but separate fleets, providing 
comparable war-risk insurance for their merchant carriers. 
By assuming all war-risk, the U.S. government built a partnership with the 
shipping industry drawing on their expertise and willingness to sail into danger.49 A 
partnership in which Robert Browning wrote of this “spirit” that the PAW had tried to 
describe: 
Historians have often overlooked the sealift capacity of this fleet. During 
the war, 203,552,000 tons of dry cargo, 64,730,000 tons of petroleum 
products, 1,000,00 vehicles, 24,000 aircraft, and over 7,000,000 troops 
and civilians were carried by American ships. The ability to move 
personnel and this amount of material over such long distances is 
staggering. It is also completely beyond today’s capability. To put this 
operation in perspective, American ships delivered 8,000 tons of cargo 
every hour of every day and every night during the entire war. This 
tremendous logistical effectiveness established the Allies’ merchant 
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marine as perhaps the most important strategic factor leading to the defeat 
of the Axis powers during the war.50 
This unique partnership between industry and government allowed the industry to stay 
solvent while at the same time meeting the wartime needs of the Allied nations. 
The Allied governments established agencies like the Petroleum Board and the 
PAW to gather, prioritize, and plan national petroleum requirements; however, lack of an 
awareness of military requirements in the United States hampered government-industry 
partnerships. For security reasons, the U.S. military refused to provide the PAW with 
information on oil tanker operations and theater petroleum consumption rates. In 
addition, military representatives appointed to the War Production Board each fought to 
meet their own service’s fuel requirements instead of providing a single, prioritized 
military effort.51 This affected the PAW’s ability to efficiently allocate limited 
transportation assets, manage refining and bulk fuel facility levels, and generally 
coordinate Allied fuel support. In addition to the normal emergencies that arise in war, 
mismanagement accounted for many short-notice requirements. This created artificial 
transport shortages and imposed last-minute product yield changes on the oil industry. 
Not until the summer of 1943 did the U.S. Army-Navy Petroleum Board and the PAW 
begin to work closely to establish clear military petroleum requirements by theater of 
operation so that short term and long term world-wide petroleum programs could be 
developed for the U.S. and the Allied nations.52 
2. Allied Fuel Supply Management 
Both the British and U.S. governments established independent, tightly organized 
petroleum coordination bodies; however, the Allies established no overall agency or body 
to manage a combined war effort. Instead, the Allies coordinated petroleum requirements 
through diplomatic channels and a series of liaison relationships. At the operational 
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theater level, the Allies chose a more pragmatic course. The Allied military leaders 
divided the operational theaters and established a support system where specific Allied 
nations would provide petroleum support to their agreed areas. Although national 
administration arrangements and operational division of labor agreements provided the 
necessary politically independent support system, the complete petroleum supply chain 
would only coalesce in the European theater of operation under a single Allied 
commander. 
Prior to its official entry into WWII, the U.S. developed policy to support the 
Allies but not to go to war. By 1941, President Roosevelt initiated a national mobilization 
and rearmament program that provided the anticipated support for both U.S. national 
requirements and British wartime needs.53 However, even this proved to be inadequate, 
as the Axis forces decimated the British petroleum tanker fleet. In April 1941, the British 
government asked for assistance and President Roosevelt secured the support of U.S. ship 
owners to release fifty tankers in support of the British crisis.54 In this first Anglo-
American petroleum operation, U.S. ship owners voluntarily coordinated a supply shuttle 
from the Caribbean and U.S. Gulf States to the United States and Canadian east coast. 
There, the U.S. ships transferred their loads to British-flagged tankers for final delivery 
across the Atlantic. Although the petroleum products were handled multiple times, the 
shuttle system shortened British sailing time by 15 days and satisfied the U.S. legal 
restrictions that forbade U.S.-flagged trans-Atlantic movement. This first operation would 
spur President Roosevelt to establish what would become the PAW.55 In addition, the 
shuttle operation set the tone for the relationship of British-U.S. Allied petroleum 
operations throughout the remainder of WWII. 
Although they were cooperative, the Allies were also wary of each other, and 
resisted establishing a single Allied petroleum body. In an earlier 1940 attempt at Allied 
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cooperation in the European theater, the French and British established the Anglo-French 
Oil and Shipping Executive to coordinate a combined petroleum effort. This executive 
body had complete authority over its responsibilities, but the British held the majority of 
assets and the dominant position in the partnership. Suspicions on both sides about equity 
of burden sharing further complicated the relationship; however, the German invasion 
and occupation of France terminated the Anglo-French Executives before the body could 
mature.56 
In their next partnership with the United States, the British role was reversed. The 
British feared the eventual development of Allied petroleum policy would be dominated 
by the larger resource holder, the United States. Instead of creating an integrated 
organization, the British pushed for and established an informal Anglo-American 
petroleum and transport program in which each nation maintained its sovereignty.57 The 
Allies established liaison positions between the U.S. PAW and the British Oil Control 
Board committees. These exchanges resembled diplomatic missions or embassy attaché 
organizations. This provided the necessary coordination and information flow without 
establishing a single executive body, and would remain in place throughout the war and 
carry into future Allied relationships.58 
As high-level political machinations dominated the Allied petroleum effort, the 
Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff developed more practical courses in regional and theater 
support. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States officially entered WWII and 
began open petroleum planning and operations with its allies. To maximize effort in 
meeting civil petroleum demands, the United States took responsibility for supplying 
petroleum to the western hemisphere while the British supported the eastern hemisphere, 
the commonwealth countries (except those supported by the United States in the west) 
and the Middle East. As the war waged on, military theater support operations developed 
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in a similar manner. The U.S. military managed petroleum for the Allied forces in the 
Pacific and North African Theaters, while the British military was responsible for the 
European Theater. Joint Anglo-American supply operations were coordinated in 
Australia and New Zealand.59 In October of 1944, the European theater was split into two 
zones in which the UK maintained supply responsibility for forces in Britain and the 
United States managed the European Continent. Because of the vast infrastructure in 
Britain and the lack of sufficient facilities on the Continent, large quantities of petroleum 
stocks were transloaded through Britain for onward movement to Allied forces on the 
Continent.60 Unlike the divided national and regional petroleum operations, the European 
theater had a uniquely unified control over a multinational supply chain under a single 
Allied commander with supporting logistics staff. 
By direction of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower 
assumed command of the European Theater of Operations and Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). With his appointment, General Eisenhower 
inherited express powers to command all Allied logistics on the Continent.61 SHAEF 
acted as the conduit between the national and regional level supply chain systems and the 
operational theater logistics system. The SHAEF G4 logistics staff consolidated theater 
requirements for sourcing by the higher-level systems. Once the national systems 
delivered fuel to England and later to Europe directly, Allied military logistics functions 
assumed all petroleum operations. 
On the Continent, Eisenhower and the SHAEF logistics staff managed 
multinational petroleum operations by three main LOCs. Figure 5 depicts the major 
pipeline systems SHAEF logistics staff developed, and represents the paths that the three 
LOCs traversed. The LOCs enabled transportation of fuel to the operational areas 
managed by the different Allies. The SHAEF staff also divided the theater level fuel 
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supply chain into management areas. Figures 6 and 7 show the development of the 
regional supply areas between November 1944 and April 1945. The British area to the 
north provided fuel support to national and Allied forces operating within their zone, 
while the United States had responsibility for the southern zones. The LOCs mirrored 
these operational areas. Two of the routes came in from the western shores of Europe and 
the third developed from the Mediterranean with the entry of Allied forces from the 
south. SHAEF established extensive pipeline and truck route systems along these LOCs 
to move fuel forward as the Allied forces advanced east toward Germany. The SHAEF 
G4 section allocated theater petroleum based on the ability of LOCs to receive and 
transport supplies and based on the operational mission requirements.62 By September 
1944, the capacity of the LOCs had reached their limits. 
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Figure 5.  The WWII Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL) Pipeline Systems provides 
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Figure 6.  The Communication Zone map shows how SHAEF G4 logistics staff 
initially divided the European theater of operations between national areas 
of responsibility and the internal divisions of the nations.64 
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Figure 7.  The April 1945 Communication Zone map depicts the final division of the 
European theater supply areas.65 
Limited transportation resources and infrastructure forced General Eisenhower to 
prioritize fuel allocation to Allied forces. Limited transportation hindered the Allied 
ability to clear the ports and move supplies of petroleum up the LOCs quickly enough to 
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match the pace of Allied operations.66 General Eisenhower opted to supply the single 
northern thrust of Field Marshal Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group and limited 
supply to General Bradley’s U.S. 12th Army Group.67 Regardless of his decision, 
however, the most significant factor was that SHAEF had the ability and authority to 
make such a decision. Because the Allied Combined Chiefs’ of Staff provided General 
Eisenhower with proper logistical authorities, he was able to make such widely impacting 
decisions and effectively command a multinational force. General Eisenhower and the 
SHAEF staff had the ability to control multinational resources and the authority to 
command multinational forces to execute logistics in a wartime theater of operation. 
During WWII, the United States and UK found it necessary to centralize their 
national fuel administrations in order to ensure adequate fuel supply to their forces and to 
continue the war effort. As the lead Allied nations, they were apprehensive of developing 
a single Allied petroleum office. This apprehension has remained a common theme with 
the creation of NATO. The divisive nature of Allied petroleum operations continued into 
NATO and fostered the development of independent national programs, none of which 
have been more important than or as large as the U.S. fuel operation. As the U.S. has 
served as lead nation in subsequent expeditionary multinational campaigns, the U.S. 
national fuel program has been the linchpin of NATO since its inception. With such an 
important role in the development of NATO, it is important to look more closely at U.S. 
fuel doctrine and fuel support operations in Afghanistan. This perspective will provide a 
better appreciation of the NATO fuel BOA as a creative departure from historical 
multinational procedures and from contemporary U.S. doctrine. 
C. POST WWII U.S. DEFENSE FUEL SUPPORT 
After WWII, the United States emerged as the single largest supplier of fuel to the 
Allied nations that would eventually form NATO. Among the lessons that the United 
States learned from WWII was that, in order to exercise effective fuel support to the 
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national defense, it was necessary to centralize fuel procurement for the entire defense 
industry. The Army-Navy Petroleum board was aligned under the U.S. Chiefs’ of Staff 
and had the primary mission of meeting fuel requirements of U.S. forces during WWII. 
In 1945, the organization was renamed the Joint Army-Navy Purchasing Agency and 
realigned under the U.S. War Department. Providing fuel to U.S. forces has remained a 
responsibility of the U.S. DoD, but the organization charged with that responsibility has 
evolved. In the early 1960s, the fuel supply organization that would someday become the 
Defense Logistics Agency-Energy became part of the larger logistics organization known 
as the Defense Logistics Agency.68 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is an agency of the U.S. DoD and is under 
the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. DLA is the primary provider of supplies and logistics to the DoD, and supplies 
the U.S. armed forces with nearly all of its consumable items required in peace and war, 
such as food, supplies, equipment and fuel.69 As such, DLA is the DoD’s executive agent 
and integrated material manager for bulk petroleum, although it delegates those 
responsibilities to DLA Energy.70 DLA Energy is a primary-level field activity of DLA, 
and is charged with providing the DoD with “effective and efficient energy solutions.”71 
DLA Energy manages the bulk petroleum supply chain from the source of supply 
to the point of customer acceptance and everything in between. As integrated material 
manager for bulk fuels, DLA Energy’s responsibilities include “consolidation and review 
of bulk petroleum requirements, procurement, funding, budgeting, storage and designated 
distribution of bulk petroleum” to meet the combatant commander’s operational 
requirements.72 DLA Energy provides the DoD with its entire fuel supply, which makes 
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it the world’s single largest procurer of fuel.73 Buying bulk fuel for the entire DoD gives 
DLA Energy buying power and enables it to offer fuel at lower and more consistent 
prices. In FY 2011, DLA Energy procured 129.5M barrels of fuel and had net sales of 
$19.1B to DoD customers.74 As of June 1, 2012, the average cost of fuel sold by DLA 
Energy was $3.60 per gallon.75 
1. DoD/DLA Concept of Operations 
This section will describe DoD/DLA doctrinal bulk fuel operations, DLA 
Energy’s management of the bulk fuel supply chain, and DLA Energy’s bulk fuel support 
to U.S. forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). DLA Energy 
procures and stages common bulk fuel products for the combatant commands through an 
interdependent partnership with other government entities and the military services in 
theater. In order to accomplish its mission, DLA Energy must determine customer 
requirements, find strategic-level fuel sources, and provide transportation, storage, and 
distribution of bulk fuels. 
a. Determining Theater Fuel Support Requirements 
Although DLA Energy procures and stages bulk fuel for operations in 
theater, it is the geographic combatant commander who is responsible for planning, 
executing and controlling bulk fuel operations and distribution throughout his area of 
operations. The joint petroleum office (JPO) is the combatant commander’s fuel 
manager, and is “responsible for the overall planning of petroleum logistic support for 
joint operations within the assigned AOR [area of responsibility].”76 Depending on the 
size and complexity of the operating area, a sub-area petroleum office (SAPO) may exist 
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at an echelon below the JPO. The SAPO focuses on support for each service component 
and is responsible for “bulk petroleum planning and execution matters within its 
operational area.”77 Each service component determines its operational fuel requirements 
based on historical usage and planned rotations, and submits it to the JPO or SAPO. The 
JPO will then validate the service requirements for before providing them to DLA Energy 
for analysis, planning, and sourcing.78 JPO or SAPO must also assess the capabilities and 
requirements of Allies and coalition partners, and must integrate those assessments into 
appropriate plans and operations.79 
b. Strategic-level Fuel Sourcing and Contracting 
DLA Energy procures bulk fuel for use by DoD components and 
apportions its fuel either for: immediate operational use (bulk storage and distribution in 
theater); peacetime operating stocks; or petroleum war reserve requirements. Peacetime 
operating stocks and petroleum war reserve requirements can be drawn from in order to 
begin operations in a new theater of conflict while the services establish fuel operations, 
or to augment bulk fuel supplies as needed during a conflict. Once robust fuel operations 
can be maintained, bulk fuel storage sites in theater are drawn from to provide fuel to 
U.S. forces throughout the area of operations. The majority of the fuel DLA Energy 
provides to the services is JP-8 jet fuel, although it also provides JP-5 jet fuel to the U.S. 
Navy, as well as diesel fuel to all the Services.80 Although DLA Energy is postured to 






77. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk 
Petroleum and Water Doctrine, December 9, 2010, III-7.  
78. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk 
Petroleum and Water Doctrine, December 9, 2010, I-3. 
79. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk 
Petroleum and Water Doctrine, December 9, 2010, IV-3. 
80. Anthony Andrews, “Department of Defense Fuel Spending, Supply, Acquisition, and Policy,” 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2009, 2. 
 45 
directs the Services to “make maximum use of commercial and host-nation sources of 
supply to meet peacetime and wartime requirements” in order to offset U.S. requirements 
and costs.81 
After receiving validated customer requirements, DLA Energy solicits 
proposals from suppliers and evaluates bids, seeking the lowest total cost to the 
government. The most competitive bids are awarded indefinite delivery/indefinite 
quantity contracts in which contractors are bound to provide an indefinite quantity of fuel 
during a fixed period.82 DLA Energy uses firm fixed price contracts with an economic 
price adjustment (commonly referred to as FFP-EPA) that “provides for upward and 
downward revision of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified 
contingencies.”83 DLA Energy “sets the standard price, for the current FY [fiscal year], 
based off of the previous 18-month price history and not the current standard price for 
fuel…in an attempt to shield the DoD from the price fluctuations that occur with the price 
of fuel on a daily basis.”84 In 2011, DLA Energy awarded 6,669 contracts worth 
$15.2B.85 
c. Transportation, Storage and Distribution 
Once DLA Energy procures bulk fuel, its contractors transport the fuel 
from refineries to strategic storage points and bulk storage facilities in active theaters of 
operation throughout the world. Once the bulk fuel has reached the theater, it may be 
maintained in bulk storage or immediately distributed to the customer. DLA Energy owns 
and tracks fuel up to the point of sale, at which time the fuel may be “placed directly into 
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a weapons system or a battlefield storage unit or handed off to the customer to move to a 
forward-deployed location.”86 The most common methods of moving bulk fuel around 
the operational environment are (from most to least efficient) by pipeline, tanker/barge on 
inland waterways, railway, airlift and truck. 
The degree of control that DLA Energy manages over the fuel supply 
chain varies and is determined by where the point of sale or customer acceptance lies 
along that chain. Doctrinally, DLA Energy delivers bulk fuel to centralized bulk storage 
sites in theater from which ground-based DoD customers draw and further distribute fuel 
to subordinate units throughout the theater of operation. In this example, DLA Energy’s 
control of the supply chain ends at the bulk storage site. The customer may be a battalion 
or company-level element that accepts the fuel product at the bulk storage site to 
distribute to subordinate units in the field or at a FOB. In contrast, many recent DLA 
Energy contracts in Afghanistan require fuel to be transported directly from refineries and 
distributed all the way to DoD customers at remote FOBs. Because customer acceptance 
moved to the end-user at the FOB, DLA Energy relinquished control of a majority of the 
supply chain to contractors and has begun to encroach on the military Services’ areas of 
responsibility in bulk fuel distribution. 
Service doctrine holds that the theater sustainment command is 
responsible for scheduling transportation and distribution of fuel from the sustainment 
base or intermediate theater bulk storage to tactical ground-based customers. The theater 
sustainment command, normally a U.S. Army activity, plans distribution based on 
customer demand, available distribution assets, permissiveness of the operating 
environment and available storage.87 Fuel is moved by the theater sustainment command 
from the sustainment base either via pipeline or truck, and is distributed to airfields or 
brigade-sized elements at forward sustainment bases. Fuel is then moved by truck for 
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distribution to battalion and company sized elements. Figure 8 depicts typical ground-
based fuel transportation and distribution methods. 
 
Figure 8.  U.S. Ground Based Fuel Distribution: From Strategic Requirements to 
Tactical Customers.88 
 
88. From: Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine, December 2010. 
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2. DLA Energy–Operation Enduring Freedom  
Since 2001, when the United States began OEF in Afghanistan, DLA Energy has 
shouldered a greater responsibility in meeting steadily growing fuel support requirements 
to U.S. forces. Afghanistan is widely considered to be the most difficult operating 
environment in which to move supplies. Although DLA Energy adheres to general 
doctrinal operating requirements, moving fuel across Afghanistan’s difficult LOCs 
presents additional challenges to U.S. logistics partners that require unique solutions. The 
following section will provide greater detail on DLA Energy and DoD fuel operations in 
Afghanistan. 
a. Determining Theater Fuel Support Requirements–OEF 
DLA Energy-Middle East is charged with supporting the fuel 
requirements to U.S. and supported Allied forces in the U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) area of responsibility.89 DLA Energy-Middle East, which is located in 
Bahrain, receives validated requirements from the USCENTCOM JPO at MacDill AFB, 
FL. The JPO validates the customer requirements it receives from the Joint Logistics 
Command at Bagram Airfield.90 The Joint Logistics Command Class III (fuels) office 
serves as the SAPO in Afghanistan. Its responsibilities include consolidating the services’ 
fuel requirements, liaising with DLA Energy-Middle East regarding bulk petroleum 
supply and infrastructure issues, as well as theater distribution planning and management. 
At its highest demand in 2009, DoD customers in OEF had a storage requirement of 30 
million gallons, and required 1.1 million gallons of fuel per day to support operations.91 
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b. Strategic-level Fuel Sourcing and Contracting–OEF 
Afghanistan has no petroleum refineries; therefore 100 per cent of bulk 
fuel is imported. In order to support the Services’ requirements, DLA Energy-Middle 
East awarded contracts to several companies in Pakistan and Central Asia, including Red 
Star Enterprises Limited and Supreme Fuels Trading FZE, among others.92 The 
contractors were required to deliver bulk fuel to the major bulk fuel hubs in Afghanistan, 
from which the services would further distribute fuel to forward units in tactical fuel 
delivery trucks. DLA Energy began to award contracts that would encompass the entire 
supply chain, and U.S. forces began to depend on contractors to drive beyond the major 
bulk fuel hubs and deliver fuel to end-users at remote FOBs. Prior to this initiative, the 
Services either delivered fuel from the bulk storage hubs to subordinate units and FOBs, 
or it tendered its own contracts for fuel support. 
c. Transportation, Storage and Distribution–OEF 
Once DLA Energy procures the required bulk fuel, the challenge of 
transporting it through Afghanistan’s treacherous LOCs begins. Fuel is delivered to 
Afghanistan along two routes. Until 2009, the majority of fuel was trucked in from 
Pakistan through the dangerous Khyber and Salang Mountain passes along the southern 
LOCs. Since then, fuel traffic has shifted to the Northern Distribution Network, where 
more than 70 percent of fuel is shipped over 1,000 miles by rail and truck from refineries 
in Turkmenistan.93 Most bulk fuel in Afghanistan is stored in two major bulk fuel storage 
hubs: Bagram Airfield in the north, and Kandahar Airfield in the south.94 In 2006, DLA 
Energy contracted to build an additional 50,000 barrel capacity storage tank in Kabul to 
hedge against delayed deliveries.95 It can take up to two weeks for bulk fuel to travel 
 
92. Henry Canaday, “Energy Expertise,” Military Logistics Forum 6, no 5, 14 (June 2012), accessed 
June 11, 2012, http://www.kmimediagroup.com/files/MLF_6-5%20Final%281%29.pdf. 
93. Jeffrey B. Carra and David Ray. “Evolution of Petroleum Support in the U.S. Central Command 
Area of Responsibility,” Army Sustainment 42, no 5, (September-October 2010) accessed June 4, 2012, 
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct10/petrol_support.html. 
94. John Faust, “Bulk Petroleum Challenges in Afghanistan,” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, 
(Spring 2007): 23. 
95. Susan Declerq Brown, “DESC Fuels the Warfighter: Meeting the Challenges of Establishing 
Facilities and Tracking Capitalized Fuel in Austere Environments,” Fuel Line, 1 (January 2006): 6. 
 50 
from its origin to the bulk fuel storage hubs, and as long as 12 days to reach the most 
remote FOBs from the bulk fuel hubs.96 According to the Director of DLA, supplying 
U.S. forces over the harsh Afghan terrain has been “the most difficult logistics 
assignment we have faced since World War II.”97 Figure 9 illustrates the routes of travel 
for bulk fuel into Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 9.  Central Asian Fuel LOCs.98 
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In 2008, USCENTCOM had to consider the fuel support needs that would 
accompany the planned 2009 troop surge. Instead of provisioning its own forces, 
USCENTCOM decided to partner with ISAF and leverage the NATO fuel BOA to 
support U.S. forces in RC South and West.99 Not only did the United States wish to show 
its support as a partner within the Alliance, it was also in its best interest to take 
advantage of the agreement that was already in place to deliver fuel to remote FOBs.100 
By relying more on fuel support through the NATO fuel BOA, the United States could 
reduce the number of support personnel and increase the number of combat forces on the 
battlefield. Key U.S. personnel on the NATO ISAF fuel team at JFC HQ Brunssum 
reassured the USCENTCOM J4 senior logistics officer that the NATO fuel BOAs could 
meet the additional U.S. fuel requirements.101 
D. NATO FUEL BOA SUPPORT TO ISAF 
In the early days of NATO, General Eisenhower’s SHAEF command failed to 
capitalize on his great partnership-building and leadership capabilities. Field Marshal 
Montgomery was one of the few senior Allied leaders who made the transition from 
WWII Alliance structure into the NATO structure. He served as the first Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe. Montgomery describes 
how General Eisenhower tried from the very outset to rebuild the WWII level of 
cooperation into Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe. He was determined that 
the staff would be international and inter-service, and that they would forego particular 
national or service-specific political agendas. However, the best-laid intentions met with 
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resistance from the reality of western politics.102 Field Marshal Montgomery most 
adeptly captured the nature of NATO when he wrote: 
National sensitivity is the trouble, and this is a great bar to progress. A 
further trouble in the realm of defense is that the nations don’t trust each 
other; no nation is willing to be dependent on another nation in the 
Alliance. There is no doubt that when the threat of war lessened and fear 
began to disappear, Western unity began to weaken. 
It will be clear from what I have said that NATO is an organization in 
which there is a tremendous waste of money and effort, and a great deal of 
unnecessary duplication. Much of the thinking is muddled and confused. 
The global aspect of defense is disregarded. Defense problems have got 
into the hands of Foreign Ministers; these know little about the subject, 
and, furthermore, they are not responsible for defense.103 
Montgomery’s writings could easily be written in any journal today. In his review of U.S. 
General (retired) Wesley K. Clark’s Waging Modern War, Richard Betts reminiscent of a 
Montgomery, captures a modern NATO commander/writer’s critique of NATO: 
After half a century of unprecedented institutionalized cooperation in 
peace-time planning for war, NATO’s first actual war was initiated, 
fought, and ended with no agreement among its members -- or within the 
councils of its single most important member, the United States -- on 
objectives, strategy, or limits of action.104 
General Clark himself wrote: 
Unity of command was nominally through my headquarters, but in 
practice national command chains continued to shape and drive the 
campaign through connections directly to NATO-assigned forces and 
sometimes bypassing NATO, including in the negotiations to end the 
fighting. Even within my U.S. chain of command, my subordinate 
component commanders were reporting to, and no doubt influenced by, 
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Chiefs, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
And because there was no pre-arranged strategy, unity of effort 
suffered.105 
Montgomery’s and Clarks’ critiques were aimed at the divided system of controls and 
duplicated efforts of the NATO logistics establishment. 
The early political struggles of a young NATO would help create a system where 
the Alliance focused inwardly on defense of Western Europe. NATO built its logistics 
structure around a western defense and failed to develop an appreciation for the global 
nature of collective defense it would need in the future. Each Alliance nation developed 
its own system of logistics and formed NATO policies that reflected these separate 
national mentalities. But, as discussed in Chapter II, the end of the Cold War brought a 
reshaping of NATO. In the mid-1990s, national leaders and NATO logisticians began 
developing policies that would encourage collective action in multinational operations 
that looked beyond the Alliance’s geographic borders. In the 1990s, few nations other 
than the United States had either the military or the economic capacity to undertake 
expeditionary operations on a large scale. In addition, the NATO structures were not 
ready to execute successful operations abroad. From the inception of NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, the Alliance had to depend heavily on U.S. logistics for fuel support. When 
the United States diverted its attention to operations in Iraq in 2005, the Alliance had no 
backup national system. This seemingly dangerous turn of events was actually beneficial 
for the ISAF Commander, as it unwittingly allowed for a political consolidation of power 
under one Allied leader and his combined staff. 
 When NATO fuel logisticians developed the BOA in 2005 to fill the gap where 
national programs would not support Alliance operations, the ISAF command position was 
held by the United States. In 2008, that same flag position was also designated the 
Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.106 Unlike the WWII petroleum supply chain, 
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NATO ISAF fuel operations were free from a higher-level tier of national administrative 
functions. With this freedom and the new dual authority, the ISAF Commander effectively 
controlled the majority of the ISAF fuel supply chain through DLA Energy, USCENTCOM 
theater petroleum related assets and distribution systems, and the NATO fuel BOA. 
While the ISAF Commander’s unique position did not allow for complete control 
over Alliance forces and operations, he did hold an unprecedented level of control over 
its fuel. Through the NATO chain of command, NATO ISAF fuel operations were 
managed through the theater logistics staff at HQ ISAF. With the establishment of the 
ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in 2009, NATO ISAF fuel operations were transferred to the 
IJC.107 In coordination with the NATO regional commands’ fuel officers, the IJC fuel 
staff consolidated NATO requirements for sourcing by the JFC HQ Brunssum fuel staff 
through the NATO fuel BOAs. In the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan chain of command, the 
Afghanistan SAPO, in coordination with the theater sustainment command, established 
U.S. fuel requirements for sourcing by the USCENTCOM JPO through DLA Energy. To 
coordinate this dual effort, the United States took the lead by establishing a series of key 
liaison relationships within the NATO chain of command. 
The liaison role developed because the NATO and U.S. chains of command 
remained distinct. At the highest level, DLA Energy sent a permanent senior advisor to 
augment and coordinate with the JFC HQ Brunssum fuel staff. The presence of a U.S. 
logistics officer as the JFC HQ Brunssum Fuel Chief further enhanced coordination 
efforts. The DLA Energy liaison and U.S. Fuel Chief provided NATO access to weekly 
meetings and other U.S. classified systems that allowed high-level information flow 
between NATO and U.S. logisticians. Within the theater, USCENTCOM provided a 
liaison to the IJC fuel staff again providing the necessary information flow and  
coordination to direct fuel operations. Ultimately both chains of command focused fuel 
logistics efforts to meet the requirements of the ISAF Commander with minimal 
duplication of effort. 
 




Early ISAF fuel operations were very much stovepiped and duplicated efforts. As 
the theater matured and the ISAF Commander consolidated his control over fuel, fuel 
operations became much more focused and efficient. As in WWII, the NATO and U.S. 
logisticians agreed to divide fuel operations regionally to no longer duplicate efforts. The 
U.S. supported fuel operations in Regional Command (RC) East and portions of RC 
North, while NATO supported fuel operations in RC West, RC Southwest, RC South, 
portions of RC North, and Kabul International Airport. The German government 
remained separate from NATO and U.S. fuel operations, and supported their forces, and 
some Alliance members, at Mazar-E-Sharif in RC North. Because LOCs to Afghanistan 
proved challenging, the United States and NATO developed two major LOCs with one 
from the north and the other from the south. 
The two LOCs represented the only politically acceptable approaches into 
Afghanistan for the United States and NATO. Because the BOA required alternate 
suppliers and alternate routes, NATO opened a northern supply route into Afghanistan 
long before the U.S. DoD created the Northern Distribution Network in 2009.108 From 
the outset, NATO contractors moved seventy percent of all contracted fuel through the 
northern LOC. At its greatest length, the northern LOC reached back as far as the U.S. 
Gulf Coast. The southern LOC reached just as far but traversed through Pakistan and 
presented the largest problem for both the United States and NATO logisticians. The 
southern LOC remained open until 2011, when Pakistani officials closed the route 
indefinitely after one of their border outposts was attacked during an ISAF operation.109 
In the south, fuel contractors faced opposition from anti-NATO/U.S. forces operating in 
Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan, RC South, RC Southwest, and RC East. And like 
their WWII counterparts, the contractors continued to move fuel despite of the heavy 
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attacks on their convoys. Table 3 provides conservative estimates of ISAF-related 
contractors’ casualties and injuries. Figure 10 and 11 detail the NATO fuel BOA related 
incidents and difficult LOCs. 
 
Table 3.   U.S. Department of Labor Data on Reported Contractor Incidents: 
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their final report to the U.S. Congress, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing 
Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting, August 2011, 31. 
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Figure 10.  NATO Fuel BOA Incident Report Summary 2008–May 2012.111 
 
111. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
NATO UNCLASSIFIED 
Slide No 21 
Incidents Civilians Escort to 
NATO Contractors Fuel Convoys 
Incident 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
KIA 98 119 103 110 2 
WIA 169 267 329 257 15 
Vehicles 
Destroyed 48 63 140 168 3 
Vehicles Damaged 121 269 358 284 16 
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Figure 11.  NATO Fuel BOA Examples of Afghanistan’s LOCs.112 
The southern LOC routinely experienced closures that inspired ISAF commanders 
to prepare for significant disruptions to this route. When U.S. General Stanley A. 
McChrystal took command of ISAF in 2009, he prepared strategically to mitigate the 
impact of disruptions to the southern LOC. He directed that an additional 30 day supply 
of fuel be stored within Afghanistan, bringing the total supply to 60 days. With Alliance 
forces using more than 6 million liters of fuel a day, this meant that a total of more than 
400 million liters had to be held in reserve. While there was an initial cry of distress from 
NATO and U.S. logisticians, they quickly developed and executed a combined logistics 
plan before the year’s end to meet the ISAF Commander’s requirement. NATO nations 
expressed concerns about this additional requirement, but they held no political power in 
 
112. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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the decision. Only Germany continued to provide fuel to their forces and so maintained 
separate policies consistent with their national interests.113 When Pakistan closed the 
southern LOC in 2011, the additional reserve proved to be critical. This allowed the 
United States and NATO to shift their operations to the northern LOC over a series of 
months while providing minimal disruption to ISAF operations. The ISAF Commander’s 
ability to make such large decisions speaks to the effectiveness of ISAF’s multinational 
fuel operation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
WWII brought together an alliance of western nations to fight common enemies 
around the world. This war marked a clear turn in the primacy of petroleum on the 
modern battlefield. To support their forces with the necessary fuel, the United States and 
the UK centralized their fuel industry and developed massive logistics systems on the 
national and theater level; however, political underpinnings prohibited formation of an 
Allied logistics structure and kept their nation’s organizations separate. A liaison 
relationship would tie the two nations’ petroleum programs together in order to provide 
fuel to SHAEF’s European theater of operations. The extraordinary powers granted 
through the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff allowed General Eisenhower to effectively 
manage a multinational force and its petroleum supply chain. 
As the western Alliance came out of WWII and transitioned into NATO, much of 
these powers were lost. Political machinations fostered NATO logistics policy that would 
duplicate efforts across the member nations’ separate logistics systems. Alliance politics 
did not allow for the development of adequate expeditionary capabilities. It was not until 
the end of the Cold War that Alliance logisticians began to reshape policy that enabled 
them to work toward a common system of collective operations. Years of neglect in 
expeditionary operations were difficult to correct quickly, and were further exacerbated 
by nations who were unwilling or incapable of operating beyond their borders. 
 
113. The majority of the information pertaining to the 60 Days of Supply (DOS) policy and the ISAF 
Fuel Plan remains classified within U.S. and NATO record systems. The information provided here is 
unclassified and drawn from personal experiences while on General McKiernan’s and McCrystal’s logistics 
staff at HQ ISAF (2009) and later during my time in the policy and plans section of the JFC Brunssum fuel 
staff (2010–2011). M.Evans. 
 60 
U.S. DLA Energy emerged from the WWII petroleum establishment to become 
the leader in world fuel operations and key to NATO’s ability to go abroad. This support 
to the Alliance became a type of crutch that hindered NATO’s development of an organic 
expeditionary fuel capacity. When the United States no longer supported the broader 
ISAF mission with fuel in 2005, NATO logisticians were unable to turn to another role 
specialist nation and they had no organic expeditionary fuel organization. Although 
NATO was seemingly disadvantaged with the departure of the United States, it would 
actually push NATO logisticians to develop a creative solution to their fuel supply 
problem. NATO moved to a contract-like solution that developed into the NATO fuel 
BOA. The BOA allowed NATO to act as its own role specialist nation separate from any 
nation’s control. When the ISAF Commander also took on the U.S. Forces Afghanistan 
Command, a new opportunity within the fuels community presented itself. For the first 
time since WWII, an Allied commander exercised the necessary command authority to 
effectively manage the wartime petroleum needs of his fielded forces. Chapter IV 
discusses how the use of the NATO fuel BOA and U.S. contracts enabled NATO and the 
United States to meet the ISAF Commander’s multinational fuel requirements. 
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IV. CONTRACT FUEL 
The history of multinational fuel operations, understanding of national fuel 
organizations, and development of NATO as a role specialist nation for petroleum 
provide a foundation in order to move into a more technical discussion of contract fuel 
operations. The previous historical discussions revealed that the petroleum industry and 
suppliers have played a critical role in supplying fuel to theaters of military operations. 
Since WWII this role has expanded beyond production and strategic delivery. In NATO 
ISAF fuel operations, contractors overtook the fuel supply chain by delivering fuel into 
the operational theater and to the forward most outposts and forward operating bases 
(FOBs) in Afghanistan. Within the NATO chain of command, contractors pushed this 
level of battlefield support even further by managing regional strategic reserves, 
developing convoy support centers, providing private security services, and running 
airport service operations and the supporting airfield bulk fuel installations. In 
comparison, U.S. fuel operations provided the same levels of support to U.S. forces and 
coalition partners, albeit on a grander scale and through different contracting methods. 
This chapter compares the instruments that enabled the United States and NATO to meet 
the fuel requirement of the ISAF Commander. It begins with a detailed discussion of the 
NATO fuel BOA, followed by a discussion of U.S. DLA Energy fuel contracting. It 
compares how NATO and the United States established fuel prices, the nature of their 
contracting instruments, and how their logistics organizations managed operations and 
oversight. The chapter concludes with and introduction to the U.S. Army’s Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) as another contracting model that is used in U.S 
contingency operations. 
A. NATO BASIC ORDERING AGREEMENTS 
With the establishment of the fuel BOAs, NATO clearly entered into a new era of 
its development. The BOAs demonstrated NATO’s ability to operate independently from 
the constraints of its member nations while also providing the support necessary for its 
member and partner nations to execute a NATO-tasked mission. When no nation came 
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forward to act as a role specialist nation for fuel at the new NATO ISAF aerial ports of 
debarkation (APODs), Alliance policy allowed logisticians to develop fuel operations 
through third-party logistic support services.114 The authority to execute the BOAs fell 
well within established NATO procurement policy.115 Within NATO logistics policy, the 
designated Joint Force Command (JFC) had responsibility for developing the operational 
logistics plans and identifying the support required for those plans. NATO designated 
JFC HQ Brunssum as the operational command for ISAF. JFC HQ Brunssum utilized the 
authorities held within their Purchasing and Contracting (P&C) staff and within NATO 
logistics doctrine to implement the NATO fuel BOAs.116 Within this framework, NATO 
executed and oversaw the use of the BOA. This section will describe the BOA instrument 
in greater detail by discussing its features, pricing procedures, command structure and 
oversight. 
1. NATO FUEL BOA: Structure, Characteristics and Procedures 
The BOAs are not contracts but, as their name implies, they are agreements. 
NATO P&C staffs utilized BOAs to prevent unnecessary reoccurring negotiations with a 
single contractor who could have a larger number of separate contracts. BOAs generally 
defined the estimated quantities of required services or products, set a time period for 
execution, and left open the possibility of extending the BOA for future periods. P&C 
policy emphasized that BOAs should utilize commercial procedures to the maximum 
extent possible, especially for invoicing and billing. In addition, BOAs did not bind P&C 




114. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication 4–Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine, 
December 2003, accessed July 2, 2012, https://nsa.nato.int/protected/unclass/ap/AJP-4(A).pdf, 1-12–1-16. 
115. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 60-70, December 
22, 2004, 3-11– 3-12. 
116. Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing and 
Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) interview by Michael Evans, May 30, 2012, interview 
vanKoeveringe.mp3, Evans Private Oral History Collection.; Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter 
van Koeveringe (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) e-mail 
message to authors on July 3, 2012; Wim de Hollander (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing and Contracting 
Officer Executing the BOA) e-mail message to authors, June 11, 2012. 
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agreement. The establishment of a BOA allowed P&C officers to quickly award future 
individual transactions without developing or renegotiating a contract for similar products 
or services.117 
The NATO fuel BOAs represent three separate agreements for fuel services in 
and around Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat, Afghanistan. The JFC HQ Brunssum Financial 
Resources Branch P&C staff structured each of the BOAs similarly. With the exception 
of the Herat fuel BOA, which had only one statement of work, the P&C staff wrote the 
BOAs in three parts. The first two documents represented statements of work that defined 
the specific tasks as identified by the requirement holder, JFC HQ Brunssum Logistics 
Resources Branch, Logistics Operations and Plans Fuels Section, or simply JFC HQ 
Brunssum fuel. The P&C staff used these documents to solicit bids from commercial 
companies and selected one contractor for each of the three BOAs. The third document 
was the formal agreement signed between the selected contractor and JFC HQ Brunssum 
P&C. The statements of work and formal agreement were used together to detail the 
scope of work, specific requirements for each party in the agreement, and to identify 
optional requirements that can be exercised as required. The signed agreement described 
in detail everything from simple definitions of terms to specific liabilities and indemnity, 
and is by far the most technical document of the three. Here the P&C staff developed the 
legal aspects of the BOAs to form a set of binding agreements. 
JFC Brunssum P&C developed the NATO fuel BOAs as an agreement directly 
between buyers and a contractor. As an example, the Kabul BOA defined the buyers as 
ISAF/NATO designated customers and identified the contractor as the supplier of the fuel 
related products and services.118 The BOA further specified that the buyer would pay a 
set price per liter (PPL) for fuel that would satisfy all of the contractor’s costs for 
 
117. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 60-70, December 
22, 2004, 3-11–3-12. 
118. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) for the 
Provision of Aviation and Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kabul Area of 
Operation (AO) Between Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Nordic Camp 
Supply A/S,” Agreement Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/002-07, July 20, 2007, 2.  
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expenses incurred during the supply of fuel and related fuel services.119 The contractors 
invoiced customers directly, and only involved JFC HQ Brunssum in cases of billing 
disputes. This system created a direct financial relationship between the ISAF troop 
contributing nations and other designated customers and the BOA contractors. JFC 
Brunssum and the NATO commands incurred no upfront costs and held no financial 
obligation to the contractor. As such, the BOAs remained separate from the NATO 
common budget and the designated customers assumed all financial responsibilities. By 
not utilizing NATO common funds, JFC HQ Brunssum P&C kept the NATO fuel BOA 
decision making within the hands of the NATO ISAF fuel team and separate from the 
diplomatic and military politics normally associated with the NATO common budget 
decision making cycle. 
2. Price Per Liter 
The total cost of fuel, from strategic acquisition through the final delivery and sale 
to the customer, was itemized within the NATO fuel BOA PPL. The initial signed 
agreements established a PPL by fuel type for each contractor. Whereas the initial written 
BOAs provided a limited itemization of the PPLs, later financial coordination between 
contractors and the JFC HQ Brunssum P&C staff led to a more detailed itemization of the 
PPL. This created a transparency not seen in other contracts or agreements and allowed 
for an open and fair negotiation of PPL adjustments. With this transparency, the PPLs 
were reviewed and adjusted on a monthly and a semiannual basis, and through incidental 
adjustments in formal agreement modifications. As of July 5, 2012, nineteen 
modifications have been made to the NATO fuel BOAs to include supplemental 
agreements in order to exercise option-year extensions of the original agreements.120 
 
119. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) for the 
Provision of Aviation and Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kabul Area of 
Operation (AO) Between Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Nordic Camp 
Supply A/S,” Agreement Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/002-07, July 20, 2007, 7.  
120. Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe, “Clarification of the Price Per Liter” 
(presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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Table 4 shows an example of the itemized PPL and the timeline of price 
adjustments.121 The monthly PPL adjustments allowed the contractors and the JFC HQ 
Brunssum P&C staff to match agreement costs with international market fluctuations 
associated with the petroleum industry (based on the average monthly prices from the 
Platts’ Mediterranean Cargos report), landed cost of strategic fuel, and contractor profit 
margin. The landed cost consists of the transportation-associated expenses incurred by 
the contractor for inter-theater transportation operations and the price of the actual fuel. 
 
Table 4.   Example Itemized Price Per Liter for the NATO Fuel BOA with 
Adjustment Periods.122 
 
121. Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing and 
Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Clarification of the Price Per Liter” (presentation to the Senior 
NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
122. From: Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Clarification of the Price Per Liter” (presentation to the 
Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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Semi-annual price adjustments were tied to the contractors’ operational costs, the 
management of NATO ISAF fuel facilities, insurance, and intra-theater landed costs. 
Incidental adjustments to the PPL were based on the recovery costs allowed to the 
contractor in accordance with JFC HQ Brunssum P&C approved contractor wartime 
losses, as well as for directed contractor development and/or expansion of NATO ISAF 
fuel infrastructure. The JFC HQ Brunssum P&C staff published all PPL adjustments and 
disseminated it directly to the BOA designated customers.  
In contrast to the NATO fuel BOA PPL, DLA Energy sells fuel to DoD customers 
at a standardized price per gallon. The DLA Energy price does not reflect the fully 
burdened cost of fuel (FBCF), which theoretically accounts for the total expenses within 
an entire fuel supply chain, as does the BOA’s PPL. Because U.S. officials have not 
determined a single method to calculate the FBCF, there is currently neither an agreed 
upon dollar value for the U.S. estimate, nor an itemized cost of U.S. fuel which can be 
compared directly against the NATO fuel BOA PPL.123 This concept is explained in 
greater detail in a discussion of financial risks to fuel operations in Chapter V, beginning 
on page 104. 
The PPL included internal distribution to the NATO APODs and the national 
FOBs, as well as full spectrum fuel operations to the NATO APODs in KAF, KAIA, and 
 
123. Refer to section 3.1.6 of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook for a discussion of the fully 
burdened cost of energy, accessed August 3, 2012, https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id= 
314767#3.1.6.; For the most recent cost estimations provided to the U.S. Congress for Afghanistan fuel see 
Moshe Schwartz, Katherine Blakely, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Department of Defense Energy Initiatives: 
Background and Issues for Congress,” Report to Congress No R42558 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, June 5, 2012): 6–7, accessed July 28, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/ 
R42558.pdf.; The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan developed the most 
comprehensive breakdown of personnel costs related to U.S. fuel operations see their final report to the 
U.S. Congress, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: 
Commission on Wartime Contracting, August 2011, Appendix F.; Steve Siegel, Steve Bell, Scott Dicke, 
and Peter Arbuckle, “Sustain the Mission Project: Energy and Water Costing Methodology and Decision 
Support Tool,” Army Environmental Policy Institute Final Technical Report, National Defense Center for 
Energy and Environment, July 2008.; For a non-government estimation of Afghanistan/Iraq fuel costs see 
Admiral (ret.) U.S. Navy John B. Nathman, “Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to 
National Security” (presentation at the Environmental and Energy Studies Institute Energy, National 
Security and Defense Department Solutions Conference, September 10, 2009) accessed July 28, 2012, 
http://www.eesi.org/energy-national-security-and-defense-department-solutions-10-sep-2009., or Charles 
F. Wald, and Tom Captain, “Energy Security American’s Best Defense: A Study of Increasing Dependence 
on Fossil Fuels in Wartime, and Its Contribution to Ever Higher Casualty Rates,” Deloitte Development 
LCC, 2009. 
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Herat. The unique financial aspect provided by the NATO fuel BOAs PPL includes not 
only fuel, but also fuel related services. In addition to the NATO APODs, the PPL 
provided for contractor management of the British-owned fuel installation at FOB 
Bastion, as well as strategic fuel acquisition and delivery to other contractor owned and 
operated storage facilities. The PPL also provides for contractor oversight of fuel quantity 
and quality throughout the BOA managed areas of the ISAF theater of operations. Lastly, 
the sale of fuel provided for all fuel related infrastructure development and expansion 
projects directed by JFC HQ Brunssum for the BOA customers and the ISAF 
Commander.124 
If customers chose not to utilize the complete services covered by the BOA’s 
PPL, they would be responsible for acquiring such services at their own cost. Such 
services may include strategic fuel reserve facilities and associated manpower 
requirements for those facilities, additional transportation internal to the customers’ 
operations, and any other quality control measures such as laboratory testing required by 
the customers. By doing so, these customers actually paid twice for some fuel services. 
The most costly double payment came from internal transportation costs that were 
already calculated into the NATO PPL. Customers’ invoices were not reduced if they 
provided their own internal distribution of fuel or any other duplicated services. In all but 
four of the ISAF installations, the cost of FOB bulk fuel installations remained separate 
from the NATO PPL and so the customers assumed construction, operation, and 
personnel costs in addition to the PPL. Although some nations elected to incur their own 
costs for fuel services above what was already paid through the PPL, many others chose 
to save on costs by using the BOA to bring a wider variety of tactical fuel support 
services to FOBs that were already included in the PPL.125 
 
124. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge (DLA Energy Representative to JFC 
HQ Brunssum), interview by Michael Evans, April 15, 2012, interview Santiago.mp3, Evans Private Oral 
History Collection. NOTE: Mr. Gulledge was interviewed jointly with LTC Santiago.; Chief Master 
Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge (DLA Energy Representative to JFC HQ Brunssum) e-mail 
message to authors, October 27, 2011. 
125. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012); Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge 
(DLA Energy Representative to JFC HQ Brunssum) e-mail message to authors, July 28, 2012. 
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Prior to the establishment of the fuel BOAs, NATO and the various ISAF TCNs 
built the basic fuel infrastructure of the early ISAF fuel supply chain. With establishment 
of the BOAs, the management of NATO and TCN facilities at the NATO APODs were 
transferred to the BOA contractors. Whether nations or NATO purchased it, the title of 
all properties were transferred to NATO through the BOA.126 Using the BOA PPL 
system, the JFC HQ Brunssum fuel staff further expanded the ISAF infrastructure to meet 
the fuel requirements of the ISAF Commander and the customers. For example, when the 
Herat APOD required additional fuel storage in March of 2011 to meet increasing usage 
demands, the BOA contractors submitted a proposal for its expansion. Following a JFC 
HQ Brunssum Crisis Requirements Coordination Board project review, the JFC HQ 
Brunssum P&C staff approved the project and agreed upon on a price of $1,050,841.00. 
The two parties signed an agreement modification that documented the contractor’s 
proposal and project timeline, and established an incidental PPL increase of $0.006568 
for two months. The BOA contractor used the PPL increase to pay for all the necessary 
costs to expand the Herat installation. In addition, by paying the increased PPL NATO 
assumed ownership of the additional fuel bladders when it accepted the completed 
project.127 The only exception to NATO ownership of BOA generated facilities or 
equipment was in the commercial reserves. The NATO fuel BOAs required contractors to 
provide a strategic fuel reserve for the ISAF Commander; the title of the reserve fuel and 
reserve storage facilities remained with the BOA contractors.128 
Although contractors assumed near total control of the supply chain, NATO 
maintained control of fuel and fuel support products. The JFC HQ Brunssum P&C staff 
structured the BOAs so that title of fuel remained with the contractors throughout almost 
 
126. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army (ret.) Brian McMurry (JFC HQ Brunssum second Fuel Chief 
executing the BOA), interview by Michael Evans, April 18, 2012, interview McMurry.mp3, Evans Private 
Oral History Collection. 
127. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Agreement for the Provision of Aviation and 
Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF and Additional Requiring Activities in the Herat 
Area of Operation Between Operation Between Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C 
and Supreme Site Services Gmbh,” Agreement number: 5080/JBJ8P&C/002/06/ISAF, February 1, 2006, 
Modification #8 December 1, 2011. 
128. Wouter van Koeveringe (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing and Contracting Officer Executing the 
BOA) e-mail message to authors, July 3, 2012.; Wouter van Koeveringe (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) e-mail message to authors, July 9, 2012. 
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the entire supply chain. The KAF agreement stated that the contractor retained title for 
the fuel during acquisition, transport, delivery and distribution of fuel. Title did not 
transfer until the fuel was accepted by the buyer and transferred into national storage sites 
or issued to an authorized customer at the four NATO contractor-managed facilities.129 
Ownership of title ensured that the contractors held all risks related to fuel operations 
except for the recovery cost of specified lost fuel. The NATO fuel BOAs allowed the 
contractor to recoup their financial losses due to terrorist activities only. This included 
loss of product but not equipment or personnel. In replacing the lost fuel, the 
reimbursement allowed for additional security costs, adjustments for new customs duties 
and/or taxes, and costs due to alternate routes caused by subsequent weather or security 
developments. When authorized by JFC HQ Brunssum P&C, contractors were allowed to 
increase the PPL for a set period until such time as the approved costs were recovered.130 
3. NATO/ISAF Command Structure 
The BOAs fit easily into the NATO ISAF fuel command structure without adding 
additional national or NATO decision-making layers. Figures 12 and 13 provide a visual 
representation of the NATO fuel command structure and information flow. The HQ IJC 
fuel staff acted as liaison between the buyers, contractors, and JFC HQ Brunssum. The 
HQ IJC represented the buyers, and was responsible for determining the required fuel 
needed from the contractors. They consolidated monthly ISAF fuel requirements sixty 
days prior to the required delivery month. JFC HQ Brunssum fuel validated the ISAF 
requirement, and JFC HQ Brunssum P&C placed the order with the contractors. This 




129. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Agreement for the Provision of Aviation and 
Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kandahar Area of Operation Between Allied 
Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Supreme Fuels Gmbh & Co KG,” Agreement 
Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/06-72, March 15, 2007, 5. 
130. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Agreement for the Provision of Aviation and 
Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kandahar Area of Operation Between Allied 
Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Supreme Fuels Gmbh & Co KG,” Agreement 
Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/06-72, March 15, 2007, 9. 
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months of projected fuel orders. The BOAs stipulated the allowed variances and changes 
to orders by JFC HQ Brunssum P&C and the contractors, including the associated 
penalties for exceeding variances.131 
 
Figure 12.  NATO ISAF Fuel Team Command Structure Information Flow.132 
 
131. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) for the 
Provision of Aviation and Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kabul Area of 
Operation (AO) Between Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Nordic Camp 
Supply A/S,” Agreement Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/002-07, July 20, 2007, 4.; Joint Force Command 
Headquarters Brunssum, “Statement of Work (SOW) for the Provision of Aviation & Ground Fuels for 
NATO ISAF Kabul International Airfield (KAIA), Afghanistan,” July 25, 2007, 7, 12.; Joint Force 
Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) for the Provision of Aviation and 
Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kabul Area of Operation (AO) Between 
Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Nordic Camp Supply A/S,” Agreement 
Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/002-07, July 20, 2007, Modification #9, October 1, 2011, 2. 
132. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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Figure 13.  NATO ISAF Fuel Command Structure.133 
4. NATO/ISAF Contract Oversight 
Initial oversight of the NATO fuel BOAs remained within in the hands of a small 
group of individuals. As the NATO ISAF fuel operation grew, a formal process of 
agreement oversight developed, broadening management of the BOA. For new 
construction or expansion of fuel faculties, JFC HQ Brunssum fuel staff utilized standing 
APOD and NATO engineering committees to review and ensure contractor projects were 
properly integrated into existing NATO facilities. In addition, formal Crisis Recourse 
Coordination Boards were convened for final review and acceptance of any NATO fuel 
BOA projects.134 To better manage theater level oversight, JFC HQ Brunssum P&C 
 
133. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
134. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA), interview by Michael Evans, April 15, 2012, Interview Santiago.mp3, Evans Private 
Oral History Collection.; Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel 
Chief Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for 
ISAF, Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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integrated a series of key performance indicators into the BOAs that provided a more 
detailed description of both the contractor’s and JFC HQ Brunssum’s responsibilities. 
The key performance indicators specifically addressed management of the bulk fuel 
installations, stock levels at the commercial reserves, and the monthly fuel orders. JFC 
HQ Brunssum P&C monitored the contractors’ general performance and the key 
performance indicators through appointed contracting officer technical representatives 
(COTRs) within the regional commands and at the NATO APODs. These individuals 
acted on behalf of the JFC HQ Brunssum P&C officer, and validated that contractors 
executed the requirements of the agreements.135 
B. DLA ENERGY CONTRACTS 
Whereas the NATO fuel BOA was managed by a small group of individuals that 
served a relatively small customer base, the U.S. DLA Energy was a significantly larger 
organization that was responsible for managing and supplying fuel to the world’s largest 
consumer, the DoD. DLA Energy has served the DoD under various names since WWII, 
and it continues to serve from worldwide regional headquarters and bulk fuel supply 
points. Together, DLA Energy and NATO have partnered to supply millions of gallons of 
fuel to the coalition during OEF. Although DLA Energy is the larger and more 
experienced organization, it has learned some practical solutions from NATO during 
OEF. This section describes DLA Energy’s traditional contracting process, its contract 
types and costs, the evolution of its contracts in OEF, and its command structure and 
oversight process. 
1. DLA Energy Contracting Process and Types 
After receiving validated customer requirements, DLA Energy solicits proposals 
from suppliers and evaluates bids, seeking the lowest total cost to the U.S. government. 
 
135. Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum, “Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) for the 
Provision of Aviation and Ground Fuels and Associated Products to NATO ISAF in the Kabul Area of 
Operation (AO) Between Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters (JFC-B) P&C and Nordic Camp 
Supply A/S,” Agreement Number: IFIB/JBJ8P&C/002-07, July 20, 2007, Modification #9, October 1, 
2011.; Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe, Wouter (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Presentation of the NATO BOA / Contracting Officer 
Technical Representative (COTR),” Training document developed for new ISAF fuel BOA COTRs, 
December 23, 2011. 
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The most competitive bids are awarded with indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity 
(ID/IQ) contracts in which contractors are bound to provide an indefinite quantity of fuel 
during a fixed period.136 According to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the 
government and the contractor agree to at least a minimum quantity of supplies (in this 
case, fuel) in an ID/IQ contract. This type of instrument is recommended when a 
recurring need is anticipated and “when the Government cannot predetermine, above a 
specified minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or services that the Government 
will require during the contract period...”137 In addition, the FAR mandates that multiple 
awards of indefinite-quantity contracts be given “under a single solicitation for the same 
or similar supplies or services to two or more sources” to the maximum extent 
possible.138 These “multiple award contracts” promote competition and provide the best 
value to the U.S. government. Having several sources provides redundancy to the 
government and hedges against loss of product or services should a single contractor 
experience hardship. In the case of DLA Energy, issuing multiple awards ensures that an 
uninterrupted supply of fuel will be available from several sources. 
DLA Energy uses firm fixed price contracts with an economic price adjustment 
(commonly referred to as FFP-EPA) that “provides for upward and downward revision of 
the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies.”139 DLA Energy 
contracts specify that fuel prices will be reviewed against the Platt’s Oilgram price report 
and adjusted bi-monthly to ensure the government is paying the contractor at current 
market prices.140 DLA Energy is also afforded price breaks due to the enormous 
quantities of its orders. In 2011, DLA Energy acquired nearly 115 million barrels of fuel 
worth $15B, which it sold to DoD customers at a product-specific “standard price.” The 
 
136. Henry Canaday, “Energy Expertise,” Military Logistics Forum 6 no 5 (June 2012). 
137. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 16.504 “Indefinite Quantity Contracts.” Vol. 1, March 
2005. 
138. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 16.504 “Indefinite Quantity Contracts.” Vol. 1, March 
2005. 
139. Anthony Andrews, “Department of Defense Fuel Spending, Supply, Acquisition, and Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2009, 15–16. 
140. Federal Business Opportunities Database, “Amendment 3 to DLA Energy solicitation SP0600-11-
R-0235,” accessed July 20, 2012, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id= 
580d12760525dea73afd15c31fa18d43&tab=core&_cview=1. 
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standard price of fuel is based on the estimated cost of purchased fuel 18 months in the 
future, the budgeted cost of transportation, storage, management, and any 
negative/positive variances in the Defense Working Capital Fund for fuel. The Defense 
Working Capital Fund is a revolving fund that allows DLA Energy to absorb market 
fluctuations in fuel prices. DLA Energy increases the standard price to make up for short 
periods or it reduces prices when costs are less than anticipated.141 During the month of 
June 2011, DLA Energy sold jet fuel (U.S. jet fuel designation JP-8) at $3.95 per 
gallon.142 In comparison, the NATO fuel BOA offered the equivalent “standard price” jet 
fuel (NATO jet fuel designation F-34) at $4.25 per gallon from Supreme Group and at 
$3.55 per gallon from Nordic Camp Supply (NCS).143 
In addition to awarding fuel contracts, DLA Energy also awards contracts for 
construction, maintenance and operation of bulk fuel facilities. While DLA Energy 
tenders separate contracts for these services, the NATO ISAF fuel team amends an 
existing agreement and increase the PPL in order to include fuel storage construction, 
maintenance and operation. Because NATO does not have a role specialist nation for its 
bulk fuel storage, the contractors complete construction, maintenance, and operational 
work. These modifications to the NATO fuel BOAs split the title of bulk fuel facilities 
between the contractors and NATO. The three NATO APOD sites are NATO owned and 
contractor operated while the ISAF commercial reserve sites, as well as the title for fuel, 
are contractor owned and operated. For DLA Energy contracts the majority of Defense 
Fuel Support Points are still U.S. government owned and operated with title of fuel  
 
 
141. Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “What the Standard Price of Fuel Is,” accessed July 31, 2012, 
http://p2web.desc.dla.mil/pls/p2wp/std_price_pkg.std_price_list. 




143. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge, (DLA Energy Representation to 
JFC HQ Brunssum) “Charts Overall Pricing Supreme and NCS 18-07-2012.xlsx,” (prepared by Major 
Royal Dutch Wouter Marechaussee van Koeveringe, JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing and Contracting 
Officer Executing the BOA) e-mail message to the authors, July 30, 2012. 
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transferring to the U.S. government.144 The only exception in Afghanistan is the Red Star 
facility near Bagram AB where the U.S. Defense Fuel Support Point and the title of fuel 
is contractor owned and operated.145 
2. Evolution of DLA Energy OEF Contracts 
DLA Energy’s role in Afghanistan evolved from its traditional “strategic” mission 
of delivering bulk fuel. Normally DLA Energy’s Bulk Fuels Division contracted for 
delivery of fuel to bulk storage facilities at various bases in Afghanistan, while the 
military services were responsible for supplying the forces and equipment to provide 
inland transportation and distribution of fuel from the bulk storage facilities to 
subordinate units in the field. In the late 2000s, due to manpower shortfalls and 
conflicting mission demands, USCENTCOM reached out to DLA Energy for assistance 
in soliciting and managing inland transportation and distribution contracts. In 2009, in a 
departure from its traditional mission of bulk fuel delivery, DLA Energy employed both 
its Bulk Fuels and Direct Delivery Fuels divisions to begin awarding inland distribution 
contracts in Afghanistan.146 As of 2011, DLA Energy has awarded ID/IQ multiple award 
contracts to six different contractors to deliver fuel to subordinate units at remote 
FOBs.147 
DLA Energy’s operations in Afghanistan were also characterized by the changes 
in the way it managed the fuel supply chain. Since 1991, DLA Energy “capitalized” its 
fuel inventory, meaning DLA Energy paid for fuel and infrastructure upfront and owned 
“all bulk petroleum product[s] from the point of purchase until its final point of issue to 
 
144. Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “Factbook: Fiscal Year 2011,” 45, accessed May 24, 2012, 
http://www.energy.dla.mil/energy_enterprise/Documents/Fact%20Book%20FY2011%20Rev.pdf. 
145. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge, (DLA Energy Representation to 
JFC HQ Brunssum) e-mail message to authors, July 28, 2012. 
146. Lynda Brown, “Bulk Services Reach Farther with Afghanistan Transportation Contracts,” Fuel 
Line (January, 2009), 5.  
147. Colonel U.S. Army Jeffrey B. Carra, (Commander, 165th Quartermaster Group (POL), Fort 
Belvoir, VA and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (2006–2009); Chief, Iraq Sub-Area Petroleum Office 2008–2009; 
Chief, Afghanistan Sub-Area Petroleum Office 2008–2009; Chief, Joint Petroleum Office, U.S. Central 
Command (2009–2010)), telephone interview, July 18, 2012. 
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power aircraft, ships, and ground equipment.”148 In 2007, DLA Energy began the 
practice of administering Free-On-Board Destination contracts in Afghanistan, under 
which it would only pay for fuel once a DoD end-user took possession of it at a bulk fuel 
storage site or a FOB. In this case, the “uncapitalized” fuel remained the property of the 
contractor who must manage the risks of in-transit losses within the treacherous LOCs of 
the Afghanistan combat zone. By shipping fuel Free-On-Board Destination, DLA Energy 
better manages the risk of product loss and finds greater efficiency in contract 
management.149 DLA Energy’s use of Free-On-Board Destination contracts is similar to 
the NATO fuel BOA, in that no payment is made until the product is delivered, and that 
responsibility for the entire supply chain (less oversight of contracts) is relinquished to 
the contractor. 
3. DLA Energy Command Structure and Oversight 
DLA Energy shoulders a heavy burden to oversee the thousands of contracts it 
issues. Each of DLA Energy’s Commodity Business Units, such as the Bulk Fuels and 
Direct Delivery Fuels divisions, are responsible for oversight of its own contracts. In 
order to perform this function, DLA Energy’s Commodity Business Units rely on 
contracting officers and contracting officer representatives (CORs) that are embedded 
with or near its customers. CORs may be employees of DLA Energy or military service 
members who are responsible for ensuring that the terms of a contract are fulfilled by 
contractors. Although the Commodity Business Units are responsible for overseeing its 
own contracts, the DLA Energy Acquisition Policy and Oversight office, which is under 
the purview of the Deputy Commander, DLA Energy, also advises each Commodity 
Business Unit on procurement-related matters, and provides oversight for all procurement 
functions.150 DLA Energy also receives contract administration and oversight from the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA “works directly with defense 
 
148. Global Security.org, “DLA Energy,” December 18, 2011, accessed July 20 2012, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/desc.htm. 
149. Lynda Brown, “Bulk Services Reach Farther with Afghanistan Transportation Contracts,” Fuel 
Line (January, 2009), 5. 
150. Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “Factbook: Fiscal Year 2011,” 45, accessed July 31, 2012, 
http://www.energy.dla.mil/energy_enterprise/Documents/Fact%20Book%20FY2011%20Rev.pdf. 
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suppliers to ensure that DoD, federal and allied government supplies and services are 
delivered on time, at projected cost and meet all performance requirements.151 DCMA 
assists DLA Energy in constructing solicitations, selecting capable contractors, writing 
contracts and monitoring contractor performance. In addition, the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) also assists DLA Energy by providing accounting, financial advisory, 
negotiation, administration, and settlement services.152 Figure 14 depicts the command 
relationships and oversight responsibilities of the organization surrounding DLA Energy. 
 
Figure 14.  DLA Energy Command Structure.153 
 
151. Defense Contract Management Agency, “Fact Sheet: FAQs.” July 2012, 5, accessed July 31, 
2012, http://www.dcma.mil/communicator/files/DCMA_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
152 Defense Contract Audit Agency, “DCAA History,” July 2012, accessed August 2, 2012, 
http://www.dcaa.mil/. 
153. From: Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “Factbook: Fiscal Year 2011,” 7, accessed July 31, 
2012, http://www.energy.dla.mil/energy_enterprise/Documents/Fact%20Book%20FY2011%20Rev.pdf. 
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Along with internal government agency oversight and audits, DLA Energy 
employs third party contractors to oversee its contracts in locations where U.S. personnel 
or agencies cannot travel. For example, DLA Energy has contracted with Cogeco Private 
Limited based in Lahore, Pakistan, to provide quality control checks on fuel originating 
in and transiting through Pakistan.154 This is part of DLA Energy’s contractor Quality 
Control Plan to provide oversight of their bulk fuel contracts. It is a firm-fixed-price 
contract with a set period of performance. The contractor’s duties are to inspect and 
observe that DLA Energy’s bulk fuel contractors are meeting the obligations of their 
performance work statements. Cogeco provides key oversight of the supply chain by 
physically witnessing and reporting on the contractors work operations from the 
refinery/port facilities through the border crossing points into Afghanistan. Essentially, 
Cogeco performs the duties of a COR/COTR. They also provide quality checks on fuel 
quality through laboratory testing.155 Cogeco Private Limited was recently awarded a six-
month extension ending on November 30, 2012 with an estimated value of 
$315,102.00.156 
C. OTHER U.S./NATO CONTRACTS 
1. The Logistic Civil Augmentation Program 
The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) provides contractor 
support to the U.S. Army, and is one of several options available to commanders for 
meeting combat support and combat service support shortfalls during crises. LOGCAP is 
a prominent logistics support instrument in USCENTCOM, and one against which it is 
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appropriate to contrast the NATO fuel BOA. Both instruments are critical in the support 
of coalition forces, and both differ in the scope of its support mission, the types of 
agreements into which it enters with contractors, the cost of investment in the program, 
and the amount of manpower and oversight required to execute the program effectively. 
In order to provide contrast between these two programs, this section explains the 
purpose and background of LOGCAP, its contract types and features, and the 
organization and oversight that surrounds it. 
2. LOGCAP Purpose and Background 
LOGCAP was developed in 1985 to provide such non-combat services to the U.S. 
Army as “delivering food, water, fuel, and spare parts; operating dining and laundry 
facilities; providing housing and sanitation; moving personnel and supplies; engineering 
and constructing projects; and maintaining facilities.”157 The U.S. Army considers the 
use of contractors as a “last resort” after exhausting the other military services, allied 
support, and local contracting.158 However, USCENTCOM has employed LOGCAP 
extensively since 1992, and is now considered essential to the success of operations. 
Using civilian contractors to augment military forces during conflict enables planners to 
mitigate several issues, such as the political sensitivity that accompanies activating guard 
and reserve forces, the lack of host nation support agreements in undeveloped countries, 
the troop ceilings designated to reduce U.S. presence, and the need to preserve military 
units to respond to a major regional conflict.159 Although the U.S. Army originated it, 
LOGCAP is available to and is used by the other services.160 
The first LOGCAP contract was competitively awarded to Brown and Root 
Services (now Kellogg, Brown and Root, or KBR) for one year with four option years in 
 
157. “Wartime Contracting Commission to Query Federal Officials Over Multi-billion-Dollar 
Logistics Contracts,” (prepared by Clark Irwin) Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, April 28, 2009, 1. 
158. Government Accountability Office, “Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,” GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February, 1997, 6. 
159. Government Accountability Office, “Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,” GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February, 1997, 4. 
160. Government Accountability Office, “Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,” GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February, 1997, 2. 
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1992.161 It provided logistics support to U.S. and United Nations (UN) forces in Somalia 
and the Balkans. LOGCAP II was awarded to DynCorp in 1997 to support U.S. forces in 
the Philippines, Latin America, and East Timor. LOGCAP III was again awarded to KBR 
in 2001, and LOGCAP IV was competitively awarded to DynCorp International LLC, 
Fluor Intercontinental Inc., and KBR Services in 2008. The Army also selected a 4th 
contractor under LOGCAP IV, Serco-North America, “to provide planning support, 
essentially monitoring the three other contractors. This structure introduces competition 
into the contracting process and allows the U.S. Army to manage the LOGCAP task 
orders more effectively.”162 The two most recent LOGCAPs supported operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, and Georgia.163 Under all LOGCAPs, the contractor was 
required to develop a worldwide management plan, participate in planning and exercises, 
and prepare to execute the plans upon notification. 
The U.S. Air Force and Navy also administer programs for contractor support, 
even though LOGCAP is available for use, and often is used by them. In fact, before 
creating their programs, both the U.S. Air Force and Navy relied on LOGCAP for 
support in Aviano, Italy, and during operations in Somalia. Both the U.S. Air Force and 
Navy admit that LOGCAP can meet their requirements; however they claim that 
contractor responsiveness and control was improved by maintaining their own programs. 
The Government Accountability Office believes that the services’ separate logistics 
support contracts provide similar services, and that LOGCAP could fulfill each service’s 
requirements as well as save the DoD money overall. A Government Accountability 
Office report explains that “[a]lthough the size and primary purpose of the three 
programs differ somewhat, the contracts will require similar engineering, logistics, and 
planning services. For example, under all three programs, the contractors will be required 
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to provide construction services and supplies and, in the U.S. Army and the Air Force 
programs, contractors are asked to identify potential civilian resources that can be relied 
on in contingencies.”164 
3. LOGCAP Contract Types and Features 
The contracts under the first three LOGCAPS were ID/IQ and were awarded to a 
single vendor. The LOGCAPs provided critical support to U.S. military operations 
worldwide, but government audits uncovered incidents of fraud, waste and abuse by KBR 
under LOGCAP III. In order to remedy the perceived problems in contractor 
performance, accountability and oversight under LOGCAP III, U.S. Army contracting 
officials sought services from multiple contractors for LOGCAP IV. LOGCAP IV was 
awarded as an ID/IQ multiple award contracts under which the three contractors compete 
for individual task orders under the overall contract. The ID/IQ multiple award contracts 
increases competition between the three contractors and is meant to improve 
transparency, quality and cost effectiveness. 
In his testimony to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Jeffrey Parsons, the Executive Director of the U.S. Army Contracting 
Command, explained the benefits of multiple award contracts in LOGCAP IV: 
The multiple award approach reduces risk by removing a single point of 
failure. It incentivizes contractor performance by providing built-in quick-
response alternatives should any one contractor fail to provide good 
contract performance. At the same time, the multiple award approach 
keeps prices down through competition at the task order level. This 
strategy increases capacity by broadening the industrial base the Army can 
draw upon to support many complex operations occurring across the globe 
at any given time.165 
The LOGCAP IV contracting process begins when the U.S. Department of the 
Army issues requests for proposals to solicit bids on task orders. The three contractors 
then compete for award of the open task orders by submitting a bid for consideration. The 
 164 Government Accountability Office, “Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,” GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February, 1997, 23–24. 
165. Jeffrey Parsons, Hearing transcript: “LOGCAP Support-contracting Challenges in Iraq and 
Afghanistan,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, May 4, 2009, 28. 
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Department of the Army then chooses the proposal that provides the best value to the 
government, and evaluates the contractor’s bids according to the following factors, listed 
in descending order of importance: technical/management approach, past performance, 
and cost/price.166 LOGCAP IV was awarded as a maximum 10-year contract (one base 
year and nine option years), under which the three contractors can each earn up to $5B 
per year of a maximum $15B per year award.167 
In addition, LOGCAP contracts are also awarded as cost-plus-award-fee 
instruments.168 William M. Solis, the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management 
at the Government Accountability Office, explains the cost-plus-award-fee contract and 
its intended benefits. 
Cost-plus-award-fee contracts entitle the contractor to be reimbursed for 
reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred to the extent prescribed 
in the contract. The advantage of cost-plus-award-fee contracts is that they 
provide financial incentives based on contractor’s performance and criteria 
stated in the contract. These contracts enable the government to evaluate a 
contractor’s performance according to specified criteria and to grant an 
award amount within designated parameters. Thus, award fees can serve 
as a valuable tool to help control program risk and encourage excellence in 
contract performance. But to reap the advantages that cost-plus-award-fee 
contracts offer, the government must implement an effective award fee 
process.169“ 
An effective award fee process must include responsible contractor oversight in order to 
assess whether the contractor is meeting the standards specified in the contract. The next 
section describes the organization that surrounds, administers and oversees LOGCAP. 
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4. LOGCAP Administration and Oversight 
Multiple DoD and service components share responsibility for managing and 
overseeing LOGCAP contracts. The Army Materiel Command is the executive agent for 
LOGCAP, and is responsible for coordinating LOGCAP requirements with the unified 
commands, other services, and Army-supported combatant commanders for Army 
Materiel Command contractor support. Army Materiel Command assigned responsibility 
for LOGCAP to the commander of Army Field Support Command, who has organized 
LOGCAP under three separate offices: the LOGCAP Program Manager; the LOGCAP 
Contracting Office; and the LOGCAP Support Unit.170 Table 5 details the key contract 
management roles and responsibilities for the three LOGCAP offices. 
 
Customers LOGCAP Contracting Officer 
• Develop requirements. 
• Write statements of work. 
• Obtain funding. 
• Monitor contract performance. 
• Evaluate technical performance. 
• Provide the award fee board with input. 
• Interprets the contract. 
• Obligates the government for work under the 
contract. 
• Delegates contract administration procedures to 
administrative contracting officers. 
• Provides the award fee board with input. 
• Definitizes the task orders 
LOGCAP Support Unit LOGCAP Program Manager 
• Serves as the Army interface between the 
customer and the LOGCAP contractor. 
• Advises customer of LOGCAP capabilities. 
• Serves as on-site contracting officer representative 
as needed. 
• Deploys worldwide in support of any contingency 
using LOGCAP. 
• Provides LOGCAP central management. 
• Provides education and training. 
• Provides plan and budget for program resources. 
• Prioritizes planning requirements. 
• Partners with contractor to ensure responsive and 
flexible support. 
• Identifies emerging requirements. 
• Ensures statement of work’s execution. 
Table 5.   Key LOGCAP Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities.171 
LOGCAP is a multi-billion dollar contract that is awarded to three contractors that 
compete for fourteen task orders. Management and oversight of such a large contract is a 
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major challenge, so DoD agencies augment the work performed by the Army Field 
Support Command. The Rock Island Contracting Center, DCMA, DCAA, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Reserve LOGCAP Support Unit and CORs within 
U.S. Army units manage LOGCAP through a collaborative effort.172 DCMA ensures that 
the cost, product performance, and delivery schedules comply with the terms and 
conditions of the contract by monitoring a contractor’s performance and management 
systems. DCAA audits LOGCAP contracts and provides accounting and financial advice 
regarding Army Field Support Command contracts and subcontracts. DCAA also 
provides services regarding the negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts 
and subcontracts.173 Figure 15 depicts the command relationships and responsibilities of 
the organization surrounding LOGCAP. 
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Figure 15.  Organizational Structure for Management of LOGCAP.174 
5. Bulk Transportation–Theater Movement Contracts 
Although the NATO fuel BOAs provide for theater fuel distribution, not all 
customers choose to take advantage of these services. Likewise the BOA cannot serve 
certain locations, such as RC East, because it lies outside of the BOAs area of 
responsibility. In order to provide theater-wide fuel delivery, the NATO Support Agency 
(NSPA) and the U.S. Joint Sustainment Command–Afghanistan (JSC-A) developed 
contract transportation solutions. NSPA provides a NATO bulk transportation contract 
managed by a commercial transportation brokerage company called XeLES. The NSPA 
system is very similar to a U.S. blanket purchase agreement; however, instead of 
soliciting directly from a supplier, NSPA contracts the XeLES Group as a middleman to 
solicit bids from various transportation subcontractors.175 XeLES invoices NSPA who in 
turn invoices the ISAF customer for services provided. Contract oversight is provided in 
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part by NSPA employees, NSPA consultants, and through third party contractors acting 
as COR/COTR similar to the Cogeco contractors of DLA Energy.176 NSPA covers its 
operating costs through a pre-negotiated processing fee that is levied during invoicing of 
ISAF customers. JFC HQ Brunssum maintains a similar brokerage-style agreement for 
commercial cargo airlift through the NATO Airlift BOA; however, no fee is assessed as 
assigned military personnel provide for the agreement’s management and oversight.177 
Like NATO, USCENTCOM, through the JSC-A, has had to rely on contract 
solutions to make up for a lack of organic military units. The JSC-A awarded contracts 
for inland transportation and distribution support that also provided for fuel delivery. 
JSC-A relies on a variety of contract instruments with various companies; however, it has 
focused on a national and regional level concept that legally limits competition to Afghan 
businesses. The National Afghan Trucking contracts provide transportation service across 
Afghanistan, and rely heavily on security from private security companies, Afghan Public 
Protection Force, or U.S. Government security services. The Afghan Transportation 
Network (ATN) contracts represent a typical U.S. blanket purchase agreement, in that it 
fills anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing charge accounts 
directly with qualified sources.178 The ATN is regionally based, and relies on the 
influence of local Afghan leaders to provide secure transportation support. The most 
recent performance work statement of March 8, 2012, for expansion of ATN service to 
RC South and Southwest, sets the contract’s primary objective as providing safe and 
reliable transportation for U.S. forces with minimal use of military assets.179 
 
176. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army (ret.) Brian McMurry, e-mail message to authors, July 30, 2012.; 
Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army (ret.) Brian McMurry, telephone interview July 18, 2012. 
177. For two years I managed the NATO Airlift BOA in coordination with our airlift broker Kuehne + 
Nagel Group based out of Frankfurt Germany. I acted on behalf of out NATO customers providing a 
requirement to the Kuehne + Nagel Group who then provided a subcontracted aircraft for our use. I in turn 
billed my customers and paid the Kuehne + Nagel Group for their services to include cost of the 
subcontracted aircraft. M.J.Evans 
178. Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 13.3 ‘Simplified Acquisition Methods,” accessed July 
31, 2012, https://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2013_3.html#wp1092109. 
179. Joint Sustainment Command–Afghanistan, “Performance Work Statement (PWS) Suite II 
Afghanistan Transportation Network (ATN)–Southwest/West,” March 8, 2012, accessed 29 July 29, 2012, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/92062744/Buying-Hearts-and-Minds-in-Afghanistan, 2-4.; First Lieutenant 
U.S. Army Mary K. Blanchfield, “Transportation Challenges in Afghanistan,” Army Logistician 37 
(March-April 2005) accessed July 29, 2012, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr05/afgan.html. 
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The ATN contract uses Afghan owned and operated companies described as 
“Elder Owned Companies” that work in cooperation with influential local leaders to 
provide safe passage through the provinces and communities. The concept goes a bit 
beyond traditional contracting methodology, in that the requirement to use Afghan owned 
and operated companies is built into the contract to positively contribute to the ATN’s 
effectiveness as well as to achieve ISAF and GIRoA political requirements to eliminate 
the need for private security forces.180 For fuel shipments, the JSC-A sets contractor 
allowances and penalties for missed delivery, delay due to requirement holder, 
contaminated shipments, excessive demurrage times, and lost fuel. While the requirement 
holder retains title of the fuel, the contract specifies that the contractor is held financially 
liable for all lost fuel. ATN contract oversight is provided by CORs stationed throughout 
Afghanistan.181 
D. CONCLUSION 
In reviewing the NATO ISAF fuel operation, two fairly distinct approaches to 
structuring contracts emerged. The NATO fuel BOA represented a single, integrated 
instrument that provided for contracted fuel operations from strategic acquisition through 
theater level operations. At the same time, the BOA provided an extreme example of 
contractor management of military support operations where contractors managed almost 
the entire NATO fuel supply chain. The BOA’s PPL was unique in that it allowed NATO 
logisticians to build and operate half of ISAF’s total fuel operation without having to 
invest upfront capital or resources. In contrast, U.S. fuel operations represented a more 
layered approach with multiple agencies that contributed to building and operating and 
overseeing the fuel supply chain. DLA Energy provided strategic acquisition and delivery 
with recent moves into theater level support, while U.S. theater commands and its service 
components provided the final portion of the U.S. fuel supply chain. Both approaches 
 
180. Joint Sustainment Command–Afghanistan, “Performance Work Statement (PWS) Suite II 
Afghanistan Transportation Network (ATN)–Southwest/West,” March 8, 2012, accessed 29 July 29, 2012, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/92062744/Buying-Hearts-and-Minds-in-Afghanistan, 2–3. 
181. Joint Sustainment Command–Afghanistan, “Performance Work Statement (PWS) Suite II 
Afghanistan Transportation Network (ATN)–Southwest/West,” March 8, 2012, accessed 29 July 29, 2012, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/92062744/Buying-Hearts-and-Minds-in-Afghanistan, 25–28. 
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have pros and cons, and certain aspects of risk are inherent. The following chapter builds 
on the review of NATO ISAF fuel history and contracting instruments, and analyzes the 
financial risks and political factors that influence decisions to use organic or contract fuel 
support. 
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V.  RISK ANALYSIS  
This chapter considers how political and financial risk influenced U.S. and NATO 
leaders’ decisions whether to use organic fuel support forces or to hire contractors to do 
the job instead. Financial risks will influence political decisions, and vice-versa. In the 
case of strategic and multinational fuel operations, leaders must consider the cost of the 
product and its delivery, as well as the cost of managing the fuel supply system, including 
manpower and oversight. Political considerations will also influence a nation’s decision 
as to whether it will use organic or contracted fuel support. Fuel support operations in 
OEF are influenced by the political environment within the United States and Allied 
nations, the nature of the conflict, the rules of engagement established in the AOR, and 
host nation interests and decisions. External political risk by international allies and 
stakeholders, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, can also have direct and significant 
impact on operations. Political risk is also often self-imposed by politicians and decision 
makers, who may directly or indirectly impede operations through ill-advised policy 
decisions. In such cases, it seems that the only decision a nation can make is to mitigate 
the risks that previous policy decisions have forced them to accept. A more thorough and 
proactive risk analysis done earlier in the strategic planning process could help leaders 
avoid a great deal more problems and make more economical and politically wise 
decisions that would better prepare a nation’s military for war. 
A. RISK ASSESSMENT 
U.S. and NATO planners performed a careful risk analysis that weighed the pros 
and cons of using either organic or contract fuel support for multinational operations in 
Afghanistan. The NATO ISAF fuel team’s decision to hire contractors under the fuel 
BOA was an economic and political one, and was born out of necessity when no member 
nation would assume responsibility for providing fuel or fuel support to the Alliance. 
USCENTCOM faced risk by releasing control of fuel operations to a NATO staff when it 
decided to use the NATO fuel BOA. DLA Energy provided traditional bulk fuel support 
to combat forces until financial and political factors led it to begin tendering contracts for 
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tactical fuel support, much like the NATO ISAF fuel team did. Both the United States 
and NATO have relinquished significant degrees of control to contractors on the 
battlefield, and both considered significant financial risk and political factors when 
selecting the most effective course of action. 
B. POLITICAL FACTORS CAN INCREASE OR MITIGATE RISK 
The internal and external policies of decision makers and stakeholders shaped the 
organization, cost and effectiveness of fuel operations in OEF. A government’s own 
internal policies, as well as its external policies toward managing sensitive international 
relationships, can either increase or mitigate risk and impact the success of operations. 
Within the United States, inconsistent policy regarding the strategic employment of its 
armed forces has practically forced military leaders to share more of the battlefield with 
and relinquish greater operational control to defense contractors. The U.S. and NATO 
strove to secure commitments from international partners who struggled with manpower, 
financial and material resources, and international pressure. Within NATO, varying 
capabilities and resources determined a nation’s commitment to collective defense. 
NATO publications strongly encourage member nation commitment to communal 
support, yet also provide easy options for a nation to forsake the Alliance and provision 
for its own forces. Finally, both organizations fear that contractors may fail in their 
duties, despite a historically very dependable record of performance. Although internal 
politics are a variable that lie within a nation’s control, external political factors are more 
difficult to predict and control. This section will describe how both internal and external 
political considerations can put fuel operations at risk. 
When U.S. policy makers decided to fight a two-front war in 2003, they created 
the requirement for a greater number of contractors in theater, whether they liked it or 
not. Military forces were stretched thin overall, and an insufficient number of organic 
military logistics forces were available to support combat forces between Iraq and 
Afghanistan. When U.S. policy limited the number of troops in theater, commanders 
often decided to deploy a greater number of combat troops in lieu of support troops. As 
such, the U.S. government left themselves with no choice other than to rely on 
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contractors to provide vital logistics and fuel support to forward forces. As contractor 
requirements grew, U.S. forces became more dependent on contractor support, while the 
burden and expense of managing and overseeing the contractors continued to grow as 
well. As the number of support contracts grew beyond the capability to effectively 
manage and oversee them, defense officials and policy makers have continually debated 
how to fix the problem into which they have contracted themselves. 
Within the U.S. government and military lies a duplicity and contradiction of 
opinion with regard to its level of dependence on contract support. On the one hand, 
contractors are extolled as a vital part of operations, while on the other hand they are 
vilified as corrupt war profiteers. During an April 2010 speech, U.S. General and ISAF 
Commander Stanley A. McChrystal provided a shining example of this duplicity. 
‘I think that the use of contractors was done with good intentions, so we 
could live with a limited number of military [personnel]; in some cases, 
we thought we could save money,’ he said. 
‘I think it doesn’t save money. I actually think it would be better to reduce 
the number of contractors involved, increase the number of military if 
necessary, and where we have contractors, in many cases, I believe we 
could stop using foreign contractors and use a greater number of Afghan 
contractors,’ he said. ‘We have created in ourselves a dependency on 
contractors that is greater than it ought to be.’182 
General McChrystal’s predecessor, U.S. General David McKiernan, attempted to reduce 
this dependency by deploying U.S. theater support forces into Afghanistan. However, 
when General McChrystal took command of ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, he 
reversed this approach in favor of more combat forces. Although General McChrystal 
expressed concerns about U.S. overdependence on contractors, he also sent home U.S. 
 
182. Pierre Tran, “NATO Commander: Too many contractors in Afghanistan,” Federal Times, April 
20, 2010, accessed July 14, 2012, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20100420/DEPARTMENTS01/ 
4200307/NATO-Commander-Too-many-contractors-Afghanistan. 
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logistics units that could have reduced that dependency.183 Those higher-level policy 
decisions that established troop limits created the dependency on contractor support. 
Duplicity exists even at the highest levels of U.S. national authority. In its final 
report, The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan heavily 
chastised the U.S. Congress for its role in this duplicity: 
The role of Congress is critical. The problems identified in this report will 
not fix themselves, and cannot be fixed for free, or even cheaply. It is not 
enough for Congress to say, “There are too many contractors,” or “Some 
contractors are performing tasks reserved to the government,” or “We 
need better oversight of contractors,” or “We won’t have another big 
contingency operation.” Congress must direct and participate in serious 
reform. 
Paying lip service to reform will not cure problems such as the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) being under-staffed and at the 
mercy of temporary funding for many of its contract-management 
professionals. Nor will lip service help the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA), whose backlog of incurred-cost contract audits has now 
grown to more than $550 billion and will require years of work to reduce 
even if hundreds of new auditors were hired.184 
The Commission itself, however, fell into this same trap. The Commission ultimately 
concluded that U.S. agencies are over reliant on contractors and as such they have eroded 
organic “capacity to perform some mission-critical functions.”185 However, the report is 
almost entirely focused on bettering contract operations and makes reference to reducing 
dependence on contractors in only two of its sixty-four recommendations to the U.S. 
 
183. Colonel U.S. Army Jeffrey B. Carra, (Commander, 165th Quartermaster Group (POL), Fort 
Belvoir, VA and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (2006–2009); Chief, Iraq Sub-Area Petroleum Office 2008–2009; 
Chief, Afghanistan Sub-Area Petroleum Office 2008–2009; Chief, Joint Petroleum Office, U.S. Central 
Command (2009-2010)), interviewed by Michael Evans, July 2, 2012, Interview Carra.mp3, Evans Private 
Oral History Collection.; As part of General McChrystal’s ISAF HQ Movement and Transportation Staff 
and later, as a NATO participant in the 2009–2010 USCENTCOM Movement Planning Conferences, I 
witnessed the U.S. policy limitation levied on USCENTCOM troop numbers and especially the U.S. 
support units in favor of combat forces. M.J. Evans. 
184. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011, 
167. 
185. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011, 
2. 
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Congress. In these two recommendations, the Commission advocated using risk analysis 
to determine if contingency contracting is required and suggested that U.S. agencies like, 
the DoD, should grow organic capacities.186 Those decision makers who complained 
about an overreliance on contractors due to a shortage of organic manpower had the 
power to change it. Without action, those complaints were essentially about their failure 
to perform a proper risk analysis enroute to a wise and well-calculated decision. 
In 2011, the senior logistics officers of the key troop contributing nations of ISAF 
expressed a growing concern about similar management issues. In a February 24, 2011 
letter to JFC HQ Brunssum, they expressed their collective concerns about the fuel BOA. 
In particular, we feel that nations who have a strategic equity in the 
delivery of fuel to this theater have limited influence in relations to key 
decisions regarding this vital commodity. Moreover, specific issues such 
as visibility over the pricing mechanism, contract performance indicators 
and supply chain velocity also appear to be vulnerabilities that are not 
addressed under the current fuel ‘contract.’ 
Given our growing concerns it may be useful to provide a level of 
assurance that the BOA is indeed delivering cost effective management of 
NATO fuel in Afghanistan to all nations. To this end you may find it 
helpful for the International Board of Auditor NATO (IBAN) to conduct 
an independent audit of fuel management and the structure of the BOA. 
We stand ready to provide assistance should you require.187 
Although these senior logisticians correctly identified key concerns within 
contract fuel management, the memorandum spoke to much larger issues internal to the 
Alliance. The letter inherently showed a perception of mistrust or fear about the lack of 
perceived control over the NATO fuel BOA. Because of the lack of organic logistics 
capability within NATO and the larger ISAF Alliance, the NATO fuel BOAs had to push 
contracted fuel support further into the operational battlefield than ever before. At the 
 
186. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011, 
176, 178. 
187. Lieutenant-General Kathleen Gainey (Director JS-J4 USA), Major-General Jeff Mason (ACDS 
Log Ops GBR), Major-General Mark McQuillan (Commander CANOSCOM CAN), and Air Vice Marshal 
Margaret Staib (Commander Joint Logistics AUS) to Major General Hans-Erich Antoni (JFC HQ 
Brunssum DCOS Support), February 24, 2011, “Governance of NATO Fuel Management.” JFC HQ 
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same time, a single U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, with at best a spartan support staff, 
centrally managed and provided oversight to this huge contracted fuel operation. It was a 
testament to the ability of the NATO ISAF fuel team, including the U.S. management 
team at DLA Energy and USCENTCOM, that their contractors met, and often exceeded 
COMISAF’s fuel and infrastructure requirements at every turn. More important, this 
letter revealed a serious communication failure within the Alliance and the national 
chains of command. 
Although it should have been, this letter was proffered without prior coordination 
with the primary NATO ISAF fuel operations stakeholders, such as USCENTCOM, 
COMISAF, COMIJC, the ISAF Regional Commands, or the National Military 
Representatives assigned to NATO. COMISAF exercised direct and complete control 
over the NATO fuel BOA. All requirements, fuel or infrastructure, came directly from 
ISAF to JFC HQ Brunssum for implementation through the BOA. The USCENTCOM J4 
had direct input into all fuel related requirements through the JPO and SAPO and 
coordinated theater operations daily with the Brunssum and HQ IJC fuel staff. The JFC 
HQ Brunssum P&C staff published itemized fuel prices to the National Military 
Representatives and to each nation’s financial institutions that paid BOA invoices. DLA 
Energy had a representative on staff at JFC HQ Brunssum and provided coordination on 
all fuel projects and BOA contractor operations. Additionally, each BOA had built-in 
pricing annexes and associated performance measures for both the contractor and the 
agreement owners at JFC HQ Brunssum. For their part, the British military manned the 
HQ IJC fuel office and also acted as contact embassy for diplomatic representation of 
NATO in Pakistan. Each National Military Representative received all logistics situation 
reports of fuel activities through the NATO reporting systems. Yet with this exceptional 
degree of transparency, information, and inter-Alliance coordination, the senior most 
logisticians of four key troop contributing nations held little working knowledge of the 
BOAs and even less information on the level of management and services that their 
nations maintained within and through the NATO fuel BOAs. 
Miscommunication and mistrust is an unfortunate characteristic of Alliances and 
multinational operations. Major stakeholders questioned the administration of the fuel 
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support agreements and were suspicious of the contractors’ ability to continue to provide 
support. The dependence on contract fuel support has led government and military 
officials to a fear that contractors will fail. Aside from the internal political factors that 
impacted military operations, external risks over which decision makers have less control 
proved to be a greater threat to contract fuel operations. One such external factor was 
whether Afghanistan’s dangerous and limited LOCs could continue to handle the 
demands of fuel transportation and distribution. Senior ISAF transportation officers 
feared that LOC capacity would prove insufficient to handle the required traffic and 
could jeopardize military operations. Between 2008 and 2011, JFC HQ Brunssum, 
Logistics Resources Branch, Movement and Transportation Section conducted numerous 
unpublished studies on the capacity and vulnerability of the ISAF LOCs. The studies 
remain unpublished because NATO had no presence along any of the LOCs and early on 
had little actual contact with ISAF’s six major border crossings. Data on LOCs came 
from personal assessment of unseen road and rail networks and depended heavily on 
contractor-provided LOC transit times and capacity evaluations.188 U.S. Transportation 
Command provided data to assist in understanding LOC transit times; however, NATO 
transportation section’s effort could not validate their fears of ISAF LOC capacity 
vulnerability. 
The real factors surrounding LOC vulnerability was neither capacity nor 
contractor ability to deliver fuel, but the political capability of foreign nations to 
effectively close LOCs and isolate ISAF. The Government of Pakistan provided this 
example on November 26, 2011 when it closed the southern LOCs.189 To mitigate this 
setback, the ISAF nations’ political and diplomatic corps moved quickly to find alternate 
suppliers and LOC through the Northern Distribution Network, a series of commercial 
logistical arrangements through which fuel passed from Russia, Central Asia, and the 
 
188. During my assignment to the HQ ISAF Joint Theater Movement Staff I had opportunity to chair 
the ISAF Boarder Crossing VTCs. While the meeting provided a forum for communication very little real 
data about ISAF LOC vulnerability could be gathered. We depended heavily on contractor provided 
information and JFC HQ Brunssum’s LRB MTS relied heavily on our information. It was not until the end 
of 2009 that U.S. teams began actively monitoring border crossings. M.J.Evans. 
189. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge (DLA Energy Representative to JFC 
HQ Brunssum), telephone interview, July 15, 2012. 
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Caucasus into Afghanistan. In addition, COMISAF mandated that ISAF maintain a 60 
day supply of fuel in bulk storage to mitigate the southern LOC closure. The JFC HQ 
Brunssum Fuel Chief expressed concern about rail congestion with the increased traffic 
on the northern LOCs and the metering of rail cars imposed by the Uzbekistan 
transportation authorities. As with the previous NATO LOC studies, however, the fears 
of a northern traffic jam impacting NATO ISAF fuel operations would prove 
unfounded.190 Figure 16 provides a snap shot of fuel levels before and after the southern 
LOC closure. With the exception of unleaded gasoline (F-67), ISAFs data reveals that 
fuel quantities actually increased during the Pakistan blockade. Even with these political 
maneuverings, ISAF fuel stock levels reached an all-time high despite the loss of two 
main LOCs. 
 
190. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge (DLA Energy Representative to JFC 
HQ Brunssum), telephone interview, July 15, 2012.; Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC 
HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior 
NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, Brunssum, The Netherlands. May 15, 2012). 
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Figure 16.  Fuel Stock Level Comparison in Days of Supply (DOS) Before and After 
Pakistan Closed the Southern LOCs.191 
Without political and diplomatic intervention by the United States and NATO on 
behalf of the contractor, it is very likely that adverse external political action could have 
impeded support to ISAF. Without their support, contractors had little recourse when 
sovereign nations closed international borders. Pakistan’s closure of the southern LOCs 
provides a prime example of how external political factors could jeopardize fuel 
operations. However, Afghanistan’s internal policies held a more significant risk.  
A chief concern of both DLA Energy and NATO fuel BOA contractors was 
obtaining commercial business licenses from the government of the Islamic Republic of 
 
191. From: Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army Eduardo Santiago (JFC HQ Brunssum Fourth Fuel Chief 
Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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Afghanistan (GIRoA) to operate within the country.192 Without business licenses, 
companies could not operate in Afghanistan. The problem of obtaining business licenses 
resulted from the opposing interpretations of status of forces agreements taxation policies 
held by the GIRoA Ministry of Finance, U.S. Department of State and NATO legal 
representatives. U.S. Diplomatic Note 202 clearly stated that U.S. contractors and the 
services contracted were not subject to the taxes of GIRoA.193 Annex A of the ISAF 
Military Technical Agreement contained similar verbiage that extended tax-exempt status 
to ISAF contractors and their services.194 However, GIRoA officials in the Ministry of 
Finance and the Customs and Revenue Department began to dispute the original 
agreements, and provided their own interpretation of the U.S. Diplomatic Note 202 and 
the ISAF Military Technical Agreement (MTA). After years of discussion, the last formal 
letters of exchange in 2011 left the issue unresolved. GIRoA held that the majority of 
contracted services, supplies, and personnel income were subject to GIRoA law and were 
legally taxable.195 ISAF has conceded certain points and understood that some aspects of 
contractor operations would be taxable.196 Figure 17 provides the COMISAF 
interpretation of the MTA taxables. Because Afghanistan still lacks a sufficient tax 
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nations. April 26, 2012). 
196. General U.S. Army Commander ISAF David H. Petraeus to His Excellency Minister of Finance 
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collection system, GIRoA holds contractors responsible for payment of all taxes. In his 
final letter to the GIRoA Minister of Finance, U.S. General David Petraeus, Commander, 
USCENTCOM, sympathized with GIRoA’s concerns and offered assistance in 
developing tax systems, but insisted that GIRoA was responsible for collecting taxes 
from its people, not from ISAF or its contractors.197 The matter remains unsettled and has 
become leverage for GIRoA to withhold contractors’ business licenses unless their tax 
demands are met. 
 
Figure 17.  ISAF Interpretation of the Military Technical Agreement and Contractor 
Tax Obligation.198 
GIRoA first required companies to obtain business licenses in 2008. By direction 
of HQ ISAF and JFC HQ Brunssum, NATO fuel BOA contractors complied with these 
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Letter of Interpretation,” accessed July 24, 2012, http://stability-operations.org/legislative/ 
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new requirements; however, in 2009 GIRoA refused to issue new business licenses to the 
Supreme Group before all GIRoA-exercised taxes were paid. For more than a year, 
negotiations took place between Supreme and GIRoA, until Supreme made a good faith 
payment of $11.2 Million to GIRoA against any possible future taxes owed so that it 
could continue to operate in Afghanistan. However, GIRoA demands upon Supreme 
continued to grow. GIRoA has enforced its interpretation of the MTA by disrupting 
LOCs through limiting customs documents, withholding of business licenses, seizing 
contractor assets and bank accounts, and limiting the freedom of movement of contractor 
personnel. In a series of recent meetings between Supreme and the GIRoA Customs and 
Revenue Department to settle these issues, GIRoA has requested an additional goodwill 
payment of $11.5 million as collateral against the current tax audit being conducting on 
Supreme’s 2005-2012 finances. The payment would enable Supreme to receive its tax 
clearance documentation required to renew its business license. Supreme has not made 
this additional payment and is currently embroiled in a running legal battle with the 
various GIRoA ministries to resolve the tax issues.199 
In a White Paper presented to ISAF leadership, The Supreme Group wrote that it 
has: 
…overcome many problems in the ten years it has supported the ISAF 
effort in Afghanistan, but this is the most serious threat we have 
encountered to our continued ability to provide support to the allied forces. 
The problems that SG has encountered in recent weeks will inevitably 
affect all contractors supporting the international effort in Afghanistan. 
We believe that the time has come for the ultimate stakeholders in 
Afghanistan—the nations and international organizations—to take 
concerted action to resolve these issues.200 
If COMISAF stands by his interpretation of the MTA and does not require contractors to 
pay GIRoA taxes, then he must actively engage GIRoA on behalf of NATO contractors 
to provide the necessary political leverage. But herein lies a critical shortfall within 
NATO; NATO has no embassy or diplomatic corps establishment to support COMISAF 
 
199. The Supreme Group, “White Paper: Tax Affairs” (paper presented to the senior leadership of 
ISAF nations. April 26, 2012). 
200. The Supreme Group, “White Paper: Tax Affairs” (paper presented to the senior leadership of 
ISAF nations. April 26, 2012). 
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thus leaving the NATO fuel BOA contractors to fend for themselves. While NATO lacks 
this capability, these same NATO contractors execute fuel contracts for the United States 
Because they receive the full support and power of the U.S. Embassy and its diplomatic 
corps, they do not face the tax issues under the U.S. contracts. This divided 
political/diplomatic support to contractors has allowed GIRoA to leverage power over 
NATO and its contractors. 
NATO contractors have complied with all local laws, but they have nonetheless 
been caught between GIRoA and HQ ISAF interpretations of international agreements. 
Contractors continue to comply with COMISAF intent while at the same time working 
through GIRoA interpretation of the MTA. NATO contractors could very simply comply 
with GIRoA intent and provide all tax liabilities requested. The increased taxes would 
ultimately drive a higher PPL for the NATO fuel BOA, but NATO ISAF fuel operations 
would remain secure. The current requirement for NATO contractors to refuse to pay 
GIRoA-interpreted taxes has been backed by insufficient political support from NATO. 
Meanwhile, NATO contractors continue in a state of limbo while awaiting NATO and 
U.S.-backed political decisions. 
Although senior logistics leadership and other national leaders have expressed 
fears about overdependence on contractors, the actual probability of failure for fuel 
contractors has proven nil within ISAF support operations. In fact, it seems that contract 
operations are more at risk due to politics than to actions of the contractors themselves. In 
addition to internal and external political factors, the policies of senior defense leaders 
within the United States and NATO could also enable or jeopardize coalition operations. 
The NATO fuel BOA was developed by a very small staff and flourished despite the lack 
of support or buy-in of coalition leadership. The BOA was innovative and successful, but 
also unusual, which may explain why it never garnered enduring support or commitments 
from coalition leadership. Although initially successful, the BOA was undercut by 
policies that complicated and slowed a simple and efficient program. 
ISAF nations’ traditional practices of rotating personnel placed the effectiveness 
of fuel operations at risk. Normally, key logistics staff positions are turned over on 
average every two to three years, while deployment times are significantly shorter and 
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range from six months to 15 months. These rotations do not enable ISAF to build and 
maintain expertise, and have created a revolving door of leadership and oversight in the 
NATO ISAF fuel programs. Contrast this practice with that during WWII, when leaders 
and their staff normally remained in the same position throughout the war to ensure 
continuity. The four senior NATO logisticians who expressed their key concerns with the 
NATO fuel BOA, have since moved on to other positions or retired from their national 
staffs, and the leadership that replaced them has not shared their original concerns and 
focused their attention on other priorities. In addition, NATO nations have been reluctant 
to fill the key Fuel Chief position at JFC HQ Brunssum. Since May 2012, the United 
States has failed to source a replacement officer for the Fuel Chief position, and neither 
have JFC HQ Brunssum nor other nations appointed a temporary replacement. Theater 
level rotations impact operations in a similar way. 
After General McChrystal took command of ISAF, he overturned his 
predecessor’s policies by redeploying organic logistics personnel. His decision created a 
greater dependence on contractors, without increasing the number of theater staff or 
oversight personnel needed to balance contractor operations. While serving as ISAF 
Commander, U.S. General Petraeus engaged GIRoA officials to work through taxation 
and customs issues, while at the same time he discontinued key staff engagement 
procedures established by his predecessors. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring 
Board of ISAF that had previously resolved these logistics concerns with GIRoA has not 
been active since 2011. The resulting inactivity has left contractors pleading for help as is 
evident in the Supreme Groups’ 2012 White Paper. Beyond senior leadership or staff 
rotation rates, the frequent rotation of COR/COTR in theater has had significant impact 
on contract oversight. By frequently changing these first line oversight managers, nations 
have placed themselves at a disadvantage in overseeing contractor operations. 
NATO and U.S. officials’ internal squabbles have created a risk for 
mismanagement, yet contract fuel operations have continued to provide fuel to military 
forces. The truth is that contractors have proven to be very capable of reliably providing 
fuel to ISAF. Until such time as nations build or expand organic logistics units, military 
operations will continue to depend heavily on contract fuel support. Because nations must 
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depend on contracted fuel operations, risk comes not from the contractors but from the 
inability to provide necessary political and diplomatic support to the contractors. While 
the contractors have proven they can perform large theater level fuel operations, there are 
still risks that contract costs could outpace the nations’ financial capabilities and that poor 
contract management practices could lead to inferior contract performance and excessive 
and wasteful costs. 
C. FINANCIAL RISK 
Inasmuch as political factors determine whether a nation provides logistic and 
fuel support using organic or contract personnel, the consequences of those political 
factors may also impact the costs of either course of action. Policies determine the 
availability of and permission for personnel to provide fuel support in theater, which is a 
factor when deciding whether to send a U.S. Army fuel company or to contract a local 
truck from Pakistan to deliver fuel to FOBs. Although LOGCAP and additional 
transportation contracts cost the United States billions of dollars, the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has concluded that contracting is often 
more cost effective than employing organic units to perform the same tasks.201 Given the 
lack of organic logistics units to cover the requirements of current international 
engagements, Allied nations must consider the cost effectiveness of the contracts used to 
provide fuel to their fielded forces. DLA Energy can provide a gallon of gas to its 
customers for less than any of NATO’s contractors. Although it would seem an easy 
choice for customers to determine where to spend their money, there are many other 
expenses that decision makers must consider when ordering its fuel.  
Much more than the cost of the product alone is figured into the final price per 
gallon. In addition to the price of the product itself, fuel providers must also factor in the 
costs of additional personnel requirements, management and administrative costs, as well 
as the costs of oversight. The combination of these additional factors would increase the 
total cost of providing fuel, but the cost could be significantly lower if operations were 
 
201. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011, 
235. 
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responsibly managed and overseen. Because of the strong reliance on contract support, it 
is more important than ever to effectively manage contracts in order to ensure taxpayer 
dollars are spent responsibly by ensuring contractors provide the services promised. This 
section will discuss the financial risks, such as personnel, management, and oversight, or 
lack thereof, to organic or contract fuel supply operations. 
By increasing its worldwide defense posture and participating in long-term 
expeditionary operations such as OEF, the United States stretched its combat and combat 
support forces thin. At the same time, U.S. defense policy imposed a limit on the number 
of troops that would be allowed within the ISAF area of responsibility.202 In order to 
accomplish all necessary support missions and to budget for more combat troops, the 
DoD has entrusted contractors to bear greater responsibility to support military 
operations. Figure 18 shows the increasing role that contractors have played in U.S. 
military operations while Figure 19 shows a corresponding view of the increasing 
military operations abroad. Not only does contract support enable the DoD to deploy a 
greater number of combat forces in theater, it also enables it to provide fuel support more 
efficiently and with less overall manpower. Regardless if troop limits had been imposed 
or not, using organic forces to deliver fuel to U.S. forces in ISAF would have required the 
U.S. Army to deploy 9,103 Soldiers and 2,760 fuel tanker trucks – 4 times more fuel 
trucks than the Army had in its entire inventory.203 These figures represent only the U.S. 






202. During the 2009/2010 USCENTCOM Movement Planning Conferences for the 2010 U.S./NATO 
Surge, U.S. national policy set specific U.S. troop limitations. This forced commanders at all levels to 
prioritize combat forces ahead of support forces in order to meet the needs of the supported commander, 
COMISAF. M.J.Evans. 
203. Jeffrey B. Carra and David Ray, “Evolution of Petroleum Support in the U.S. Central Command 






Figure 18.  The Growth of the Contractors on the Battlefield.204 
 
204. From: Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, Contracting in Conflict: The Path to Reform, 
Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2010, 9. 
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Figure 19.  Major U.S. Military Operations Abroad Lasting More Than One Year.205 
Cost risks are based on various figures and are important to leaders at all levels. 
Two key figures of concern to OEF stakeholders are DLA Energy’s “standard price” and 
the NATO fuel BOA PPL. The DLA Energy “standard price” is the worldwide flat-rate 
price per gallon for each commodity sold to DoD customers, and includes the fuel cost, 
inter-theater transportation costs, DLA Energy overhead costs, associated strategic fuels 
infrastructure, oversight programs, and personnel; however, it does not account for the 
costs to manage, store, and distribute fuel within the theater that are provided under 
LOGCAP and other contracts. The NATO fuel BOA PPL includes not only the standard 
price of fuel, but also all theater level infrastructure, personnel, inter- and intra-theater 
transportation, management, storage, and distribution services. The standard price and the 
PPL represent a pump cost such as at a local gas station, and are most relevant to a 
tactical customer because they are the price that they actually pay for a unit of fuel. The 
NATO fuel BOA PPL is all-inclusive and represents all associated costs for supplying 
and delivering fuel. The DLA Energy price, while much lower than the NATO fuel BOA 
prices, is not all-inclusive and does not represent the total cost of providing fuel to the 
tactical customer. Those additional costs can be most closely compared to the FBCF. 
 
205. From: The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming 
Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime 
Contracting, 2011, 17. 
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evolved over the last decade and the number of contractors and the scope of their 
work overwhelmed the government’s capacity to manage them e!ectively. 
The use of contractors in the United States’ earlier contingencies did not 
overtax agencies’ capacity to support, manage, and oversee them because the 
contingencies’ scope or duration were comparatively smaller or shorter than the 
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 However, in every year of the past 23 
years, the United States has been engaged in an overseas-contingency operation. 
For the past 12 years, the United States has always and simultaneously been 
engaged in two or more overseas regions. 
The United States has engaged in 56 “ventures abroad” for other than normal 
peacetime purposes since 1962, and Figure 1 illustrates that the United States has 
conducted 10 land-based deployments lasting a year or more during this time 
period. 3 
)LJXUH86)RUFHV$EURDGWKURXJK
Source: Commission analysis of CRS Report R41677, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces 
Abroad, 1798-2010,” March 10, 2011. 
2. The scope and durati n of previous contingencies are outlined in CRS Report R41677, “Instances of Use 
of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010,” March 10, 2011. 
3. Ibid., 1. Note: Ventures abroad include those “instances in which the United St tes has utilized military 
forces abroad in situations of military con"ict or potential con"ict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. 
interests.”
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The concept of the “fully burdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) warrants discussion early 
in this section regarding costs. The FBCF is a metric that attempts to determine the actual 
cost to the U.S. government to deliver a gallon of fuel to fielded forces. In response to the 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 2009, which mandated that all 
defense related weapons systems purchases include the FBCF, defense officials, policy 
makers and academics have debated exactly what figures into it.206 The FCBF is defined 
as “the commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and assets required to 
move and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the point at which the fuel is received 
from the commercial supplier to the point of use.”207 The FBCF even includes the cost of 
the fuel burned to transport the fuel to its final destination. With all the attention given to 
the FBCF, however, there is still no consensus on how to appropriately determine it, 
although estimates of the FBCF vary between nine and 45 dollars per gallon, depending 
on the situation.208 The FBCF is a relevant figure for determining the final cost of new 
systems for long-term acquisitions and budget strategies, but it overly complicates fairly 
simple logistics calculations. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the FBCF is an 
important concept to consider when comparing the DLA Energy price to the NATO fuel 
BOA price. 
 
206. United States Congress. House Committee on Armed Services. Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009: committee print of the House of Representatives Committee on 
Armed Services: joint explanatory statement to accompany S. 3001. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008. 
Accessed August 15, 2012. 
207. United States Congress. House Committee on Armed Services. Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009: committee print of the House of Representatives Committee on 
Armed Services: joint explanatory statement to accompany S. 3001. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008. 
Accessed August 15, 2012. 
208. For the most recent cost estimations provided to the U.S. Congress for Afghanistan fuel see 
Moshe Schwartz, Katherine Blakely, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Department of Defense Energy Initiatives: 
Background and Issues for Congress,” Report to Congress No R42558 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, June 5, 2012): 6–7, accessed July 28, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/ 
R42558.pdf.; The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan developed the most 
comprehensive breakdown of personnel costs related to U.S. fuel operations see their final report to the 
U.S. Congress, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: 
Commission on Wartime Contracting, August 2011, Appendix F.; For a non-government estimation of 
Afghanistan/Iraq fuel costs see Admiral (ret.) U.S. Navy John B. Nathman, “Powering America’s Defense: 
Energy and the Risks to National Security” (presentation at the Environmental and Energy Studies Institute 
Energy, National Security and Defense Department Solutions Conference, September 10, 2009) accessed 
July 28, 2012, http://www.eesi.org/energy-national-security-and-defense-department-solutions-10-sep-
2009. 
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Although those additional costs above and beyond the DLA Energy standard price 
are of no concern to a tactical customer, they should be an important consideration for 
strategic decision makers within the DoD when choosing whether to provide traditional 
fuel support or contractor services. Because certain additional costs have already been 
absorbed by other agencies’ budgets and personnel/manpower systems within the DoD, 
recalculating these expenses would be redundant and create an artificially inflated 
value.209 Because of this, and because of the difficulty in accurately determining the 
FBCF, there is no all-inclusive U.S. fuel price against which decision makers can 
compare the all-inclusive NATO fuel BOA PPL. That is of no consequence to the tactical 
customer, however; what concerns the tactical customer is the price of a unit of fuel on 
the invoice. 
Figure 20 compares the cost of fuel provided by the United States and NATO in 
Afghanistan. All U.S. figures have been converted to liters. The two sets of lines, solid 
and dashed, compare DLA Energy, Supreme, and NCS jet fuel costs. The lower set 
compares the DLA “standard price” to the NATO contractor’s landed costs, and shows 
that the DLA Energy standard price is far less expensive than that of either Supreme or 
NCS. The U.S. has tremendous buying power and influence over international fuel 
markets that makes it difficult for any nation or agency to provide comparable prices at 
this level. However, the NATO fuel BOA contractors provide fuel and all related services 
for a PPL, instead of simply the standard price alone. 
 
209. Moshe Schwartz, Katherine Blakely, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Department of Defense Energy 
Initiatives: Background and Issues for Congress,” Report to Congress No R42558 (Washington, DC: 




Figure 20.  Comparison of DLA Energy, Supreme, NCS Fuel Costs, Current as of 
August 2012.210 
The top three lines of Figure 21 represent the actual cost of fuel invoiced by the 
NATO contractors and the price of fuel under the NATO fuel BOA as leveled by DLA 
Energy for its U.S. customers. The large disparity between the DLA Energy standard 
price and the NATO fuel BOA PPL has led some to questions whether NATO contractors 
were overcharging for fuel. Although DLA Energy’s fuel support may appear to be a 
better bargain, it carries significant additional costs that are not reflected in the standard 
price, whereas the NATO fuel BOA contract price is all-inclusive. The NATO fuel BOA 
PPL more accurately reflects their true “cost” of providing that service, while the DLA 
Energy standard price is what they “charge” to the customer, and not the actual total cost 
of a gallon of fuel to the U.S. government. Like the FBCF, there is no consensus on how 
to account for all additional costs above the DLA Energy standard price. Therefore, there 
 
210. After: Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe, (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Charts overall pricing Supreme and NCS 18-07-2012,” July 
18, 2012; Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “DLA Energy Standard Prices,” http://www.energy.dla.mil/ 
DLA_finance_energy/Pages/dlafp03.aspx, accessed August 26, 2012; The appendix at the end of this thesis 



















































































































































are no means to compare an official U.S. price to that of the NATO fuel BOA 
contractor’s prices. Figure 21 presents a compilation of representative FBCF calculations 
for U.S. and NATO fuel operations in USCENTCOM. The most conservative estimate of 
the U.S. FBCF is more expensive than the NATO fuel BOA. Although DLA Energy may 
be able to provide the least expensive gallon of fuel, no other nation or agency can 
currently match the cost savings provided by the NATO fuel BOA. 
 
Figure 21.  Cost Comparison of NATO PPL and U.S. FBCF Estimate Figures that 
Excludes FOB Costs.211 
 
211. After: Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe, (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Charts overall pricing Supreme and NCS 18-07-2012,” July 
18, 2012; Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “DLA Energy Standard Prices,” http://www.energy.dla.mil/ 
DLA_finance_energy/Pages/dlafp03.aspx, accessed August 26, 2012; Charles F. Wald, and Tom Captain, 
“Energy Security American’s Best Defense: A Study of Increasing Dependence on Fossil Fuels in 
Wartime, and Its Contribution to Ever Higher Casualty Rates,” Deloitte Development LCC, 2009, 19; 
Steve Siegel, Steve Bell, Scott Dicke, and Peter Arbuckle, “Sustain the Mission Project: Energy and Water 
Costing Methodology and Decision Support Tool,” Army Environmental Policy Institute Final Technical 
Report, National Defense Center for Energy and Environment, July 2008, 8; The appendix at the end of this 


























































































































For those member nations to which U.S. fuel support was unavailable, however, 
the NATO fuel BOA became the only viable solution. Not only was it cost-effective for 
the nation, but exercising the BOA appeared to be the only feasible method for NATO to 
overcome the drawbacks of lacking programmed funding, sufficient personnel, and a role 
specialist nation to plan and execute fuel support for member nations. Although the DLA 
Energy standard price outcompetes the NATO fuel BOA landed cost, U.S. forces may 
find that there are benefits to using NATO contract fuel support. Indeed, the DoD has 
long established policy, which advocates the use of NATO, host nation and contract 
logistics to enable U.S. forces to “live off the land” rather than drag along its own 
cumbersome logistics train. The decision for some U.S. units to use the NATO fuel BOA 
in 2009 was consistent with U.S. policy of mutual logistics support among NATO 
nations.212 The DoD also directs its components to “make maximum use of commercial 
and host-nation sources of supply to meet peacetime and wartime requirements” as well 
as to “minimize Government-owned fuel infrastructure on military installations to the 
maximum extent possible through the use of commercial assets and privatization of 
existing infrastructure…”213 The practice of “hiring local” aids U.S. counterinsurgency 
efforts by boosting the local economy and employing young men who may otherwise 
participate in an insurgency because of their perceived lack of options.214 By making 
greater use of contractors and host nation resources, not only does the DoD eliminate its 
long logistics trail and conserve resources, but it also keeps more U.S. service men and 
women, its “national treasure,” out of harm’s way.  
As contractors share more of the battlefield with service members, they also share 
more of the risks of war. Regardless if leadership chooses to use organic or contract fuel 
support, both options run the significant risk of losing personnel, equipment, materiel and 
fuel product due to insurgent attack and transport over difficult terrain. Logistics convoys 
 
212. Department of Defense Directive 2010.8, “Department of Defense Policy for NATO Logistics,” 
November 12, 1986. 
213. Department of Defense Directive 4140.25, “DoD Management Policy for Energy Commodities 
and Related Services,” April 12, 2004. 
214. Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, Contracting in Conflict: The Path to Reform (Washington: 
Center for a New American Security, 2010), 22. 
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are frequent targets of attack by ambush and improvised-explosive devices. U.S. 
Transportation Command estimates that ground convoys suffered over 1,100 attacks, 
while U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps officials estimate that between 10 and 20 per 
cent of battlefield casualties are related to ground resupply operations.215 From 2003-
2007, more than 3,000 U.S. servicemen and contractors were injured or killed in fuel 
supply convoys.216 DoD officials reported that in June 2008, for example, 44 trucks and 
220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other events.217 Overall, more than 
1,600 servicemen and 750 contractors have been killed in Afghanistan between 2003 and 
2011.218 The U.S. has paid a heavy price for its dependency on fuel and on contract 
logistics, both in lives and in dollars. Whereas relying on contractors can reduce the cost 
on service members’ lives, improving management and oversight of contracts can also 
save the government millions, if not billions, of dollars. 
Choosing and managing contracts wisely can mitigate the risks and costs of 
failure. By its nature, the NATO fuel BOA represents a theoretical single point of failure 
risk. The BOAs employ two major companies, but one of them, Supreme Fuels Gmbh & 
Company KG, supplies 85 percent of all fuel to NATO.219 Because the BOAs are 
inclusive agreements, the greater portion of NATO’s ISAF fuel stocks, distribution 
network, and infrastructure management are dependent on the success of a single 
company. The concept of a single point of failure can be misleading, however. NATO 
contractors, like Supreme Fuels and Nordic Camp Supply, are brokers of fuel services. 
 
215. Moshe Schwartz, Katherine Blakely, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Department of Defense Energy 
Initiatives: Background and Issues for Congress,” Report to Congress No R42558 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2012): 12, accessed July 28, 2012, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42558.pdf. 
216. Moshe Schwartz, Katherine Blakely, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Department of Defense Energy 
Initiatives: Background and Issues for Congress,” Report to Congress No R42558 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2012): 12, accessed July 28, 2012, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42558.pdf. 
217. Government Accountability Office, “Defense Management: DoD Needs to Increase Attention on 
Fuel Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations,” GAO 09-300. Washington, D.C.: February 
2009, 8. 
218. Catherine Lutz, “U.S. and Coalition Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Brown University: 
Watson Institute, June 13, 2011: 1, accessed August 20, 2012, http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files 
/articles/11/attachments/Lutz%20US%20and%20Coalition%20Casualties.pdf 
219. Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force (ret.) Donald Gulledge (DLA Energy Representative to JFC 
HQ Brunssum), “NATO BOA Fact Sheet,” e-mail to authors October 27, 2011. 
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They act as parent companies that coordinate a fuel supply network, and mitigate the risk 
of failure by diversifying fuel sources, transportation providers, and construction and 
maintenance firms.220 The risk of a company like Supreme failing through internal risk is 
quite limited compared to the risks it cannot control, such as political, environmental and 
terrorist threats. 
DLA Energy mitigates this single point failure risk by building multiple layers of 
strategic and tactical contracts that spread the U.S. ISAF fuel system across various 
contractors. Because of this redundancy, management and oversight responsibility is 
more widely spread among independent U.S. agencies such as DCMA and DCAA. In 
contrast, oversight of the NATO fuel BOA remains in the hands of a single agency. 
NATO must focus its efforts on ensuring the survivability of a single, critical company 
while the United States must concentrate its work on integrating oversight of multiple 
contracting efforts. In both approaches to contracting, proper management becomes key 
to mitigating risk. Improper manning or lack of skilled management and audit personnel 
imposes greater risk associated with the probability of failure than the default of a 
contractor. 
The number of contractors in theater has grown faster than the government’s 
ability to effectively manage and oversee them. The improper manning of management 
and contracting staffs has created a high risk of waste, fraud and abuse, and has actually 
increased dependence on contractors to oversee contracts. Lack of sufficient manpower 
and appropriate training has led to such systemic problems as inadequate planning, weak 
management and oversight of contractor performance, and insufficient recovery of over-
billings or questionable costs.221 As a result of these systemic problems, the U.S. 
Commission on War Time Contracting (the Commission) estimates that $31 to $60 
billion out of a total of $206 billion spent on contracts was wasted in Iraq and 
 
220. E-mail conversation between M.J. Evans and Mr. David Williams (Supreme Liaison to JFC HQ 
Brunssum) regarding Supreme risk management practices; Supreme Group declined to comment. 
221. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” Arlington: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011, 
83. 
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Afghanistan between 2002 and 2011.222 In contrast, NATO has not had the same level of 
oversight or audits as the U.S. contracting community. The NATO ISAF fuel team has 
depended heavily on the self-policing of contractors, so there is much unknown about the 
practices of the contractors and the operation of the NATO fuel BOAs. The only audit of 
the NATO fuel BOAs was recently conducted by the International Board of Auditor 
NATO and has not been publicly released. 
The Commission’s 2011 report to the U.S. Congress noted that U.S. contracting 
staffs were severely undermanned.223 Although the U.S. Army contracting corps retained 
a steady number of personnel from 1996-2005, the number of contract actions increased 
654 per cent while contract value increased 331 per cent.224 There is an insufficient 
number CORs in theater, and many complain of not being given enough time to oversee 
contracts as they often serve in that capacity as a secondary duty. In addition, many 
CORs are not acquisition professionals, and are not afforded appropriate training before 
deploying to theater.225 Not only were many personnel poorly trained, but frequent 
rotations in theater impacted contract management effectiveness. Short duration 
deployments did not afford enough time to gain or to retain a competent level of expertise 
in theater. The Commission’s report noted that short deployment cycles have put military 
and civil service personnel at a disadvantage to contractors, who tend to have more 
continuity, time in theater and knowledge of contracts and agreements.226 
 
222. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
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224. Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, Contracting in Conflict: The Path to Reform (Washington: 
Center for a New American Security, 2010), 14. 
225. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “At What Cost?” Interim 
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226. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Transforming Wartime 
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Because of insufficient manning and short deployment lengths, both the United 
States and NATO have been forced to contract for audit and oversight services. When 
NATO leadership sought a third-party contractor to audit and oversee the BOA, they 
further increased their dependency on contractors. Manpower shortfalls have also 
severely impacted the effectiveness of other DoD agencies. Between 1990 and 2006, 
DCMA workforce fell 60 per cent while the DoD relied on contractors more heavily than 
ever.227 DCAA’s personnel shortfall has delayed recovery of millions of dollars of 
possible overpayments to contractors. In addition, it has created an audit backlog that, at 
current staffing levels, will “continue to grow virtually unchecked and will exceed $1 
trillion in 2016.”228 Personnel shortfalls also prohibit the effective oversight of sub-
contractor performance, which contributes to waste. In one disappointing example, 
Afghan contractors that were hired under the Host Nation Trucking program hired 
Afghan private security contractors to protect its convoys. The subcontractor’s preferred 
method of securing the convoys was to pay the insurgents or warlords who control the 
roads the convoys must use.229 The Commission estimates that, next to the Afghan illicit 
drug trade, “extortion of funds from U.S. construction projects and transportation 
contracts is the insurgent’s second-largest funding source.”230 As part of its effort to 
improve contract oversight and reduce the cost of waste, fraud and abuse, the DoD will 
have to greatly increase the number of qualified CORs and defense contract oversight 
specialists.	  
Without organic military units to provide fuel support, the United States and 
NATO must depend on contractors if they wish to employ their forces abroad. The luxury 
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of maintaining WWII levels of theater support forces and control over the petroleum 
industry is currently not politically feasible. Some within the United States have even 
called for reinstating the military draft, but implementing a draft would not ensure that 
those forces will be allocated to logistic services, and may not address equipment 
shortfalls or national level imposed theater personnel limitations.231 In its final report, the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan recommended fifteen 
actions that Congress must take in order to improve the structures, policies, and resources 
for managing the contracting process and contractors, and to reduce fraud, waste and 
abuse. Leadership can do much to alleviate these problems by making wise decisions, by 
adhering to consistent and responsible policy, and by committing to building the 
manpower pool in order to responsibly oversee the contracting infrastructure it has 
created. 
D. CONCLUSION 
DLA Energy and NATO negotiated political and financial risks in a manner in 
which they felt would best benefit their mission to provide fuel to their forces in theater. 
One can compare the risks against the decisions that each entity made given its situation. 
Duplicitous politics within the United States demanded more from its military forces and 
contractors without allocating enough manpower to perform the mission properly. The 
financial impact of those decisions led to billions of dollars of waste. Despite those facts, 
fuel support operations were not cost prohibitive, even as the United States spent billions 
more than it had to in order to supply fuel and logistics solutions to its forces in OEF. The 
NATO ISAF fuel team found perhaps the only solution to their fuel support needs. 
Without funding and member nation commitment, it developed the BOA to provide a 
cost-effective and innovative fuel support solution. Nations could afford the pay as you 
go system, but could not afford to invest its national and financial treasures to support 
their operations in traditional ways. Their solutions fit the situation in which each entity 
found itself. Although both had its pros and cons, perhaps the lessons learned from one 
 
231. Josh Rogin, “McChrystal Says It’s Time to Bring Back the Draft,” Stars and Stripes, July 6, 2012, 
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approach can be used to improve the other. Or perhaps one approach is more applicable 
in certain situations than the other. Could the NATO fuel BOA be the new standard for 
multinational fuel support operations? Could the NATO fuel BOA be successful in, and 
could it be adopted for, U.S. unilateral operations? Or was it an anomaly that it was as 
successful as it was in OEF? The U.S. and NATO plan to leave Afghanistan by 2014, but 
there certainly will be more contingency operations to fight in the years that follow. In 
order to provide the most consistent and cost-effective strategy for future conflicts, we 
must take the best from the current conflict and apply those lessons learned in the next 
one. The next chapter will attempt to answer the questions posed above, and will provide 
policy recommendations for improvements for future contingency fuel operations. 
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A. THE NATO FUEL BOA: AN ISOLATED ANOMALY? 
The purpose of this thesis is to capture the history of the NATO logistics 
operation to supply fuel to ISAF, to highlight the success of and capture the lessons 
learned from the NATO fuel BOA, to understand the context of the NATO ISAF fuel 
case study as compared to similar historical examples of large-scale multinational fuel 
efforts, and to provide a model of logistic fuel support for future multinational and U.S. 
operations. Future conflicts will arise as national interests are threatened, and the nature 
of those conflicts will vary as a result of leadership decisions, the operating environment, 
military capabilities and availability of national resources. The BOA has been useful and 
versatile in the current multinational Allied conflict, and may well be a valuable option 
for future conflicts. U.S. fuel operations have not failed, but may benefit from applying 
the lessons learned from NATO ISAF fuel operations. By taking the best features of each 
process and strengthening current shortcomings, the United States can improve the 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of its current fuel support process. Unique strategic 
solutions must be driven by the nature of future conflicts. Regardless which approach is 
chosen, none will be as potentially successful without leadership-driven management and 
oversight. The final chapter reviews the creation of the NATO fuel BOA, discusses 
lessons learned, considers its suitability for the future, and provides recommendations for 
improvements to U.S. military fuel operations. 
The NATO fuel BOAs were born of necessity in a unique environment, but they 
also represented the inevitable end of a progression that began in WWII. The nature of 
the petroleum industry created a unique relationship between nations and industry. 
National control of industry was strongest during WWII, yet the Allied nations still 
depended heavily on their commercial partners’ expertise to extract, refine, and deliver 
petroleum products to theaters of war. The earliest beginnings of NATO showed that 
nations placed a primacy on national sovereignty. This led to years of national and 
Alliance policies that reduced organic logistics capabilities within national forces and the 
NATO command. 
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In addition to the historical context that has led to this option, Allied logistics 
decisions in OEF empowered NATO to create the fuel BOA. The NATO fuel BOAs 
emerged, in part, as an isolated anomaly as a result of these decisions. Key elements 
created a permissive context where NATO became a logistics role specialist nation that 
was on scale with its member nations, yet independent from the influence of their 
individual national policies. NATO accepted responsibility for the APODs at Herat, 
Kandahar, and Kabul, because no ISAF nation would provide the required fuel logistics 
for the airfields. To support the APODs, JFC HQ Brunssum chose to offer a BOA for fuel 
support instead of utilizing the more traditional logistics services that NSPA had long 
offered to NATO. The uniqueness of the NATO fuel BOA’s PPL system had a disarming 
effect on traditional NATO politics surrounding its military and political headquarters in 
Mons and Brussels, Belgium. The PPL allowed a small group of military and civilian 
logisticians to expand the NATO fuel BOA network with little to no political 
interference. 
The U.S. return in force to ISAF in 2009 provided the final contextual element. 
USCENTCOM made a conscious choice to use the NATO fuel BOA instead of DLA 
Energy services for its new force deployments. As part of this decision, USCENTCOM 
and JFC HQ Brunssum agreed to expand the NATO fuel BOA beyond the APODs and 
provided fuel service to the FOB level. Fuel distribution immediately doubled and 
continued to increase, while outreach extended further to an ever-widening tactical 
customer base. U.S. logisticians who were assigned to NATO facilitated the growth of 
the BOA, and reassured USCENTCOM and national leadership that they could consider 
the fuel BOA to be on par with DLA Energy’s fuel program. Figure 22 shows the 
resulting spike in NATO fuel BOA operations in 2009, and the subsequent growth that 
came with increasing forces and expanded service to ISAF FOBs. In the end, the BOA 
proved to be flexible, capable, and cost efficient. 
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Figure 22.  NATO Fuel BOA Growth from 2005 to 2011.232 
B. BOA CONCEPT FOR FUTURE COALITION OPERATIONS 
The emphasis on contract fuel operations was inevitable due to the progression of 
the Alliance defense establishments and the ability of fuel contractors to execute large-
scale logistics for the Alliance. The international commercial fuels industry has long been 
able to execute large-scale worldwide operations across hostile LOCs and within violent 
theaters of war, and is well suited to support national and Alliance fuel operations. There 
are now as many contractors in the OEF theater of operations as there are uniformed 
service members and, like their WWII counterparts, they have accepted their share of risk 
to accomplish the mission. In their final submission to the U.S. Congress, The Wartime 
Commission on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan noted that “contractor deaths, 
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Executing the BOA) “Fuel Concept on ISAF,” (Presentation to the Senior NATO Logisticians’ for ISAF, 
Brunssum, The Netherlands, May 15, 2012). 
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including local and third-country nationals, exceeded the military’s in both countries” 
between June 2009 and March 2011.233 
The NATO fuel BOAs provided a tangible example of contractor reliability, as 
well as NATO’s ability to conduct logistics operations. The BOA became successful in 
part because it may have been the only option that would enable NATO to provide fuel to 
ISAF nations. With no funding from the NATO common budgets, and no personnel 
commitment from member nations, the BOA enabled tactical customers to elect to 
receive fuel with no upfront costs. The BOA also owed it success to the unique 
personalities who managed the BOA at the right time and with the right connections to 
the U.S. logistics system and agencies. NATO proved the worth of a BOA and what a 
small team could accomplish; however, the political climate of NATO has changed little 
since Field Marshal Montgomery’s days. 
Over the course of the past months, the continued vacancy of the JFC HQ 
Brunssum Fuel Chief position has shown the weakness of personality-based success. The 
NATO fuel BOA has been compromised because NATO’s multinational politics has 
impeded fulfillment of this key position. Senior leadership within JFC HQ Brunssum and 
the NATO HQs at Mons and Brussels in Belgium are currently making decisions about 
the future of the fuel BOA. Many of these nations’ representatives have no stake in the 
BOA or ISAF other than their designation as NATO staff officers. Now that these more 
traditional NATO political bodies are moving to control it, the NATO staffs may find that 
the NATO fuel BOA is too great a task, and may quickly find means to remove the fuel 
BOA from their burden of staff work. 
This process has already started as the NATO staffs, against the advice of the JFC 
HQ Brunssum fuel staff and DLA Energy, have begun to seek a transfer of the NATO 
fuel BOA to NSPA. Negotiations are currently ongoing for transfer of contractor 
oversight to NSPA with options for a possible transfer of all BOA operations to 
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NSPA.234 Although NSPA has the manpower and capability to manage NATO fuel 
BOAs, transfer of agreement ownership will not relieve the core problem of poor top-
level logistics leadership within the NATO political and military chain of command. 
NATO has failed to properly manage high personnel rotation rates within the staffs, and 
it has not rectified the lack of manpower for key positions, nor has it addressed the 
diplomatic requirement to support contractors’ work within Afghanistan. In addition, 
U.S. patronage of the NATO fuel BOA was decisive in its success. U.S. logisticians 
provided the key personnel and liaisons to the JFC HQ Brunssum staff that enabled the 
NATO fuel BOA to succeed. Without the active support of its largest customer, the 
NATO fuel BOA cannot flourish as it once had. While the NATO fuel BOA showed that 
a NATO military staff could successfully manage and conduct long-term, larger scale 
logistics operations, the personalities who made it successful, its supporting patron, and 
the contextual setting cannot be guaranteed in future NATO staffs. 
BOAs on the scale of the NATO fuel BOA will not be manageable unless they are 
managed by an organization with robust infrastructure and capable, responsible 
leadership. Because of reduced NATO manpower, command capabilities, and lack of 
national support, BOAs within the current system of NATO leadership will only be 
sustainable on small scale, short-term operations that focus on supporting NATO 
expeditionary headquarters. Large-scale theater logistics operations are best conducted by 
a willing role specialist nation, under a single national commander with the required 
strategic and theater capabilities to support fielded expeditionary forces, whether they are 
organic fuel support forces or contract personnel. In the absence of a willing role 
specialist nation and capable NATO command leadership, NSPA’s stable staff and 
logistics capability present the best alternative to the NATO command or the NRF 
logistics staffs. With proper manning, and leadership-driven management and oversight, 
the United States may find features of the BOA useful in developing a cost-effective and 
efficient alternative for future U.S.-led operations. 
 
234. Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Army (ret.) Brian McMurry, telephone interview, July 18, 2012. 
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C. ADOPTING THE BOA FOR U.S.-LED OPERATIONS 
For the same reasons they were successful for ISAF, BOAs with fuel contractors 
could be an efficient and economical option for logistics planners in U.S.-led operations. 
In order for a fuel BOA to be an effective and efficient instrument, regardless of the scale 
and duration of conflict, it must have the advocacy of military and national leadership 
and must be managed responsibly. It is difficult to argue whether the NATO fuel BOA is 
more cost effective than DLA Energy fuel operations because the FBCF is so challenging 
to accurately estimate. However, the data representing the strategic U.S. estimates of the 
FBCF in the Appendix show that the BOA may be a smarter economic choice because it 
removes the requirement to fund all the additional costs of providing organic forces and 
infrastructure to supply fuel. Granted, DLA Energy and the U.S. military must remain 
prepared for a variety of security situations and cannot completely forsake their organic 
fuel assets or contingency storage requirements. As such, there will always be additional 
costs for which to account. 
That said, contractors, who have proven their worth throughout history, can 
enable the United States to largely eliminate its hefty logistics trail in theater. Not only 
would this option enable the United States to save money on equipment and 
infrastructure, but it would also allow it to apply a greater number of its military forces in 
combat roles. Other costs savings could come from continuing to buy bulk fuel “free-on-
board destination” to hedge against delays in delivery and product loss. Like the NATO 
fuel BOA, there would be no upfront costs, and the title of fuel would remain with the 
contractor, who absorbs the risk of loss until the fuel is delivered to the customer. In 
addition, DLA Energy can use its position as the world largest consumer of fuel to 
negotiate the lowest aggregate price of fuel possible for the tactical consumer. The U.S. 
can also leverage its technological strength and lead position in international politics in 
order to negotiate and overcome any limitations imposed by environmental or external 
political constraints. 
DLA Energy and the DoD are well capable of overcoming one of NATO’s major 
shortcomings in management of the BOA: understaffing and lack of a lead role specialist 
nation. DLA and DLA Energy have built decades of institutional knowledge and 
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expertise as the DoD lead for logistics, and have robust staffs worldwide to handle the 
work. DLA Energy liaisons are embedded in the U.S. military’s geographic combatant 
commands and can provide the support it would need to execute operations in any 
theater. Because of their relationship with industry and adept understanding of 
international fuel markets, contracting and oversight, DLA Energy is well suited to lead 
fuel procurement, contracting, distribution and oversight. Although the authors have 
criticized the DoD’s ability to provide responsible contract oversight, there is hope and 
direction for reform. The organizations and procedures are in place, but leadership has 
neither adequately staffed critically low contract oversight positions, nor enforced 
contracting instructions. Leadership alone is responsible to create change, and they must 
push for increases in well-trained manpower, and improvements in contracting integrity 
and contractor accountability in order to provide economical and effective contract 
solutions. 
Since the latter half of the 20th century, the gap between the number of 
contractors to uniformed service members in the theater of operations has closed. As the 
number of contractors has increased, the numbers and capabilities of DoD contract 
managers, auditors, contracting officers and contracting officer representatives has failed 
to keep pace. As a result, there has been too little oversight of defense contracts which 
has led to mission failure and billions lost due to waste, fraud, and abuse. The 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has recommended, among 
many other measures, that the DoD must increase the number of qualified and trained 
contract management specialists.235 The key to this contract reform is sound, responsible 
leadership. 
Regardless if top decision makers choose to continue using organic military fuel 
support or if they choose to use contract support more extensively, only strong leadership 
will make either option efficient and successful. Both options would require an increase 
in personnel which only national-level leadership can prioritize and authorize. As it 
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stands, DCMA and DCAA are sorely understaffed and have years of backlogged audits 
on billions worth of contracts. The military services lack the proper number of trained 
CORs to perform contract oversight in theater. Overworked contracting staffs often 
become victims of fraud, and often fail to properly inspect shoddy work that fails to meet 
the terms of a contract. Although the U.S. Congress complains about poor contract 
oversight and waste, it alone has the authority to enact the changes it seeks and place the 
proper amount of manpower and political focus against this problem. 
Leadership is absolutely key in providing the proper amount of manpower and 
oversight to realize cost-effectiveness and success in whichever approach it decides to 
take for fuel operations. In order to rely more heavily on organic military forces, 
leadership must make wise political decisions regarding the fielding and apportionment 
of manpower. Regardless to what extent contractors are employed, the burden of 
responsible oversight will always accompany decisions to employ defense contractors. 
By taking lessons from the NATO fuel BOA, the United States may realize significant 
savings by leaving its long logistics train at home and reducing its fuel support equipment 
and materiel inventory. In addition to saving on financial costs, the United States can also 
save on the cost of its more important “national treasures.” 
D. CONCLUSION: LEADERSHIP IS KEY 
On November 10, 1945, the U.S. Army-Navy Petroleum Board extended their 
great appreciation to the U.S. Petroleum Administration for War and the entire American 
petroleum industry for their significant contribution to the Alliance’s victory: 
by providing in full and on time the vast flood of petroleum products 
required by the Armed Forces during World War II. 
The fulfillment of this gigantic task was without question one of the great 
industrial accomplishments in the history of warfare. The urgent demands 
of the Army and the Navy for unprecedented volumes of aviation 
gasolines, motor gasoline, diesel oil, fuel oils, lubricants and countless 
other petroleum products vital to victory were unending and often 
appeared impossible of fulfillment. 
It is a very special tribute, therefore, that at no time did the Services lack 
for oil in proper quantities, in proper kinds and at the proper places. 
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Because of the resourcefulness, untiring and unceasing efforts, and 
outstanding accomplishments of the Petroleum Administration for War 
and the petroleum industry, not a single operation was delayed or impeded 
because of a lack of petroleum products. No Government agency and no 
branch of American industry achieved a prouder record.236 
Merchant shipping moved these products across dangerous lines of communication as 
part of, and complementary to, the petroleum industry and governmental managing 
agencies. Like their counterparts serving today’s Alliance in Afghanistan, the history of 
civilian fuel industry has proven that the contractor, in the face of hostile opposition, 
could meet and exceed the demands placed upon them. 
Although contractors have successfully executed these logistics operations, the 
dependence on contractors has been regarded as highly risky. Even in WWII, the large 
bureaucracies and nationalization programs were not able to completely remove this 
dependence factor and so the Alliance had to depend heavily on industry to find, extract, 
refine, and transport petroleum for national and military use. Since WWII the course of 
this dependence has only increased. By the time ISAF operations commenced, Alliance 
logistics had neither the organic assets nor the command capability to physically handle 
theater fuel operations on the scale required in Afghanistan. ISAF nations had to depend 
on contractors on a scale never seen before in military operations. This dependence came 
as the direct result of Alliance and national policy decisions that reduced organic fuel 
logistics capabilities and undermined the Alliance’s capacity to coordinate and command 
national logistics. These were conscious choices that created dependency and self-
imposed risks. 
Dependence on contractor support for expeditionary operations has caused even 
greater self-imposed risk to nations due to their mismanagement of contract logistics 
operations. As in WWII, the Alliance and nations increased risk through poor 
management practices and political machinations that created internal national conflicts 
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of interest, and undermined the Alliance’s ability to manage fuel operations. By 
committing to worldwide operations, nations have overextended organic units’ abilities to 
meet fuel requirements for fielded forces. If those commitments are not curtailed, then 
nations must place greater attention on mitigating such self-imposed risks. The Chairman 
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the need for strategic planning and 
accountability by codifying these ideals in U.S. fuel doctrine:  
The GCC, subordinate JFCs, and supporting commanders must understand 
that contracting is not a “fire-and-forget” system. Contracting support to 
military operations requires significant planning and management efforts 
from both the contracting staff and the requiring activity. The JFC and 
component commanders must ensure that the requiring activities are 
properly trained and actively participate in the requirements generation 
and validation process.237 
The reality of today’s risk is that, like any other military weapon system or military unit, 
contractors require active support and proper management from their patrons for 
successful expeditionary operations. 
For the U.S., WWII was a four-year campaign that utilized the draft, coopted 
industry, and had little third party political interference affecting fuel operations. ISAF, in 
contrast, has been involved in OEF for more than 11 years. A near-total volunteer force 
and an independent industry supported ISAF with marked political interference from 
third parties that impacted Alliance and national fuel operations. The MTA and 
diplomatic border crossing struggles surrounding NATO ISAF fuel contractors revealed a 
new political risk never before faced. Sovereign nations, including Afghanistan, have 
been able to levy control over contractors and LOCs, thus increasing risks to Alliance 
operations. ISAF has shown that the political and diplomatic agencies of the Alliance 
must intercede on behalf of its contractors in order to protect the fuel supply to its fielded 
expeditionary forces. 
The long-term nature of ISAF operations and the aspects of managing a volunteer 
force have created additional risks to contracted fuel operations. The Alliance and nations 
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have established defense personnel management systems that, while politically 
sustainable, have created personnel rotation rates and manpower levels that are 
disadvantageous to long-term military operations. At all levels of operations there are 
sufficient mechanisms in place for oversight and management; however, these programs 
have suffered from both frequent personnel rotations rates and lack of adequate 
manpower. If nations and the Alliance are unable to maintain personnel in positions for 
longer terms and/or adequately man oversight and management positions, then such 
practices will only further exacerbate risk. Given the constraints of personnel resources, a 
concerted effort must then be placed on mitigating these risks by developing stable, long-
term management of contract operations. With proper manning levels, agencies like DLA 
Energy, NSPA, and DCMA could develop stable, long-term management. In order to be 
effective, however, they must also be able to extend their authority farther into the 
operational theaters of war, where high personnel rotation rates have weakened the 
management and oversight of contractors. 
For the foreseeable future, nations will be dependent on contractors and the 
petroleum industry to provide fuel to expeditionary forces. Fortunately, despite the 
shortcomings of nations and the Alliance, contractors and industry have proven their 
ability to supply fuel to expeditionary forces for more than 70 years. The relationship 
between contractors and defense establishments can remain advantageous to both parties 
if the requirement holders can correct poor management and oversight practices. In their 
final report to the U.S. Congress, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan wrote: 
Failure by Congress and the Executive Branch to heed a decade’s lessons 
on contingency contracting from Iraq and Afghanistan will not avert new 
contingencies. It will only ensure that additional billions of dollars of 
waste will occur and that U.S. objectives and standing in the world will 
suffer. Worse still, lives will be lost because of waste and 
mismanagement. The nation’s security demands nothing less than 
sweeping reform.238 
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Within the broader logistics community, including fuels, contracting and 
acquisition, etc., sweeping reform is not the answer. Before abandoning the current 
system and committing to reform, leadership must first enforce current regulations and 
contracting guidelines. Sweeping reform of agencies will not guarantee sufficient 
manning, nor will it ensure that the technical abilities of personnel will remain 
commensurate with the tasks required to manage and oversee contractors. Instead, 
responsible leadership and personal accountability is critical to ensuring that contracting 
programs have the proper levels of resources and oversight to be successful. U.S. Army 
Major General (ret.) Aubrey S. Newman wrote that “[t]here is no substitute for troop duty 
in a company as the foundation for command and leadership at all levels—which 
includes a basic understanding of how to establish supply discipline.”239 Military 
commanders and their civilian counter parts who manage logistics organizations at all 
levels have the primary responsibilities to exercise their duties correctly. Before 
executing sweeping changes, leaders must hold managers accountable to existing 
regulations and ensure that these managers properly train, equip, and man the logistics 
organizations already executing and overseeing support operations. 
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APPENDIX. U.S. AND NATO FUEL COST DATA 
The data provided is a capture from an Excel sheet used to calculate cost data 
presented in this thesis. Table 6 through Table 8 represent a continuous spread sheet that 
has been broken into larger images for readability. The first row of data provides the 
calculations used to convert DLA Energy and other U.S. figures into liter values. The 
gallon data has also been provided for reference, Table 8. U.S. FBCF data was derived 
from the U.S. PPL plus the cost per liter to deliver fuel to the FOB level. FBCF Data for 
“U.S. FBCF 1,” “U.S. FBCF 3,” and “U.S. FBCF 4” was derived from Figure 23 with the 
substitution of the actual monthly cost of DLA Energy fuel. FBCF Data for “U.S. FBCF 
2” was derived from Table 11 with the substitution of the actual monthly cost of DLA 
Energy fuel. As there is no official U.S. figure for the FBCF, the examples are 
representative of a conservative spectrum of FBCF estimates. Table 9 and Table 10 are 
from NATO data that was provided directly from JFC HQ Brunssum P&C staff records. 
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?GK%.. 921949;;;;;; 7236*6;;;;;;;;;;;; 123.1F;;;;;;;;;;;; ..23347;;;;;;;;;; F2*FF7;;;;;;;;;;;; F25.*1;;;;;;;;;;;;
(LA%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
(LM%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
$LN%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
-DJ%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
OEB%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
P@Q%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
"DE%.. 92*114;;;;;; 629F.1;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.63.;;;;;;;;;;;; .929416;;;;;;;;;; .2F746;;;;;;;;;;;; F2345*;;;;;;;;;;;;
(GA%.9 92*4.3;;;;;; 62.159;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.975;;;;;;;;;;;; .929F9.;;;;;;;;;; .2FF3.;;;;;;;;;;;; F23F1.;;;;;;;;;;;;
<DH%.9 92*4.3;;;;;; 62.159;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.975;;;;;;;;;;;; .929F9.;;;;;;;;;; .2FF3.;;;;;;;;;;;; F23F1.;;;;;;;;;;;;
?GI%.9 92*4.3;;;;;; 62.159;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.975;;;;;;;;;;;; .929F9.;;;;;;;;;; .2FF3.;;;;;;;;;;;; F23F1.;;;;;;;;;;;;
$JI%.9 92*4.3;;;;;; 62.159;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.975;;;;;;;;;;;; .929F9.;;;;;;;;;; .2FF3.;;;;;;;;;;;; F23F1.;;;;;;;;;;;;
?GK%.9 92*4.3;;;;;; 62.159;;;;;;;;;;;; 52.975;;;;;;;;;;;; .929F9.;;;;;;;;;; .2FF3.;;;;;;;;;;;; F23F1.;;;;;;;;;;;;
(LA%.9 92554*;;;;;; 62.F3.;;;;;;;;;;;; 52F111;;;;;;;;;;;; .92.77F;;;;;;;;;; F236.F;;;;;;;;;;;; F2*644;;;;;;;;;;;;
(LM%.9 92744F;;;;;; 7251*4;;;;;;;;;;;; 12596*;;;;;;;;;;;; ..2*F49;;;;;;;;;; F21.F9;;;;;;;;;;;; F2671*;;;;;;;;;;;;
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+FGG,E&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJIE+&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EF=HRE&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHEGJ&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FGH,,&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJGJ/&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFEEE,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&& +FHREH&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FGH,,&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJGJ/&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFEEE,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&& +FHREH&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FGH,,&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJGJ/&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFEEE,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&& +FHREH&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FGH,,&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJGJ/&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFEEE,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&& +FHREH&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FGH,,&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJGJ/&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFEEE,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&& +FHREH&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FGH,,&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FJGJ/&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFEEE,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FHI+R&&&&&&&& +FHREH&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FRII/&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FIHI+&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& =FGRI,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FG+IE&&&&&&&& +FG/I,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FRII/&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FIHI+&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& =FGRI,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FG+IE&&&&&&&& +FG/I,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FRII/&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& /FIHI+&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& =FGRI,&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FG+IE&&&&&&&& +FG/I,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FHJH+&&&&&&&&&&& /FG/G/&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& EFIH==&&&&&&&&&&&&& +F,/J+&&&&&&&& +F,=G=&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F/+J=&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFRG+R&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/,/J&&&&&&&& /F=+,,&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F+RGE&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFI/GJ&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/I/H&&&&&&&& /F/G+E&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F+RGE&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFI/GJ&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/I/H&&&&&&&& /F/G+E&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F+RGE&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFI/GJ&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/I/H&&&&&&&& /F/G+E&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F+RGE&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFI/GJ&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/I/H&&&&&&&& /F/G+E&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F+RGE&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JFI/GJ&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F/I/H&&&&&&&& /F/G+E&&&&&&&&&&&&&
/F++RI&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& JF=IHI&&&&&&&&&&&&& /F+HIH&&&&&&&& /F/+/R&&&&&&&&&&&&&
+FRJJR&&&&&&&&&&& /F,H/E&&&&&&&&&&&& =F+I=R&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& =FGE/I&&&&&&&&&&&&& +FR,GJ&&&&&&&& +FG+H+&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+, ''()**+,
=RL? =RI, =R,K ORK KRK /=RII HR/L =/=RHI HR==
=R?= =RKH =R,, ORK KRK? /=RO= HR== =/KR+I HR=L
=R?= =RKH =R,, ORK KRK? /=RO= HR== =/KR+I HR=L
=R?= =RKH =R,, ORK KRK? /=RO= HR== =/KR+I HR=L
=R?= =RKH =R,, ORK KRK? /=RO= HR== =/KR+I HR=L
=R?= =RKH =R,, ORK KRK? /=RO= HR== =/KR+I HR=L
=R?= =RKH =R,, ORK KRK? /=RO= HR== =/KR+I HR=L
=RHI =R/ =RI? ORK O /+RIL =ROL /L?RII =RL/
=RHI =R/ =RI? ORK O /+RIL =ROL /L?RII =RL/
=RHI =R/ =RI? ORK O /+RIL =ROL /L?RII =RL/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR+H =RL= HR=/ ORK LRLL /HRKO HRIO ==? HRK/
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR,K HRKK IR/? LRK LRLL /LRO? IRK/ =,LR=H IRK?
HR?= HRIH IR+I LRK LRLL /LR/ IRHO =?LRIK IRIH
HR?= HRIH IR+I LRK LRLL /LR/ IRHO =?LRIK IRIH
HR?= HRIH IR+I LRK LRLL /LR/ IRHO =?LRIK IRIH
HR?= HRIH IR+I LRK LRLL /LR/ IRHO =?LRIK IRIH
HR?= HRIH IR+I LRK LRLL /LR/ IRHO =?LRIK IRIH
HRO HR=H HR?/ LRK LRLL /OR/= IR// =L+R, IR/L
=RH/ =R+L =RII LRK LRLL /+RHI =ROI /LHR?H =RO?
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Table 9.   NATO Fuel BOA Monthly Equivalent “Standard Price” Per Liter (SPPL) in 
U.S. Dollars.240 
 
240. From: Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe, (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Charts overall pricing Supreme and NCS 18-07-2012,” July 
18, 2012. 
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Table 10.   NATO Fuel BOA Monthly Price Per Liter in U.S. Dollars.241 
 
241. From: Major Royal Dutch Marechaussee Wouter van Koeveringe, (JFC HQ Brunssum Purchasing 
and Contracting Officer Executing the BOA) “Charts overall pricing Supreme and NCS 18-07-2012,” July 
18, 2012. 
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Table 11.   Example Base Case FBCF in Theater (in Iraq) for a Stryker Brigade 
















242. From: Steve Siegel, Steve Bell, Scott Dicke, and Peter Arbuckle, “Sustain the Mission Project: 
Energy and Water Costing Methodology and Decision Support Tool,” Army Environmental Policy Institute 
Final Technical Report, National Defense Center for Energy and Environment, July 2008, 8. The authors 
calculated that the FBCF was $14.13 per gallon; however the figures they provided did not equal the value 
of $14.13. Using their figures the FBCF should be $15.74 + $3.14 (fuel cost) = $18.88 per gallon of fuel. 
The correct value of $15.74 was used to develop data for Column “U.S. FBCF2.” 
 
3. Ground convoy re-supply is conducted 100% by military (using 8,400 1 liter bottles per truck, 
40% of trip with air protection, and ground protection provided by MRAP). 
4. Water Re-supply Distances – 1,700 miles roundtrip (Port to Consuming Unit). 
5. Re-supply is conducted 100% by military. 
6. SBCT (and sustainment brigade) water consumption - 90% provided by commercially-bottled 
water, 10% ROWPU. 
 
3.2.3 Base Case:  Training Base 
 
1. The consuming unit is comprised of 3,972 soldiers (SBCT). 
2. The unit is training at Ft. Lewis. 
3. All water consumed is provided by installation infrastructure. 
 
 
4 Illustration of SMP Tool Calculations and Analyses 
 
4.1 Case Study - Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in Iraq (Base Case) 
 
To illustrate the types of output produced by the Alpha SMP Tool, the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) 
results for the Base Case Scenario (Iraq) are shown below as an example.  This scenario is based on the 
assumptions outlined in Section 3.1.1 and is included in the Alpha SMP Tool.  Table 3 presents a 
summary of the FBCF cost component outputs in the Iraq Base Case Scenario.  Appendix A describes 
the steps used to calculate the FBCF in the Iraq Base Case.  The total FBCF calculated in the Iraq Base 
Case Scenario is $14.13 per gallon. 
 
Table 3.  Base Case FBCF in Theater (in Iraq) 
 
Cost Components Annual Cost Base Case % of FBCF $ Per Gallon 
Force Protection (Air)  $                 5,163,788.99  15.5%  $             2.19  
Force Protection (Ground)  $                 2,823,413.83  8.5%  $             1.20  
Transport  $               11,189,210.80  33.6%  $             4.75  
  Resupply  $               10,564,739.00  31.7%  $             4.48  
  Initial Deployment  $                    579,656.31  1.7%  $             0.25  
  Relocation  $                      44,815.50  0.1%  $             0.02  
  Return   0.0%  $                 -    
Fuel Support Military Personnel in SBCT  $                 5,737,231.63  17.2%  $             2.43  
Fuel Support Equipment in SBCT  $                    432,488.07  1.3%  $             0.18  
Sustainment Brigade/TSC  $                    571,155.90  1.7%  $             0.24  
Fuel Commodity  $                 7,402,829.15  22.2%  $             3.14  
    
Summary Statistic Value 
 FBCF Annual Cost for SBCT   $                    33,320,118  
 Annual Gallons Consumed by SBCT                           2,357,589  
 FBCF per Soldier   $                             8,389  
 FBCF per SBCT  $                    33,320,118  
 FBCF per Gallon   $                             14.13  
 










Figure 23.  U.S. FBCF Data.243 
 
243. From: Charles F. Wald, and Tom Captain, “Energy Security American’s Best Defense: A Study 
of Increasing Dependence on Fossil Fuels in Wartime, and Its Contribution to Ever Higher Casualty Rates,” 
Deloitte Development LCC, 2009, 19. 
Energy security America's best defense    19
Beyond the danger to lives — the most important issue 
raised here — there is the issue of cost. Beyond the basic 
purchase cost of fuel are other ‘hidden’ costs, including 
maintaining fuel transport equipment, training personnel, 
and maintaining and protecting the oil supply chain.  The 
military currently pays between $2 and $3 per gallon for fuel 
depending on market conditions.  The process of getting 
the fuel to its intended destination, even assuming that 
no protection is provided to the convoys during transport, 
increases the cost to nearly $15 a gallon. Protection of fuel 
convoys in combat zones requires an enormous show of 
force in the form of armored vehicles, helicopters, and fixed 
wing aircraft, forcing costs even higher. 
Protecting fuel convoys from the ground and air costs 
the DoD upward of 15 times the actual purchase cost 
of fuel, depending on the level of protection required 
by the convoy and the current market prices of the fuel 
commodity. Fuel costs grow exponentially as the delivery 
distance increases or when force protection is provided 
from air. 
The following chart illustrates the fully burdened costs 
of fuel and shows how high the cost is to protect and 
transport this fuel to its final destination, bringing the cost 
per gallon to almost $45 per gallon, compared to the 
average cost at the retail gas pump of approximately $3 
per gallon in 2009.
The business case for alternative energy development has 
rested first on the concept of a sustainable planet, resulting 
in reductions in hydrocarbons and other harmful emissions 
in the creation and use of fossil fuels. With the dramatic 
rise in the price of oil seen in 2008, and increased recogni-
tion that the oil supply may be limited, the business case 
has shifted emphasis to the economic benefit for devel-
oping and using renewable energy sources. 
This study demonstrates that the development and use of 
alternative energy can be a direct cause for reductions in 
wartime casualties and may rank on par with the business 
cases for development of ever more effective offensive 
weapons, sophisticated fuel transport tankers, mine resistant 
armored vehicles, and net-centric sensing technologies. 
Aerospace and Defense firms, their government 
customers, and research labs around the world are well 
positioned to accelerate the development and deployment 
of such technologies.   
Chart 15:    Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel
Source: “Sustain the Mission Project Energy Costing Methodology,” Steve Siegel, 
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